Import Packages
In [11]:
from sklearn.feature_extraction.text import TfidfVectorizer
import numpy as np
import avro.schema
from avro.datafile import DataFileReader
from avro.io import DatumReader
File Location
In [ ]:
file_location = "/Users/tdavid/Downloads/data.avro"
Read in Text from AVRO
In [12]:
data = []
reader = DataFileReader(open(file_location,"r"), DatumReader())
for user in reader:
data.append(user)
Clean Text
In [61]:
new_list = []
for i in range(0,len(data)):
s = data[i]['contents'].encode('utf-8').replace('\n',' ')
s1 = ' '.join(re.findall(r"[\w']+|[.,!?:;-]", s)).replace(' .','.').replace(' ,',',').replace(' : ',':').replace(' - ','-').replace(' ;',';').replace(' ?','?').replace(' !','!')
new_list.append(s1)
In [76]:
data[0]
Out[76]:
{u'author': u'Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivan11@state.gov>',
u'contents': u'UNCLASSIFIED\nU.S. Department of State\nCase No. F-2015-04841\nDoc No. C05739545\nDate: 05/13/2015\nSTATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.\nSUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.\nRELEASE IN FULL\nFrom: Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivan11@state.gov>\nSent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:16 AM\nTo:\nSubject: FW: Wow\nFrom: Brose, Christian (Armed Services) (mailto:Christian_Brose@armed-servic,essenate.govi\nSent: Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:09 AM\nTo: Sullivan, Jacob J\nSubject: Wow\nWhat a wonderful, strong and moving statement by your boss. please tell her how much Sen. McCain appreciated it. Me\ntoo\nUNCLASSIFIED\nU.S. Department of State\nCase No. F-2015-04841\nDoc No. C05739545\nDate: 05/13/2015\nSTATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.\nSUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045247\n\x0c',
u'hash': u'4b50305efee34a90a1b24b38733303dd',
u'part': 0,
u'title': u'hillary'}
Vectorize
In [63]:
vect = TfidfVectorizer()
td = vect.fit_transform(new_list)
Define Functions
In [64]:
def cosine_similarity(new_docs, old_docs):
"""
Returns a similarity matrix where the first row is an array of
similarities of the first new_doc compared with each of the old
docs.
"""
return new_docs*old_docs.T
def find_closest_matches(similarity_matrix, n_matches_to_return=1):
"""
Expects a dense array of the form [[1., .5, .2],
[.3, 1., .1],
[.2, .4, 1.]]
where rows correspond to similarities.
"""
top_indices = np.apply_along_axis(func1d=lambda x: x.argsort()[-n_matches_to_return:][::-1],
axis=1,
arr=similarity_matrix)
return top_indices
Similarities & Matches
In [65]:
similarities = cosine_similarity(td, td).todense()
matches = find_closest_matches(similarities, 2)
Calculations
In [67]:
enumerate(matches[:])
Out[67]:
<enumerate at 0x109e16190>
In [66]:
top_score = 0
for new_text, old_texts in enumerate(matches[:]):
max_score = max([float(similarities[[new_text],[ind]]) for ind in old_texts[1:]])
if top_score < max_score:
top_score = max_score
print max_score
similar_texts = [(float(similarities[[new_text],[ind]]), new_list[ind]) for ind in old_texts[1:]]
print new_list[new_text]
print similar_texts
print new_text, old_texts
print
0.53694635124
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739545 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN FULL From:Sullivan, Jacob J Sullivan11 state. gov Sent:Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:16 AM To:Subject:FW:Wow From:Brose, Christian Armed Services mailto:Christian_Brose armed-servic, essenate. govi Sent:Wednesday, September 12, 2012 10:09 AM To:Sullivan, Jacob J Subject:Wow What a wonderful, strong and moving statement by your boss. please tell her how much Sen. McCain appreciated it. Me too UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739545 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045247
[(0.5369463512398643, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B5 From:Schwerin, Daniel B SchwerinDB state. gov Sent:Friday, October 12, 2012 7:37 AM To:H; Sullivan, Jacob 1 Cc:Hanley, Monica R; Abedin, Huma Subject:RE:Ending of speech Attachments:HRC CSIS-v8. doc Here is a new version with the alternative ending and our other edits. Dan Original Message From:H rnailto:HDR22 clintonemail. com Sent:Friday, October 12, 2012 6:10 AM To:Sullivan, Jacob Cc:Schwerin, Daniel B Subject Re:Ending of speech Ok. I'll read the whole thing. Can you email it to me? Original Message---From:Sullivan, Jacob imailto:Sullivanii state. govj Sent:Friday, October 12, 2012 12:56 AM To:H Cc:Schwerin, Daniel B SchwerinDa state. gov Subject:Ending of speech B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045670 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 1 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 3 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045671 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON REMARKS ON THE MAGHREB IN TRANSITION AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES WASHINGTON, DC OCTOBER 12, 2012 B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045672 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045673 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045674 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045675 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045676 B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045677 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045678 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045679 B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045680 B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045681 B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045682 B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045683 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045684 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. B5 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739685 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045685")]
0 [ 0 108]
0.941235546951
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent:To:Subject:Attachments:B6 Thursday, March 3, 2011 9:45 PM H:Latest How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311. docx; hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311. docx CONFIDENTIAL March 3, 2011 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Syria aiding Qaddafi This memo has two parts. Part one is the report that Syria is providing air support for Qaddafi. Part two is a note to Cody from Lord David Owen, former UK foreign secretary on his views of an increasingly complex crisis. It seems that the situation is developing into a protracted civil war with various nations backing opposing sides with unforeseen consequences. Under these circumstances the crucial challenge is to deprive Qaddafi of his strategic depth his support both financial and military. I. Report During the afternoon of March 3, advisers to Muammar Qaddafi stated privately that the Libyan Leader has decided that civil war is inevitable, pitting troops and mercenary troops loyal to him against the rebel forces gathering around Benghazi. Qaddafi is convinced that these rebels are being supported by the United States, Western Europe and Israel. On March 2 Qaddafi told his son Saif al-Islam that he believes the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, and France have deployed paramilitary officers to Benghazi to assist in organizing, training, and equipping opposition forces. Qaddafi is convinced that the National Libyan Council NLC, and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Galil have been chosen by the foreign powers to replace him. On March 1 advisors to Qaddafi stated that UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045000 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Qaddafi's cousin, Col. Ali Qaddafiddam had failed in efforts to recruit fighters among the Egyptian population living immediately across the border with Libya. These individuals added that during the week of February 21 the Libyan Leader spoke to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad on at least three occasions by secure telephone lines. During the conversations Qaddafi asked that Syrian officers and technicians currently training the Libyan Air Force be placed under command of the Libyan Army and allowed to fight against the rebel forces. Source Comment:Senior Libyan Army officers still loyal to Qaddafi added that On February 23, President Assad told General Isam Hallaq, the commander in chief of the Syrian Air Force, to instruct the pilots and technicians in Tripoli to help the Libyan regime, should full scale Civil War breaks out in the immediate future. On March 2, a military officer with ties to Qaddfi's son Khamis stated privately that the number of Libyan pilots defecting to the opposition has destroyed the morale and professional spirit of the Libyan Air Force at this critical moment, when Tripoli's air superiority is its principal weapon against insurgents. In the opinion of this individual Qaddafi and his senior military advisors are convinced that the European Union and the U. S will impose a no-fly zone over Libya in the immediate future. These advisors believe that the no fly zone will serve as air support for opposition forces. They are also prepared for the Western allies to bomb anti-aircraft facilities in and around Tripoli in preparation for the establishment of the no-fly zone. Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa is convinced that that Russia and Turkey will oppose the move, and may prevent the implementation of the no fly zone. The Syrian soldiers in Libya are part of a mission established in 1984 following the signing of a military agreement between Qaddafi and Syria's long-time ruler and Bashir's father, Hafez al-Assad, in the presence of General Soubhi Haddad, who was the commander in chief of the Air Force at the time. Both Air Forces are equipped with Russian materiel and have had long-standing, close links with Moscow. Note from David Owen, former UK foreign secretary UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045001 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. In exchange for Syria's help, Libya provided financial support to the Syrian state, including funds in support of operations carried out by the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon. Libyan money helped Hafez al-Assad bribe his brother Rifaat, the author of an attempted coup d'etat in 1983, to leave the country and go into exile in Spain and France, where he has remained ever since. According to individuals with access to the Syrian military, Damascus has also sent a second team of pilots and technicians to Tripoli. These are lower-ranking officers loyal to the regime who are specialized in flying helicopters. Before their departure for Tripoli on February 23, they met with General Allaq and General Jamil Hasan, head of Air Force's Intelligence. Source Comment:During the afternoon of 3 March, an associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi stated that he and the Libyan leaders other family members were concerned over the announcement of Jose Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court ICC, announced that he was investigating Qaddafi, his sons Khamis, the commander of the 32 battalion, and Montasem, as well as the head of Gadhafi's personal security detail, the Director-General of the External Security Organization Abuzaid Dorda, the spokesman of the regime Musa Ibrahim, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mousa Kousa. This source added that Saif al-Islam had said that Qaddafi himself found the announcement amusing. From:Lord Owen Cody, Realistically the UN will not authorise a no fly zone while Gaddafi continues to hold off bombing and strafing but keeping it up front and on the military agenda keeps him worried. Yet for a few frustrating months that ambivalence kept the Serbian aeroplanes on the ground before we acted. My hope is that preparations continue with visuals of planes flying off carriers, airborne early warning planes flying and people with clout outside the Administration demanding preparations. But and it is a big BUT what else can and should we be doing? Encourage humanitarian ships and convoys from Egypt to bring in supplies since we must ensure the cities in the East can hold up living standards, maybe for months. More adventurous, Egyptian Special Forces to go in and advise, even supplying hand held missiles. It appears they have few missiles; the military in the East having been deliberately kept ill-equipped. There is old Nasserite sentiment for a Federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. I know some will say Egypt has enough problems and they should stay resolutely focused on domestic reforms. it is delicate but words alone and the balance of advantage will slip to Gaddafi. A Gaddafi victory is possible and needs to be weighed in the balance now when deciding what to do. I'm more worried than I am ready to say publicly. Yours David UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045002
[(0.9412355469506928, "B6 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739561 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent:To:Subject:Attachments:H hrod17 clintonemail. corn Friday, March 11, 2011 1:36 PM Huma Abedin Fw:H:Latest:How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid hrc memo Syria aiding libya 030311. docx Pis print. From:Sent:Thursday, March 03, 2011 09:45 PM To:H Subject:H:Latest:How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid CONFIDENTIAL March 3, 2011 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Syria aiding Qaddafi This memo has two parts. Part one is the report that Syria is providing air support for Qaddafi. Part two is a note to Cody from Lord David Owen, former UK foreign secretary on his views of an increasingly complex crisis. It seems that the situation is developing into a protracted civil war with various nations backing opposing sides with unforeseen consequences. Under these circumstances the crucial challenge is to deprive Qaddafi of his strategic depth-- his support both financial and military. I. Report During the afternoon of March 3, advisers to Muammar Qaddafi stated privately that the Libyan Leader has decided that civil war is inevitable, pitting troops and mercenary troops loyal to him against the rebel forces gathering around Benghazi. Qaddafi is convinced that these rebels are being supported by the United States, Western Europe and Israel. On March 2 Qaddafi told his son Saif al-Islam that he believes the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739561 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045007 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739561 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Egypt, and France have deployed paramilitary officers to Benghazi to assist in organizing, training, and equipping opposition forces. Qaddafi is convinced that the National Libyan Council NLC, and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Galil have been chosen by the foreign powers to replace him. On March 1 advisors to Qaddafi stated that Qaddafi's cousin, Col. Ali Qaddafiddam had failed in efforts to recruit fighters among the Egyptian population living immediately across the border with Libya. These individuals added that during the week of February 21 the Libyan Leader spoke to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad on at least three occasions by secure telephone lines. During the conversations Qaddafi asked that Syrian officers and technicians currently training the Libyan Air Force be placed under command of the Libyan Army and allowed to fight against the rebel forces. Source Comment:Senior Libyan Army officers still loyal to Qaddafi added that On February 23, President Assad told General Isam HaIlaq, the commander in chief of the Syrian Air Force, to instruct the pilots and technicians in Tripoli to help the Libyan regime, should full scale Civil War breaks out in the immediate future. On March 2, a military officer with ties to Qaddfi's son Khamis stated privately that the number of Libyan pilots defecting to the opposition has destroyed the morale and professional spirit of the Libyan Air Force at this critical moment, when Tripoli's air superiority is its principal weapon against insurgents. In the opinion of this individual Qaddafi and his senior military advisors are convinced that the European Union and the U. S will impose a no-fly zone over Libya in the immediate future. These advisors believe that the no fly zone will serve as air support for opposition forces. They are also prepared for the Western allies to bomb anti-aircraft facilities in and around Tripoli in preparation for the establishment of the no-fly zone. Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa is convinced that that Russia and Turkey will oppose the move, and may prevent the implementation of the no fly zone. The Syrian soldiers in Libya are part of a mission established in 1984 following the signing of a military agreement between Qaddafi and Syria's long-time ruler and Bashir's father, Hafez al-UNCLASSIFIED Note from David Owen, former UK foreign secretary U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739561 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. Date:05 13 2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045008 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739561 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Assad, in the presence of General Soubhi Haddad, who was the commander in chief of the Air Force at the time. Both Air Forces are equipped with Russian materiel and have had long-standing, close links with Moscow. In exchange for Syria's help, Libya provided financial support to the Syrian state, including funds in support of operations carried out by the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon. Libyan money helped Hafez al-Assad bribe his brother Rifaat, the author of an attempted coup d'etat in 1983, to leave the country and go into exile in Spain and France, where he has remained ever since. According to individuals with access to the Syrian military, Damascus has also sent a second team of pilots and technicians to Tripoli. These are lower-ranking officers loyal to the regime who are specialized in flying helicopters. Before their departure for Tripoli on February 23, they met with General Allaq and General Jamil Hasan, head of Air Force's Intelligence. Source Comment:During the afternoon of 3 March, an associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi stated that he and the Libyan leaders other family members were concerned over the announcement of Jose Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court ICC, announced that he was investigating Qaddafi, his sons Khamis, the commander of the 32 battalion, and Montasem, as well as the head ofGadhaffs personal security detail, the Director-General of the External Security Organization Abuzaid Dorda, the spokesman of the regime Musa Ibrahim, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mousa Kousa. This source added that Saif al-Islam had said that Qaddafi himself found the announcement amusing. From:Lord Owen Cody, Realistically the UN will not authorise a no fly zone while Gaddafi continues to hold off bombing and strafing but keeping it up front and on the military agenda keeps him worried. Yet for a few frustrating months that ambivalence kept the Serbian aeroplanes on the ground before we acted. My hope is that preparations continue with visuals of planes flying off carriers, airborne early warning planes flying and people with clout outside the Administration demanding preparations. But and it is a big BUT what else can and should we be doing? Encourage humanitarian ships and convoys from Egypt to bring in supplies since we must ensure the cities in the East can hold up living standards, maybe for months. More adventurous, Egyptian Special Forces to go in and advise, even supplying hand held missiles. It appears they have few missiles; the military in the East having been deliberately kept ill-equipped. There is old Nasserite sentiment for a Federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. I know some will say Egypt has enough problems and they should stay resolutely focused on domestic reforms. it is delicate but words alone and the balance of advantage will slip to Gaddafi. A Gaddafi UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No F-2015-04841 Doc No C05739561 STATE DEPT-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM Date 05 13 2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS NO FOIA WAIVER STATE-SCB0045009 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739561 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. victory is possible and needs to be weighed in the balance now when deciding what to do. Pm more worried than I am ready to say publicly. Yours David UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739561 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045010")]
1 [1 7]
0.952809617723
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739580 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:H hrod17 clintonemaiLcom Sent:Wednesday, September 12, 2012 11:30 PM To:'Russorv stategov' Subject:Fw:H:Magariaf on attack on US in Libya. Sid Attachments:hrc memo magariat attack on US in Libya 091212. docx Pis print. From:Sidney Blumenthal malt Sent Wednesday, September 12, 2012 12:50 AM To:H Subject:H:Magariaf on attack on US in Libya. Sid CONFIDENTIAL September 12, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Magariaf and the attack on US in Libya SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During the afternoon of September 11, 2012 new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf spoke in private with senior advisors, including the members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on U. S. missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to a sensitive source, el Magariaf was shaken by the attacks, and gave permission to commanders on the ground for security forces to open fire over the heads of the crowds in an effort to break up mobs attacking the missions. During this session, a senior security officer told el Magariaf that the attacks on that day were inspired by what many devout Libyan viewed as a UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No F-2015-04841 Doc No C05739580 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. Date 05 13 2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045280 B6 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739580 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. sacrilegious internet video on the prophet Mohammed originating in America. The Libyan attacks were also inspired by and linked to an attack on the U. S. mission in Egypt on the same day. At the same time, el Magariaf noted in strong terms that the atmosphere that made fostered these incidents in Libya is the product of widespread publicity regarding the security situation in the country between 2004 and 2010 and the cooperation that developed between a number of Western Intelligence services and the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. 2. This source added that el Magariafs advisors believe that this situation adds to the President's growing concern over the unpredictable effects that will follow current covert efforts by his political opponents to link him directly to foreign intelligence services. According to a separate sensitive source, el Magariaf noted that his opponents had often tried to connect him to the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency CIA through the National Front for the Salvation of Libya NFSL, a group established in opposition to former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, which el Magariaf led in the 1980s. In the opinion of this individual el Magariaf believes that he can survive potential negative publicity in this regard, but if this situation continues to develop in this manner it will complicate his efforts to establish an orderly administration in the country. Again, he stated that the attacks on the U. S. missions were as much a result of the atmosphere created by this campaign, as the controversial internet video. 3. At the same time, this individual noted that several of el Magariafs advisors share his concerns in this matter, pointing out that the return of Qaddafi's intelligence chief Abdullah al-Seno-ussi for trial in Libya has heightened public interest in the liaison relationships conducted by the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service SIS with Qaddfi's intelligence and security services. These same individuals note that they believe Islamist militia forces under the command of General Abdelhaldm Belhaj captured files and documents describing this relationship from Qaddafi's offices in Tripoli. This fascination with Western intelligence operations in Qaddafi's Libya is also driven by Human Rights Watch HRW and its efforts to tie Western governments to human rights violations committed under Qaddafi. In this regard HRW has interviewed at least fourteen 14 individuals claiming that they were turned over to Qaddafi's forces by the Western powers. Belhaj is included in this group. 4. Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el Magariafs enemies are working to take advantage of his suspected links to the CIA at a time when Western intelligence services are under scrutiny in Libya. They also fear that this situation will only grow more complex as Qaddafi's son Saif al Islam Qaddafi and al Senousi are brought before Libyan courts to answer for their crimes under the old regime, particularly during the 2011 revolution. These individuals believe both men will be linked to Western Intelligence during their trials. 5. According to this individual, el Magariaf is working with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to defuse this situation. He is particularly UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739580 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. Date:05 13 2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045281 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739580 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. concerned by the level of violence between Sufi Muslims and Salafists, and believes he must maintain his reputation for impartiality if he is to defuse this growing problem. As he works to organize the government, and disarm the militias, he cannot afford to lose the respect and trust of the Libyan people, especially at a time when cultural clashes between followers of the mystical Sufi tradition and ultra-conservative Salafis have taken central stage in the new Libya. This source adds that these religious conflicts were largely unknown during Qaddafi's rule. 6. Source Comment:This source added that the individuals interviewed for the HRW report were former members of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group LIFG, an Islamist group formed in opposition to Gaddafi's controversial interpretations of Islam. These LIFO fighters fled the country in the late 198os and went to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Soviet Union while also gaining training and experience for their own struggle. A separate source adds that messages to Libya from the CIA and SIS were found among the Tripoli Documents published by HRW, indicating that the United States and Britain were eager to help Libya capture several senior LIFG figures, including its co-founders, Belhaj and Sarni al-Saadi. 7. As Libyan authorities struggle to control the armed rings that refuse to surrender weapons following last year's civil war, Salafis, who say Islam should return to the simple ways followed by Mohammed, have established their own armed gangs in post-Gaddafi Libya. They view Sufi practices as idolatrous. Since the start of the Arab Spring uprising across the region, a number of Sufi sites have been attacked in Egypt, Mali and Libya. Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. This individual adds that Magariaf remains dedicated to the idea of building a tolerant Islamic state in Libya. El Magariafs opinions continue to be shaped by his experience with Qaddafl, whom he felt built a cult of personality in violation of all of the basic ideas of Islam. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739580 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045282
[(0.9528096177233153, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739583 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:H hrod17 clintonemail. com Sent:Wednesday, September 12, 2012 11:30 PM To:'sullivanjj state. gov' Subject:Fw:H:Magariaf on attack on US in Libya. Sid Attachments:hrc memo magariaf, attack on US in Libya 091212. docx Follow Up Flag:Follow up Flag Status:Flagged More info, From:Sidney Blumenthal meta Sent:Wednesday, September 12, 2012 12:50 AM H Subject:H:Magariaf on attack on US in Libya, Sid B6 CONFIDENTIAL September 12, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Magariaf and the attack on US in Libya SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During the afternoon of September 11, 2012 new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf spoke in private with senior advisors, including the members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on U. S. missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to a sensitive source, el Magariaf was shaken by the attacks, and gave permission to commanders on the ground for security forces to open fire over the heads of the crowds in an effort to break up mobs UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739583 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. Date:05 13 2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045283 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739583 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. attacking the missions. During this session, a senior security officer told el Magariaf that the attacks on that day were inspired by what many devout Libyan viewed as a sacrilegious internet video on the prophet Mohammed originating in America. The Libyan attacks were also inspired by and linked to an attack on the U. S. mission in Egypt on the same day. At the same time, el Magariaf noted in strong terms that the atmosphere that made fostered these incidents in Libya is the product of widespread publicity regarding the security situation in the country between 2004 and 2010 and the cooperation that developed between a number of Western Intelligence services and the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. 2. This source added that el Magariafs advisors believe that this situation adds to the President's growing concern over the unpredictable effects that will follow current covert efforts by his political opponents to link him directly to foreign intelligence services. According to a separate sensitive source, el Magariaf noted that his opponents had often tried to connect him to the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency CIA through the National Front for the Salvation of Libya NFSL, a group established in opposition to former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, which el Magariaf led in the 198 OS. In the opinion of this individual el Magariaf believes that he can survive potential negative publicity in this regard, but if this situation continues to develop in this manner it will complicate his efforts to establish an orderly administration in the country. Again, he stated that the attacks on the U. S. missions were as much a result of the atmosphere created by this campaign, as the controversial internet video. 3. At the same time, this individual noted that several of el Magariafs advisors share his concerns in this matter, pointing out that the return of Qaddafi's intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senoussi for trial in Libya has heightened public interest in the liaison relationships conducted by the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service SIS with Qaddfi's intelligence and security services. These same individuals note that they believe Islamist militia forces under the command of General Abdelhakim Belhaj captured files and documents describing this relationship from Qaddafi's offices in Tripoli. This fascination with Western intelligence operations in Qaddafi's Libya is also driven by Human Rights Watch HRW and its efforts to tie Western governments to human rights violations committed under Qaddafi. In this regard HRIAr has interviewed at least fourteen 14 individuals claiming that they were turned over to Qaddafi's forces by the Western powers. Belhaj is included in this group. 4. Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el Magariafs enemies are working to take advantage of his suspected links to the CIA at a time when Western intelligence services are under scrutiny in Libya. They also fear that this situation will only grow more complex as Qaddafi's son Saif al Islam Qaddafi and al Senousi are brought before Libyan courts to answer for their crimes under the old regime, particularly during the 2011 revolution. These individuals believe both men will be linked to Western Intelligence during their trials.. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739583 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045284 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739583 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 5. According to this individual, el Magariaf is working with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to defuse this situation. He is particularly concerned by the level of violence between Sufi Muslims and Salafists, and believes he must maintain his reputation for impartiality if he is to defuse this growing problem. As he works to organize the government, and disarm the militias, he cannot afford to lose the respect and trust of the Libyan people, especially at a time when cultural clashes between followers of the mystical Sufi tradition and ultra-conservative Salafis have taken central stage in the new Libya. This source adds that these religious conflicts were largely unknown during Qaddafi's rule. 6. Source Comment:This source added that the individuals interviewed for the HRW report were former members of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group LIFG, an Islamist group formed in opposition to Gaddafi's controversial interpretations of Islam. These LIFG fighters fled the country in the late 198os and went to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Soviet Union while also gaining training and experience for their own struggle. A separate source adds that messages to Libya from the CIA and SIS were found among the Tripoli Documents published by HRW, indicating that the United States and Britain were eager to help Libya capture several senior LIFG figures, including its co-founders, Belhaj and Sarni al-Saadi. 7. As Libyan authorities struggle to control the armed rings that refuse to surrender weapons following last year's civil war, Salafis, who say Islam should return to the simple ways followed by Mohammed, have established their own armed gangs in post-Gaddafi Libya. They view Sufi practices as idolatrous. Since the start of the Arab Spring uprising across the region, a number of Sufi sites have been attacked in Egypt, Mali and Libya. Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. This individual adds that Magariaf remains dedicated to the idea of building a tolerant Islamic state in Libya. El Magariafs opinions continue to be shaped by his experience with Qaddafi, whom he felt built a cult of personality in violation of all of the basic ideas of Islam. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739583 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045285")]
22 [22 23]
0.963308796217
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 B6 From:Sent:To:Subject:Attachments:Sidney Blumenthat Friday, September 14, 2012 6:32 PM H:Morsi's private conversations today. Sid hrc memo morsi's private conversations 091412. docx CONFIDENTIAL September14, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Morsi's private conversations coordination with Magariaf SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. I. Late in the day on September 14, 2012, Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi told senior European diplomats that he is increasingly concerned the current anti-U. S. and anti-Western violence spreading through Cairo and into the rest of Egypt may be part of an effort by his Salafist political rivals to destabilize his government, which many of them believe is too moderate in its positions regarding Islam, Israel, and the non-Muslim world. According to this source, Morsi, who is in Brussels for meetings with the European Union EU, was particularly concerned over a message from Army commander General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, that Islamist guerrillas, believed to be drawn primarily from the Sawarki Bedouin tribe, had launched an attack on a base of the International Peacekeeping Force IPF in the Sinai. The General reported that the 1500 United Nations troops at the base, including some U. S. forces, were under heavy attack and casualty figures were not yet known. Morsi stated that this fight was an example of radical anti-government forces and Salafist Islamist dissidents taking advantage of the current situation to carry out attacks that demonstrate his government is unable to protect Western personnel and facilities in Egypt. Morsi stated that the success or failure of his regime is directly tied to his ability to establish a moderate Islamic state that can work with western business interests. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of this individual, the current wave of violence is related to an ongoing struggle between Salafist and Sufi Muslims throughout Egypt. What makes it more frustrating for Morsi is that much of the violence appears to be inspired by members of the Salafist al Nour Party, the coalition partner of Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party RIP in the new Egyptian Parliament. According to this individual, Morsi delayed condemning the initial attacks on the U. S. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045319 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Embassy out of concern that his opponents would use such a statement to move against his government. Late on the evening of September 13, 2012, Mohammed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood MB, sent a message to Morsi warning that he and the Supreme Guidance Council were concerned that the situation around the U. S. Embassy was getting out of control and that, difficult as it might seem, he had to take tough measures against the demonstrators, and protect the interests of the U. S. and other Western Governments. In a telephone discussion with Saad al-Katany, the MB Freedom and Justice Party MB KIP Speaker of the lower house of parliament, Morsi admitted that he had felt constrained from acting, given his past history of poor personal relations with the leaders of al Nour. Al-Katany urged him to gain control of the situation. 3. On September 14, Morsi also stated to an EU official that he had received extremely forceful messages from both the U. S. State Department and the Office of the U. S. President, leaving no doubt in his mind that the U. S. Egyptian relations and more than 1billion in U. S. aid were at stake in this matter. Morsi added that since much of this aid goes to the Egyptian Army, he and al-Katany agreed that actions that put it in jeopardy would also damage the new Egyptian administration's current good relationship with the Army. Accordingly, Morsi instructed the military and security forces to use all necessary force short of lethal measures to protect U. S. and Western facilities. In a private conversation, Morsi stated that he felt he is losing control of the political situation and fears that if the current fighting results in deaths, either of demonstrators, U. S. diplomats, Egyptian security personnel, or UN peacekeepers, the situation may spin out of control and his government could fall. Al-Katany agreed, but said that taking no action would guarantee disaster. They agreed that when the situation calms down they will have to deal with the al Nour party, which they fear will, in the future, take advantage of circumstances to try to destabilize Morsi's administration. With this in mind, Morsi ordered al-Sissi to direct the commanders of Military Intelligence MI-Mukhabarat el-Khabeya to step up operations collecting information on the activities of the al Nour leadership, focusing on any contacts with potentially violent Salafist dissidents. 4. Source Comment:A separate sensitive source also noted that General al-Sissi is warning Morsi about press reports that the person who made the controversial internet film at the heart of this situation is an Egyptian Coptic Christian. The General cautioned that as this report gains wider circulation, the government and the Army must prepare for violent attacks by Islamists against that community, which makes up ten 10 percent of the Egyptian population. 5. A separate sensitive source noted that for his part, al-Sissi is prepared to to have his troops take harsh measures against any demonstrators who attack Western personnel and facilities. The General is also concerned that the al Nour leaders are even more dangerous than Morsi realizes, and he has ordered the MI to increase technical and physical surveillance of these individuals. In addition, he stated in private that Morsi and al-Katany spoke with Libyan President Mohammed Yussef el Ma. gariaf, and they had all agreed that military and security officials in Egypt and Libya will cooperate in an effort to track links between the violence in Cairo and Benghazi. Al-Sissi has ordered Special Forces units to step up patrols in the Egypt-Libya border region, while the MI will monitor communications between dissidents; primarily Salafists, in both countries. According to this source the General is convinced that these dissidents are seizing the opportunity presented by the current unrest to move against the governments of Morsi and al-Magariaf. He also received permission from Morsi to step up cooperation with his counterparts in the U. S. and Western Europe to deal with this situation and al-Sissi believes al-Magariaf has given similar instructions to Libyan military and security officials. 6. Source Comment:According to a separate sensitive source, al-Sissi believes that, given his new orders from Mori, the Army can, for the most part, protect Western facilities and personnel in Egypt. But the General is concerned that the security services can never completely eliminate the UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045320 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. threat from small well organized bands looking to carry out terrorist attacks. Following discussion with Libyan security officials he believes they have the same concerns. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045321 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL September 14, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Morsi's private conversations coordination with Magariaf SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. Late in the day on September 14, 2012, Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi told senior European diplomats that he is increasingly concerned the current anti-U. S. and anti-Western violence spreading through Cairo and into the rest of Egypt may be part of an effort by his Salafist political rivals to destabilize his government, which many of them believe is too moderate in its positions regarding Islam, Israel, and the non-Muslim world. According to this source, Morsi, who is in Brussels for meetings with the European Union EU, was particularly concerned over a message from Army commander General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, that Islamist guerrillas, believed to be drawn primarily from the Sawarki Bedouin tribe, had launched an attack on a base of the International Peacekeeping Force IPF in the Sinai. The General reported that the 1500 United Nations troops at the base, including some U. S. forces, were under heavy attack and casualty figures were not yet known. Morsi stated that this fight was an example of radical anti-government forces and Salafist Islamist dissidents taking advantage of the current situation to carry out attacks that demonstrate his government is unable to protect Western personnel and facilities in Egypt. Morsi stated that the success or failure of his regime is directly tied to his ability to establish a moderate Islamic state that can work with western business interests. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of this individual, the current wave of violence is related to an ongoing struggle between Salafist and Sufi Muslims throughout Egypt. What makes it more frustrating for Morsi is that much of the violence appears to be inspired by members of the Salafist al Nour Party, the coalition partner of Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party FJP in the new Egyptian Parliament. According to this individual, Morsi delayed condemning the initial attacks on the U. S. Embassy out of concern that his opponents would use such a statement to move against his government. Late on the evening of September 13, 2012, Mohammed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood MB, sent a message to Morsi warning that he and the Supreme Guidance Council were concerned that the UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045322 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. situation around the U. S. Embassy was getting out of control and that, difficult as it might seem, he had to take tough measures against the demonstrators, and protect the interests of the U. S. and other Western Governments. In a telephone discussion with Saad al-Katany, the MB Freedom and Justice Party MB FJP Speaker of the lower house of parliament, Morsi admitted that he had felt constrained from acting, given his past history of poor personal relations with the leaders of al Nour. Al-Katany urged him to gain control of the situation. 3. On September 14, Morsi also stated to an EU official that he had received extremely forceful messages from both the U. S. State Department and the Office of the U. S. President, leaving no doubt in his mind that the U. S.-Egyptian relations and more than 1billion in U. S. aid were at stake in this matter. Morsi added that since much of this aid goes to the Egyptian Army, he and al-Katany agreed that actions that put it in jeopardy would also damage the new Egyptian administration's current good relationship with the Army. Accordingly, Morsi instructed the military and security forces to use all necessary force short of lethal measures to protect U. S. and Western facilities. In a private conversation, Morsi stated that he felt he is losing control of the political situation and fears that if the current fighting results in deaths, either of demonstrators. U. S. diplomats, Egyptian security personnel, or UN peacekeepers, the situation may spin out of control and his government could fall. Al-Katany agreed, but said that taking no action would guarantee disaster. They agreed that when the situation calms down they will have to deal with the al Nour party, which they fear will, in the future, take advantage of circumstances to try to destabilize Morsi's administration. With this in mind, Morsi ordered al-Sissi to direct the commanders of Military Intelligence MI-Mukhabarat el-Khabeya to step up operations collecting information on the activities of the al Nour leadership focusing on any contacts with potentially violent Salafist dissidents. 4. Source Comment:A separate sensitive source also noted that General al-Sissi is warning Morsi about press reports that the person who made the controversial internet film at the heart of this situation is an Egyptian Coptic Christian. The General cautioned that as this report gains wider circulation, the government and the Army must prepare for violent attacks by Islamists against that community, which makes up ten 10 percent of the Egyptian population. 5. A separate sensitive source noted that for his part, al-Sissi is prepared to to have his troops take harsh measures against any demonstrators who attack Western personnel and facilities The General is also concerned that the al Nour leaders are even more dangerous than Morsi realizes, and he has ordered the MI to increase technical and physical surveillance of these individuals. In addition, he stated in private that Mani and al-Katany spoke with Libyan President Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf, and they had all agreed that military and security officials in Egypt and Libya will cooperate in an effort to track links between the violence in Cairo and Benghazi. Al-Sissi has ordered Special Forces units to step up patrols in the Egypt-Libya border region, while the MI will monitor communications between dissidents; primarily Salafists, in both countries. According to this source the General is convinced that these dissidents are seizing the opportunity presented by the current unrest to move against the governments of Morsi and al-Magariaf. He also received permission from Morsi to step up cooperation with his counterparts in the U. S. and Western Europe to deal with this situation and UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045323 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. al-Sissi believes al-Magariaf has given similar instructions to Libyan military and security officials. 6. Source Comment:According to a separate sensitive source, al-Sissi believes that, given his new orders from Morsi, the Army can, for the most part, protect Western facilities and personnel in Egypt. But the General is concerned that the security services can never completely eliminate the threat from small well organized bands looking to carry out terrorist attacks. Following discussion with Libyan security officials he believes they have the same concerns. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739624 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045324
[(0.9633087962170459, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739785 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:H 1. 1rod17 clintonemail. com Sent:Sunday, September 23, 2012 10:35 PM To:hanIeymr state. gov' Subject:Fw:H:Morsi's private conversations today. Sid Attachments:hrc memo morsi's private conversations 091412. docx Pis print. From:Sidney Blumenthal fmailto:Sent:Friday, September 14, 2012 06:31 PM To:H Subject:H:Morsi's private conversations today. Sid CONFIDENTIAL September 14, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Morsi's private conversations coordination with Magariaf SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. Late in the day on September 14, 2012, Egyptian President Moharriad. Morsi told senior European diplomats that he is increasingly concerned the current anti-U. S. and anti-Western violence spreading through Cairo and into the rest of Egypt may be part of an effort by his Salafist political rivals to destabilize his government, which many of them believe is too moderate in its positions regarding Islam, Israel, and the non-Muslim world. According to this source, Morsi, who is in Brussels for meetings with the European Union EU, was particularly concerned over a message from Army commander General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, that Islamist guerrillas, believed to be drawn primarily from the Sawarki Bedouin tribe, had launched an attack on a base of the International Peacekeeping Force IPF in the Sinai. The General reported that the 1500 United Nations troops at the base, including some U. S. forces, were under heavy attack and casualty figures were not yet known. Morsi stated that this fight was an example of radical anti-government forces and Salafist Islamist dissidents taking advantage of the current situation to carry out attacks that demonstrate his government is unable to protect Western personnel and facilities in Egypt. Morsi stated that the success or failure of his regime is directly tied to his ability to establish a moderate Islamic state that can work with western business interests. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739785 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045461 B6 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739785 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of this individual, the current wave of violence is related to an ongoing struggle between Salafist and Sufi Muslims throughout Egypt. What makes it more frustrating for Morsi is that much of the violence appears to be inspired by members of the Salafist al Nour Party, the coalition partner of Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party FJP in the new Egyptian Parliament. According to this individual, Morsi delayed condemning the initial attacks on the U. S. Embassy out of concern that his opponents would use such a statement to move against his government. Late on the evening of September 13, 2012, Mohammed Badie, the Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood MB, sent a message to Morsi warning that he and the Supreme Guidance Council were concerned that the situation around the U. S. Embassy was getting out of control and that, difficult as it might seem, he had to take tough measures against the demonstrators, and protect the interests of the U. S. and other Western Governments. In a telephone discussion with Saadi al-Katany, the MB Freedom and Justice Party MB FJP Speaker of the lower house of parliament, Morsi admitted that he had felt constrained from acting, given his past history of poor personal relations with the leaders of al Nour. Al-Katany urged him to gain control of the situation. 3. On September 14, Morsi also stated to an EU official that he had received extremely forceful messages from both the U. S. State Department and the Office of the U. S. President, leaving no doubt in his mind that the U. S. Egyptian relations and more than ibillion in U. S. aid were at stake in this matter. Morsi added that since much of this aid goes to the Egyptian Army, he and al-Katany agreed that actions that put it in jeopardy would also damage the new Egyptian administration's current good relationship with the Army. Accordingly, Morsi instructed the military and security forces to use all necessary force short of lethal measures to protect U. S. and Western facilities. In a private conversation, Morsi stated that he felt he is losing control of the political situation and fears that if the current fighting results in deaths, either of demonstrators, U. S. diplomats, Egyptian security personnel, or UN peacekeepers, the situation may spin out of control and his government could fall. Al-Katany agreed, but said that taking no action would guarantee disaster. They agreed that when the situation calms down they will have to deal with the al Nour party, which they fear will, in the future, take advantage of circumstances to try to destabilize Morsi's administration. With this in mind, Morsi ordered al-Sissi to direct the commanders of Military Intelligence MI-Mukhabarat el-Khabeya to step up operations collecting information on the activities of the al Nour leadership, focusing on any contacts with potentially violent Salafist dissidents. 4. Source Comment:A separate sensitive source also noted that General al-Sissi is warning Morsi about press reports that the person who made the controversial internet film at the heart of this situation is an Egyptian Coptic Christian. The General cautioned that as this report gains wider circulation, the government and the Army must prepare for violent attacks by Islamists against that community, which makes up ten 10 percent of the Egyptian population. 5. A separate sensitive source noted that for his part, al-Sissi is prepared to to have his troops take harsh measures against any demonstrators who attack Western personnel and facilities. The General is also concerned that the al Nour leaders are even more dangerous than Morsi realizes, and he has ordered the MI to increase technical and physical surveillance of these individuals. In addition, he stated in private that Morsi and al-Katany spoke with Libyan President Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf, and they had all agreed that military and security officials in Egypt and Libya will cooperate in an effort to track links between the violence in Cairo and Benghazi. Al-Sissi has ordered Special Forces units to step up patrols in the Egypt-Libya border region, while the MI will monitor communications between dissidents; primarily Salafists, in both countries. According to this source the General is convinced that these dissidents are seizing the opportunity presented by the current unrest to move against the governments of Morsi and al-Magariaf. He also received permission from Morsi to step up cooperation with his counterparts in the U. S. and Western Europe to deal with this UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739785 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045462 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739785 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. situation and al-Sissi believes al-Magariaf has given similar instructions to Libyan military and security officials. 6. Source Comment:According to a separate sensitive source, al-Sissi believes that, given his new orders from Morsi, the Army can, for the most part, protect Western facilities and personnel in Egypt. But the General is concerned that the security services can never completely eliminate the threat from small well organized bands looking to carry out terrorist attacks. Following discussion with Libyan security officials he believes they have the same concerns. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739785 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045463")]
53 [ 53 189]
0.96720547856
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739654 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent:To:Subject:Attachments:B6 Friday, April 8, 2011 5:28 PM H:UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in. Sid-hre memo UK games new rebel strategists; Egypt moves 040811. docx; hrc memo UK games new rebel strategists; Egypt moves 040811. clocx CONFIDENTIAL For:Hillary From:Sid Re:UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in Latest report:LIBYA GREAT BRITAIN FRANCE On the morning of April 8, an individual with direct access to the leadership of the Libyan National Council LNC stated in strictest confidence that members of the Military Committee of the LNC are concerned that despite the involvement of NATO against the forces of tkiluamrnar Qaddafi, the government of Great Britain is using its intelligence services in an effort to dictate the actions of both the LNC and the Qaddafi regime. These individuals add that they have been informed by contacts in France and Italy that while they have been engaged in discussions with the LNC regarding possible assistance, British diplomats and intelligence officers have maintained contact with members of the Qaddafi government in an effort to protect the British position in the event the rebellion settles into a stalemate. These LNC officials believe that the defection of Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mouse Kousa to the United Kingdom was part of this effort. By the same token they believe that British intelligence officers are in discussion with associates of Saif akislarn Qaddafi, regarding future relations between the two countries if he takes over power from his father and implements reforms. According to these individuals, senior LNC military personnel suspect that despite early indications that they would provide clandestine military support to the rebels; neither the French nor the British government will provide the rebels with enough equipment and training to defeat Qaddafi's forces. They also believe that the French, British, and other European countries will be satisfied with a stalemate that leaves Libya divided into two rival entities. Source Comment:In the opinion of these individuals the LNC military leaders are considering the possibility of hiring private secunty firms to help train and organize their forces. One of these individuals added that a number of the LNC members believe that this solution may be best for the rebels; noting that if they accept clandestine aid from France and or Great Britain those two countries will be in a position to control the development of post Qaddafi Libya. LIBYA-INSURGENT ACTIVITY This information is based on sensitive reporting from individuals with direct access to the leadership ofthe LNC. 1. With little hope of achieving a quick military victory, the LNC is deploying a three part strategy; leveraging tribal relationships, oil production and diplomatic pressure to get the better of Qaddafi. A former spokesman for the Libyan Human Rights League LHRL in Europe, Ali Zidane, is in talks with representatives of tribes in Sebha and Sine in an effort to persuade them to rally to the revolution and the LNG before fighting actually reaches their regions. Zidane is a candidate to be the Minister of the Interior in the new Libya. Among his close associates is Mohamed Allagui, president of the LHRL, who is interested in the justice portfolio in the future, transition government. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739654 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045039 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739654 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 2. At the same time, All Tarhouni, the LNC's financial expert and possibly Finance Minister in post-Qaddafi Libya, is struggling to get oil exports back on track in eastern Libya, with backing from the United States and Qatar. The LNC believes that the U. S will focus on restarting operations at the oil terminal in Tobruk. and an American envoy is expected in Benghazi in the near future to facilitate this process. For its part, Qatar is advancing cash to the LNC to stimulate the shipment of oil from eastern Libya. Some commodity traders stepped in recently under contract from Qatar to deliver refined oil products to the insurgents. VITOL and the Swiss firm GLENCORE are operating in the rebel zone, but denied any involvement in this shipment. Elsewhere, these sources add that Mahmud Shammarn is overseeing the information and communications campaign for the rebels against Qaddafi. Considered one of the LNC most important leaders, Sharnmam brings to the insurgency the expertise he acquired while working for Voice of America, Foreign Policy, Newsweek and Al Jazeera. Shammam lived in the U. S. for more than twenty years, and he is believed to have excellent connections in the U. S. Government. 3. Islamist activity:Libya's Islamist activists have maintained a low profile since the start of the insurgency in late February; fearing that their activities would give credence to Qaddafi's claims that the rebeis are terrorists. As the LNC is taking shape, they are now working to make their voice heard, and influence events within the LNC. Ali Sallabi, Salem Al Shiki and Mohamed Al Guirtili, leading Islamic figures who had taken refuge in London and are close to the Moslem Brotherhood, drafted a 'national pact which looks like a road map for organizing the role of the Islamist movement in the transition to a post Qaddafi Libya. Sallabi and his two associates draw their inspiration from the February 17 Movement which helped spark the uprising by commemorating the massacre of Islamist prisoners at the Abu Salim prison in 1996. Prior to the current rebellion, Mustapha Abdel Jalil, the President of the LNC and former Minister of Justice called for the release of reformed Islamists. At present, the Islamists are handicapped by the fact they supported Sail's reform projects before the recent crisis. Saif played a crucial part in getting the Islamists to sever ties between the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's and al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM. EGYPT AND LIBYA:A source with excellent access to the highest levels of the SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES SCAF states that the Egyptian Military has turned its full attention to the crisis in Libya. Traditionally, Egypt is a strong influence in the eastern Libyan region of Cyreriaica and is now taking advantage of the current crisis to regain that position. Regardless of whether Muammar Qaddafi remains in power or not, the political division of Libya will give Egypt the opportunity to fill the void in the east. A senior diplomatic source reported that since the early days of the Libyan crisis, the Egyptian government has been quietly supporting Libyan opposition forces through training, weaponry, food, and medical supplies, while attempting to organize a political structure in the east. In addition, Egyptian Special Operations troops are serving with rebel forces in the eastern part of Libya. Senior Egyptian military officers stated privately that these troops are responsible for many of the rebel's combat successes. The following factors are the focus of Egypt's plans for a post-Qaddafi regime:- Avoiding a refugee crisis. In the event Qaddafi's forces invade the east, Egypt is the most logical destination for refugees from Libyan. Egypt has an interest in controlling any turmoil in Libya that could harm efforts to restart its struggling economy.-Labor market. Libya is an important market for unemployed Egyptian laborers. According to the Egyptian Labor Ministry, around 1. 5 million Egyptians reside and work in Libya, sending home an estimated 254 million in remittances In the past few years, Qaddafi has placed heavy restrictions on foreign workers, and Egypt hopes that a new regime will be more flexible, and open to receiving Egyptian workers.-Radical Islamists. Traditionally, the eastern part of Libya has been a stronghold for radical Islamist groups, including the al Qaida-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group While Qaddafi's regime has been successful in suppressing the jihadist threat in Libya, the current situation opens the door for jihadist resurgence. Egypt has a growing interest in keeping a close eye on jrhadist movements in eastern Libya. This is especially true as the Egyptian Military is already concerned about Islamist militancy overflow from Gaza, after their forces were pulled back to Cairo during the uprising against Mubarak.-Oil and energy resources. Egypt has strong economic interests in the oil rich eastern part of Libya. Any opportunity to gain direct or indirect access to these energy resources will increase Egypt's wealth. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739654 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045040 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739654 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.-Regional power. The Egypt's military-led government is looking to reestablish their country's role in the Arab world. So far, Egypt has fostered discussions in the Palestinian territories between Fatah and Homes, while reaching out to Syria and Saudi Arabia on the issue of Iran. Source Comment:According to a sensitive diplomatic source, the current Egyptian diplomatic strategy is to enhance its stature by defending the Libyan people against Qaddafi's regime, while at the same time, distancing itself from any military intervention led by the region's former colonial powers in Europe. It should be noted that, in the opinion of knowledgeable sources, Egypt cannot count on the support of every Arab power in the region. Egypt led the call for imposing the no-fly zone in Libya, while Algeria, while Yemen, and Syria voted against it. These countries especially Yemen fear the precedence that would be created for their own governments in the event Qaddafi is ousted. Source Comment:A source with access to the leadership of NATO state in confidence that their information indicates that Syria and Algeria are concerned with Egypt's revival in the region. This source stated that a de facto split between eastern and western Libya would give Egypt the opportunity to reassume an influential position in Cyrenaica. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739654 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045041
[(0.9672054785598422, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B5, B6 From:Sent:To:Subject Attachments:H hrod17 clintonernail. com Friday, April 8, 2011 5:35 PM 'sullivanjj state. govi Fvv:H:UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in Sid hit memo UK games; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves 040811. docx Fyi, B5 From:Sent:Friday, April 08, 2011 05:27 PM To:H Subject:H:UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in Sid CONFIDENTIAL For:Hillary From:Sid Re:UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in Latest report:LIBYNGREAT BRITAIN FRANCE On the morning of April 8, an individual with direct access to the leadership of the Libyan National Council LNC stated in strictest confidence that members of the Military Committee of the LNC are concerned that despite the involvement of NATO against the forces of Muammar Qacidafi, the government of Great Britain is using its intelligence services in an effort to dictate the actions of both the LNC and the Qaddafi regime. These individuals add that they have been informed by contacts in France and Italy that while they have been engaged in discussions with the LNC regarding possible assistance, British diplomats and intelligence officers have maintained contact with members of the Qadclafi government, in an effort to protect the British position in the event the rebellion settles into a stalemate. These LNC officials believe that the defection of Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mouse Kousa to the United Kingdom was part of this effort By the same token they believe that British intelligence officers are in discussion with associates of Safi al-Islam Qaddafi, regarding future relations between the two countries if he takes over power from his father and implements reforms. According to these individuals, senior LNC military personnel suspect that despite early indications that they would provide clandestine military support to the rebels; neither the French nor the British government will provide the rebels with enough equipment and training to defeat Qaddafi's forces. They also believe that the French. British, and other European countries will be satisfied with a stalemate that leaves Libya divided into two rival entities. Source Comment:in the opinion of these individuals the LNC military leaders are considering the possibility of hiring private security firms to help train and organize their forces_ One of these individuals added that a number of the LNC members believe that this solution may be best for the rebels; noting that if they accept clandestine aid from France and or Great Britain those two countries will be in a position to control the development of post-Qaddafi Libya LIBYA-INSURGENT ACTIVITY This information is based on sensitive reporting from individuals with direct access to the leadership of the LNC. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045042 B6 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 1. With little hope of achieving a quick military victory, the LNC is deploying a three part strategy; leveraging tribal relationships, oil production and diplomatic pressure to get the better of Qaddafi. A former spokesman for the Libyan Human Rights League LHRL in Europe, Ali Ziciane, is in talks with representatives of tribes in Sebha and Sirte in an effort to persuade them to rally to the revolution and the LNC before fighting actually reaches their regions. Zidane is a candidate to be the Minister of the Interior in the new Libya. Among his close associates is Mohamed Allagui, president of the LHRL, who is interested in the justice portfolio in the future, transition government 2. At the same time, All Tarhouni, the LNC's financial expert and possibly Finance Minister in post-Qaddafi Libya, is struggling to get oil exports back on track in eastern Libya, with backing from the United States and Qatar. The LNC believes that the U. S. will focus on restarting operations at the oil terminal in TGWU, and an American envoy is expected in Benghazi in the near future to facilitate this process. For its part, Qatar is advancing cash to the LNG to stimulate the shipment of oil from eastern Libya. Some commodity traders stepped in recently under contract from Qatar to deliver refined oil products to the insurgents. VITOL and the Swiss firm GLENCORE are operating in the rebel zone, but denied any involvement in this shipment. Elsewhere, these sources add that Materna:I Shannmarn is overseeing the information and communications campaign for the rebels against Qaddafi. Considered one of the LNC most important leaders, Shammam brings to the insurgency the expertise he acquired while working forVoice of America, Foreign Policy, Newsweek and Al Jazeera. Shammarri lived in the U. S. for more than twenty years, and he is believed to have excellent connections in the U. S. Government. 3. Islamist activity:Libya's Islamist activists have maintained a low profile since the start of the insurgency in late February; fearing that their activities would give credence to Qaddafi's claims that the rebels are terrorists. As the LNC is taking shape, they are now working to make their voice heard, and influence events within the LNC, All Saliabi, Salem Al Shiki and Mohamed Al Guirtili, leading Islamic figures who had taken refuge in London and are close to the Moslem Brotherhood, drafted a national pact which looks like a road map for organizing the role of the Islamist movement in the transition to a post Qaddafi Libya, Sallabi and his two associates draw their inspiration from the February 17 Movement' which helped spark the uprising by commemorating the massacre of Islamist prisoners at the Abu Salim prison in 1996. Prior to the current rebellion, Mustapha Abdel Jail!, the President of the LNC and former Minister of Justice called for the release of reformed Islamists. At present, the Islamists are handicapped by the fact they supported Saifs reform projects before the recent crisis. Saif played a crucial part in getting the Islamists to sever ties between the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's and al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM. EGYPT AND LIBYA:A source with excellent access to the highest levels of the SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES SCAF states that the Egyptian Military has turned its full attention to the crisis in Libya. Traditionally, Egypt is a strong influence in the eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica and is now taking advantage of the current crisis to regain that position. Regardless of whether Muammar Qaddafi remains in power or not, the political division of Libya will give Egypt the opportunity to fill the void in the east. A senior diplomatic source reported that since the early days of the Libyan crisis, the Egyptian government has been quietly supporting Libyan opposition forces through training, weaponry, food, and medical supplies, while attempting to organize a political structure in the east. In addition, Egyptian Special Operations troops are serving with mitel forces in the eastern part of Libya. Senior Egyptian military officers stated privately that these troops are responsible for many of the rebel's combat successes. The following factors are the focus of Egypt's plans for a post-Qaddafi regime:- Avoiding a refugee crisis. In the event Qaddaffs forces invade the east, Egypt is the most logical destination for refugees from Libyan. Egypt has an interest in controlling any turmoil in Libya that could harm efforts to restart its struggling economy.-Labor market. Libya is an important market for unemployed Egyptian laborers. According to the Egyptian Labor Ministry, around 1. 5 million Egyptians reside and work in Libya, sending home an estimated 254 million in remittances. In the past few years, Qaddafi has placed heavy restrictions on foreign workers, and Egypt hopes that a new regime will be more flexible, and open to receiving Egyptian workers.-Radical Islamists. Traditionally, the eastern part of Libya has been a stronghold for radical Islamist groups, including the al Qaida-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. While Qadclafi's regime has been successful in suppressing the jihadist threat in Libya, the current situation opens the door for jihadist resurgence. Egypt has a growing interest in keeping a close eye on jihadist movements in eastern Libya. This is especially true as the Egyptian Military is already UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045043 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. concerned about Islamist militancy overflow from Gaza, after their forces were pulled back to Cairo during the uprising against Mubarak.-Oil and energy resources. Egypt has strong economic interests in the oil rich eastern part of Libya. Any opportunity to gain direct or indirect access to these energy resources will increase Egypt's wealth.-Regional power. The Egypt's military-led government is looking to reestablish their country's role in the Arab world. So far, Egypt has fostered discussions in the Palestinian territories between Fatah and 1-lamas, while reaching out to Syria and Saudi Arabia on the issue of Iran. Source Comment According to a sensitive diplomatic source, the current Egyptian diplomatic strategy is to enhance its stature by defending the Libyan people against Qaddafi's regime, while at the same time, distancing itself from any military intervention led by the region's former colonial powers in Europe. It should be noted that, in the opinion of knowledgeable sources, Egypt cannot count on the support of every Arab power in the region. Egypt led the call for imposing the no-fly zone in Libya, while Algeria, while Yemen, and Syria voted against it. These countries especially Yemen fear the precedence that would be created for their own governments in the event Qaddati is ousted. Source Comment:A source with access to the leadership of NATO state in confidence that their information indicates that Syria and Algeria are concerned with Egypt's revival in the region. This source stated that a de facto split between eastern and western Libya would give Egypt the opportunity to reassume an influential position in Cyrenaica. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045044 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL For:Hillary From:Sid Re:UK game playing; new rebel strategists; Egypt moves in Latest report:LIBYA GREAT BRITAIN FRANCE On the morning of April 8, an individual with direct access to the leadership of the Libyan National Council LNC stated in strictest confidence that members of the Military Committee of the LNC are concerned that, despite the involvement of NATO against the forces of Muammar Qaddafi, the government of Great Britain is using its intelligence services in an effort to dictate the actions of both the LNC and the Qaddafi regime. These individuals add that they have been informed by contacts in France and Italy that, while they have been engaged in discussions with the LNC regarding possible assistance, British diplomats and intelligence officers have maintained contact with members of the Qaddafi government, in an effort to protect the British position in the event the rebellion settles into a stalemate. These LNC officials believe that the defection of Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mousa Kousa to the United Kingdom was part of this effort. By the same token they believe that British intelligence officers are in discussion with associates of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, regarding future relations between the two countries if he takes over power from his father and implements reforms. According to these individuals, senior LNC military personnel suspect that despite early indications that they would provide clandestine military support to the rebels; neither the French nor the British government will provide the rebels with enough equipment and training to defeat Qaddafi's forces. They also believe that the French, British, and other European countries will be satisfied with a stalemate that leaves Libya divided into two rival entities Source Comment:In the opinion of these individuals the LNC military leaders are considering the possibility of hiring private security firms to help train and organize their forces. One of these individuals added that a number of the LNC members believe that this solution may be best for the rebels; noting that if they accept clandestine aid from France and or Great Britain those two countries will be in a position to control the development of post-Qaddafi Libya. LIBYA-INSURGENT ACTIVITY This information is based on sensitive reporting from individuals with direct access to the leadership of the LNC. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045045 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 1. With little hope of achieving a quick military victory, the LNC is deploying a three part strategy; leveraging tribal relationships, oil production and diplomatic pressure to get the better of Qaddafi. A former spokesman for the Libyan Human Rights League LHRL in Europe, Ali Zidane, is in talks with representatives of tribes in Sebha and Sirte in an effort to persuade them to rally to the revolution and the LNC before fighting actually reaches their regions Zidane is a candidate to be the Minister of the Interior in the new Libya. Among his close associates is Mohamed Allagui, president of the LHRL, who is interested in the justice portfolio in the future, transition government. 2. At the same time, Ali Tarhouni, the LNC's financial expert and possibly Finance Minister in post-Qaddafi Libya, is struggling to get oil exports back on track in eastern Libya, with backing from the United States and Qatar. The LNC believes that the U. S. will focus on restarting operations at the oil terminal in Tobruk, and an American envoy is expected in Benghazi in the near future to facilitate this process. For its part, Qatar is advancing cash to the LNC to stimulate the shipment of oil from eastern Libya. Some commodity traders stepped in recently under contract from Qatar to deliver refined oil products to the insurgents. VITOL and the Swiss firm GLENCORE are operating in the rebel zone, but denied any involvement in this shipment. Elsewhere, these sources add that Mahmud Shammam is overseeing the information and communications campaign for the rebels against Qaddafi. Considered one of the LNC most important leaders, Shammam brings to the insurgency the expertise he acquired while working for Voice of America, Foreign Policy, Newsweek and Al Jazeera. Shammam lived in the U. S. for more than twenty years, and he is believed to have excellent connections in the U. S. Government. 3. Islamist activity:Libya's Islamist activists have maintained a low profile since the start of the insurgency in late February; fearing that their activities would give credence to Qaddafi 's claims that the rebels are terrorists. As the LNC is taking shape, they are now working to make their voice heard, and influence events within the LNC. Ali Sallabi, Salem Al Shiki and Mohamed Al Guirtili, leading Islamic figures who had taken refuge in London and are close to the Moslem Brotherhood, drafted a national pact which looks like a road map for organizing the role of the Islamist movement in the transition to a post Qaddafi Libya. Sallabi and his two associates draw their inspiration from the February 17 Movement which helped spark the uprising by commemorating the massacre of Islamist prisoners at the Abu Salim prison in 1996. Prior to the current rebellion, Mustapha Abdel Jalil, the President of the LNC and former Minister of Justice called for the release of reformed Islamists. At present, the Islamists are handicapped by the fact they supported Sair s reform projects before the recent crisis. Saif played a crucial part in getting the Islamists to sever ties between the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's and al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM. EGYPT AND LIBYA:A source with excellent access to the highest levels of the SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES SCAF states that the Egyptian Military has turned its full attention to the crisis in Libya. Traditionally, Egypt is a strong influence in the eastern Libyan region of UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045046 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Cyrenaica and is now taking advantage of the current crisis to regain that position. Regardless of whether Muammar Qaddafi remains in power or not, the political division of Libya will give Egypt the opportunity to fill the void in the east A senior diplomatic source reported that since the early days of the Libyan crisis, the Egyptian government has been quietly supporting Libyan opposition forces through training, weaponry, food, and medical supplies, while attempting to organize a political structure in the east. In addition, Egyptian Special Operations troops are serving with rebel forces in the eastern part of Libya Senior Egyptian military officers stated privately that these troops are responsible for many of the rebel's combat successes. The following factors are the focus of Egypt's plans for a post-Qaddafi regime:- Avoiding a refugee crisis. In the event Qaddafes forces invade the east, Egypt is the most logical destination for refugees from Libyan. Egypt has an interest in controlling any turmoil in Libya that could harm efforts to restart its struggling economy.-Labor market. Libya is an important market for unemployed Egyptian laborers. According to the Egyptian Labor Ministry, around 1. 5 million Egyptians reside and work in Libya, sending home an estimated 254 million in remittances. In the past few years, Qaddafi has placed heavy restrictions on foreign workers, and Egypt hopes that a new regime will be more flexible, and open to receiving Egyptian workers.-Radical hlarnists. Traditionally, the eastern part of Libya has been a stronghold for radical Islamist groups, including the al Qaida-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. While Qaddafi 's regime has been successful in suppressing the jihadist threat in Libya, the current situation opens the door for jihadist resurgence. Egypt has a growing interest in keeping a close eye on jihadist movements in eastern Libya. This is especially true as the Egyptian Military is already concerned about Islamist militancy overflow from Gaza, after their forces were pulled back to Cairo during the uprising against Mubarak.-Oil and energy resources. Egypt has strong economic interests in the oil rich eastern part of Libya. Any opportunity to gain direct or indirect access to these energy resources will increase Egypt's wealth.-Regional power. The Egypt's military-led government is looking to reestablish their country's role in the Arab world. So far, Egypt has fostered discussions in the Palestinian territories between Fatah and flamas, while reaching out to Syria and Saudi Arabia on the issue of Iran Source Comment:According to a sensitive diplomatic source, the current Egyptian diplomatic strategy is to enhance its stature by defending the Libyan people against Qaddafi 's regime, while at the same time, distancing itself from any military intervention led by the region's former colonial powers in Europe. It should be noted that, in the opinion of knowledgeable sources, Egypt cannot count on the support of every Arab. power in the region. Egypt led the call for imposing the no-fly zone in Libya, while Algeria, while Yemen, and Syria voted against it These countries especially UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045047 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Yemen fear the precedence that would be created for their own governments in the event Qaddafi is ousted. Source Comment:A source with access to the leadership of NATO state in confidence that their information indicates that Syria and Algeria are concerned with Egypt's revival in the region. This source stated that a de facto split between eastern and western Libya WOUICI give Egypt the opportunity to reassume an influential position in Cyrenaira. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739660 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045048")]
80 [80 85]
0.97137998267
B6 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sidney Blumenthal Sent:Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:57 AM To:Subject:H:Latest intel:Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid Attachments:rim memo Libyan Leadership Private Discussions 102512, docx CONFIDENTIAL October 25, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions Sz Plans SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army NLA Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September ii, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011 civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, supported by the Misrata troops, that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa Belgasirn Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and Southeastern Libya. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb AQIM, in the assassination of the U. S. Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045748 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Salafist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the attack on the U. S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar al Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos. 3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia terrorist group killed four national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa. According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al Sharia's senior commanders, Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility. 4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLA Misrata force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns. 5. Source Comment:In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Bani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shahan, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata commanders report that Shaban was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council GNC, demanded the surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shahan. As the fighting expanded through late September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045749 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL October 25, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions Plans SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. I. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army NLA Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011 civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the county is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, supported by the Misrata troops, that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa Belgasim Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and Southeastern Libya. 2. Source Comment In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Ziclan agree that Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al Qai'cla in the Islamic Magrel AQIM, in the assassination of the U. S Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western sources realize Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Salafist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the attack on the U. S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities Just as Ansar al Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045750 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768. Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos. 3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia terrorist group killed four national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from flaftar Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa. According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al Sharia's senior commanders, Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility. 4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLAJMisrata force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns 5. Source Comment:In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Bani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shaban, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walk. The Misrata commanders report that Shaban was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council GNC, demanded the surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shaban. As the fighting expanded through late September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739768 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045751
[(0.9713799826695149, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739769 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:H hrod17 clintonemail. corn Sent Thursday, October 25, 2012 10:18 AM To:'Russorv state. gov' Subject Fw; H; Latest intel:Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid Attachments:hrc memo Libyan Leadership Private Discussions 102512. doo Pis print. From:Sidney Blumenthal mato Sent:Thursday, October 25, 2012 09:57 AM Eastern Standard Time To:H Subject:H:Latest intel:Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid CONFIDENTIAL October 25, 2012 For:Hillary From:Ski Re:Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions Plans SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Aimy NLA Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias believing that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, supported by the Misrata troops, that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General IChalifa Belqasirn Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and Southeastern Libya UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No F-2015-04841 Doc No C05739769 Date 05 13 2015 B6 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045752 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739769 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb AQIM, in the assassination of the U. S. Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Sala. fist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the attack on the U. S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar at Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos. 3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar at Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia terrorist group killed four national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa. According to this sensitive source, the NLA. suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar at Shaaia's senior commanders, Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility. 4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of Bani Walid approximately mot miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qadclafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NTLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLA Misrata force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns. 5. Source Comment:In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Rani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shaban, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata commanders report that Shaban was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qadclafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council GNC, demanded the surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shaban. As the fighting expanded through late September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739769 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045753 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739769 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL October 25, 2012 For:Hilary From:Sid Re:Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions Plans SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army NLA Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011 civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, supported by the Misrata troops, that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa Belciasim Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and Southeastern Libya. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb AQ1M, in the assassination of the U. S. Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western sources realize Mangoush informs them that AQIIvf and radical Salafist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the attack on the U. S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar al Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739769 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045754 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739769 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program, He also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos. 3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Amu al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia terrorist group killed four national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al Sharia's senior commanders, Saran bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility. 4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government That said the NLA Misrata force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns. S. Source Comment:In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Bani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shaban, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bard Walid The Misrata commanders report that Shahan was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sine. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council GNC, demanded the surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shahan As the fighting expanded through late September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739769 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045755")]
176 [176 177]
0.973319453637
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent To:Subject:Attachments:B6 Thursday, January 5, 2012 12:26 PM H:latest int libyan conflicts, leaders rniittias, Sid hrc_merno_libyan_leaders_kmilitias_010512. docx CONFIDENTIAL January 5, 2012 For:HRC From:Sid Re:Libyan leadership and militias SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister Abdurrahina el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jai engaged in a series of emergency planning meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National Transitional Council NTC Government According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, as well as the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-Keib's office and demanded better treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi advisors from the new government 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Mamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control, That said, el Keib has been told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood MB that even Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command, This is particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias. 3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045107 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood MB that even Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command. This is particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias. 3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yaw, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Ngeb Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange. 4-Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jalil are also very concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses 'contacts. 5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011e1-Kieb resisted efforts by General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a relationship with the U. S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia leaders and in late December 20 ael-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef Mangoush to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters, particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible, before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war. 6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jail are attempting to reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living standards are met. 7. Source Comment:One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative Islamic Republic. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045108 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL January 5, 2012 For:HR, C From:Sid Re:Libyan leadership and militias SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa, Abdul Jafil engaged in a series of emergency planning meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National Transitional Council NTC Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, as well as the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-ICeib's office and demanded better treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi advisors from the new government. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of a vet, sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Bell and his conservative Islamist supporters, By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control. That said, el Keit has been told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood MB that even Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhaj's loose command. This is particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias. 3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a particular target of the militiamen In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045109 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglarn, National Oil Company chief Nur Berrusien, and Ngeb Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange. 4. Source Comment. In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jail are also very concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of Chief of Staff of the National Army, El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle this matter in short order to avoid provoking sec. urity concerns among foreign allies and businesses contacts 5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011el-Kieb resisted efforts by General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a relationship with the U. S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia leaders and in late December 2011el-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of Qadclafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of Defense Osaina al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters, particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff El-Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible, before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Marigotish, but the Prime Minister believes that the Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war. 6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and hill are attempting to reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living standards are met. 7. Source Comment:One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that be is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya He believes that if he does not disarm the militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long tern relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative Islamic Republic. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739789 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045110
[(0.9733194536369308, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739794 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:H hroc117 clintonemail. com Sent Thursday, January 5, 2012 5:16 PM To:'sulliyanfOstate. gott Subject Fw:H:latest Intel libyan conflicts, leaders militias. Sid Attachments:hrc_memo_libyanJeaders__ _militias_010511doa Worrying. Pls distribute and request feedback from Jeff, Cretz, et al. From:Sent:nursciay, January ub, 2012 1Z:Zfa PM To:H Subject:H:latest intel libyari conflicts, leaders militias. Sid B6 CONFIDENTIAL January, 2012 For:HRC From:Sid Re:Libyan leadership and militias SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jail engaged in a series of emergency planning meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National Transitional Council NTC Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muaimnar al Qaddafi, as well as the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-Keib's office and demanded better treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi advisors from the new government. 2. Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his conservative Islamist supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control,. That said, el Keib has been UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No F-2015-04841 Doc No C05739794 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. Date 05 13 2015 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045111 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739794 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood MB that even Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhars loose command. This is particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misrata and Zintan regional militias. 3. In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a particular target of the militiamen. In the opinion of well informed individuals, el-Keib's closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Nge, b Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange. 4. Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jail are also very concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses contacts. 5. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011e1-Kieb resisted efforts by General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a relationship with the U. S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular NTC army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia leaders and in late December 20liel-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-Keit is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of Qaddafi's elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters, particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff. El-Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible, before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war. 6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jalil are attempting to reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi Abd All as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living standards are met. 7, Source Comment:One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long term relationships with Libya. El-Keil3 believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative Islamic Republic. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739794 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045112 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739794 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL January 5, 2012 For. HRC From:Sid Re:Libyan leadership and militias SOURCE. Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services, 1. During the last week of December 2011, and the first week of 2012, Libya's Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib and President Mustafa Abdul Jalil engaged in a series of emergency planning meetings attempting to deal with specific issues threatening the stability of the new National Transitional Council NTC Government. According to extremely sensitive sources speaking in strict confidence, paramount among these issues are the questions of disarming and rewarding the regional militias who bore the majority of the fighting against the regime of Muammar al Qadclafi, as well as the related issue of finding ministers and senior administrators for the new government who are acceptable to these revolutionary forces. These individuals noted that on four occasions, beginning on December 23, 2011, groups or angry militiamen came to el-ICeib's office and demanded better treatment, a clear message of support for the role of Islamic law, and the removal of former Qaddafi advisors from the new government. 2, Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib is genuinely concerned that this situation could spiral out of control and threatens the regime. He also suspects that much of the unrest is being stirred by General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj and his conservatiti'e Islamist supporters. By staying out of the new government, Belhaj has established a position from which he can criticize their actions and appointments without concern or control. That said, el Keib has been told by his contacts in the Moslem Brotherhood MB that even Belhaj has been surprised that the unrest in the militias has begun to manifest itself in fighting between groups that previously shared the same goals and operated under Belhaj s loose command. This is particularly true in the case of the increasingly violent conflicts between the Misr and Zintan regional militias. 3, In an effort to address these problems el-Keib is making changes in his new administration, removing Minister of Economics Taher Sherkaz, who, as a former economic advisor to Qaddafi, was a particular target of the militiamen_ In the opinion of well informed el-Keib's closest and most influential advisors are experts with economic UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739794 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045113 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739794 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. backgrounds and experience dealing with Western firms and governments. The most influential of this group are Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, Minister of Finance Hassan Ziglam, National Oil Company chief Nuni Berrusien, and Ngeb Obeda from the Libyan Stock Exchange. 4. Source Comment:In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el-Keib and Jra. Ill are also very concerned over growing criticism that these technocrats are puppets of various Western governments and firms. Belhaj and the militiamen appear intent on limiting the influence of these Western entities, using them as a weapon to weaken the el-Keib regime. This trend is also affecting national security, where, despite el-Keib's efforts to maintain a balance between the Islamists, regional commanders, and the national army, a potentially dangerous conflict has arisen over the position of Chief of Staff of the National Army. El-Kieb, according to this individual, believes that he must settle this matter in short order to avoid provoking security concerns among foreign allies and businesses contacts. S. According to a knowledgeable individual, in late December 2011el-Kieb resisted efforts by General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar to establish himself as the Chief of Staff of the National Army. Haftar, who lived in the United States for many years and is believed by Belhaj and others to have a relationship with the U. S. Government, is using his popularity among the officer corps of the regular Nrc army to support his claim to be Chief of Staff. This produced heated protests from militia leaders and in late December 2011el-Keib named deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Yussef al-Mangoush, to be Chief of Staff. In the opinion of one source, this is a problematic choice, since el-Keib is replacing the supposedly pro-American Haftar with al-Mangoush who commanded one of Qaddafrs elite Special Forces units, even after the revolution began. This individual believes that el-Keib's decision was driven by personal animosity toward Haftar, and the influence of Minister of Defense Osama al-Juwali. The situation is far from resolved, as Haftar and his supporters, particularly in the Benghazi garrison, continue to claim that the General is the true Chief of Staff, El-Keib and al-Juwali are working to reconcile all of the elements in this conflict as quickly as possible, before the supporters of the two claimants begin fighting. In the meantime, el-Keib has stated in private that he fully expects Belhaj to attack al-Mangoush, but the Prime Minister believes that the Colonel is the only officer strong enough to disarm the militias and avoid a civil war. 6. At the same time, a very sensitive source added that el-Keib and Jalil are attempting to reconcile the fighting between Misrata and Zintan forces in Tripoli by naming Misrata leader Fawzi Abd Ali as Minister of the Interior and al-Juwali, who was commander of the Zintan militia, as Minister of Defense. To date, according to this individual, this effort has met with limited success, as the fighting has continued and the militias are refusing to disarm until their demands regarding living standards are met 7. Source Comment:One very sensitive source noted, that el-Keib is aware of the fact that he is running out of time to stabilize the situation in Libya. He believes that if he does not disarm the militias and meet their demands in the next six months there is a good chance of increased fighting among rival groups that could lead to civil war. In any event, he realizes that the ongoing instability will cause Western governments, firms, and banks, to hesitate before committing themselves to long term relationships with Libya. El-Keib believes that Belhaj and his advisors have made the same judgment, and are waiting to fill any vacuum created by this violence, by establishing a conservative Islamic Republic. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739794 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045114")]
193 [193 198]
0.974809191051
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739874 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sullivan, Jacob I SullivanJJ state. gov Sent:Tuesday, April 3, 2012 649 PM To:Subject:FW:Latest from HRC's contact FYI Original Message-----From:Stevens, John C Sent:Tuesday, April 03, 2012 6:33 PM To:Sullivan, Jacobi Cc:Feltrnan, Jeffrey 0; Cretz, Gene A Subject:RE:Latest from HRC's contact Very interesting report. By chance, Imet with our insightful in Benghazi yesterday and we discussed B6 the LMB's electoral prospects. He didn't think they would have a large following b c they don't have a strong organization and because most Libyans view the LMB as a branch of the Egyptian MB, and Libyans don't want to be ruled by Egypt. He did not mention the interesting point below about the LMB as a counterbalance to the eastern based Federalists. He did emphasize, though, that the Federalist movement has widespread support in the east and will continue to up the ante with Tripoli, including possibly making a move on the oil production in that part of the country AGOCO, a large state-owned oil company, is based in Benghazi.-- Chris SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED Original Message From:Sullivan, Jacobi Sent:Tuesday, April 03, 2012 12:44 PM To Feltman, Jeffrey D., Cretz, Gene A; Stevens, John C Subject:Latest from HRC's contact Below is the latest report from HRC's contact; would be interested in your reactions. SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During the last week of March 2012, the leaders of the National Transitional Council NTC regime in Libya discussed the rising popularity and independence of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood LMB in preparation for the national parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2012. According to a source with direct access to these discussions, President Mustafa Abclel Jalil stated in very direct terms that he sees the emergence of the LMB as a major factor in the upcoming elections, which are already complicated by the Federalist movement for the semi autonomous status of the historic Eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica Barge in Arabic. Minister of Defense Ousarra al Juwali and Prime Minister Abdurrahirn el Keib both believe that the rise of the LMB, which was a relatively minor member of the NTC until November 2011, is, in fact, related to the Federalist movement fl Eastern Libya. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739874 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045172 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739874 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. According to al Juwali, a native of the Western Libyan region of Zintan, the LMB is drawing strength from people who fear that the Federalist movement in Barqa will result in that region dominating the country, gaining control of an inordinate share of the country's oil and mineral reserves. For his part, Jalil stated that he agrees with Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza that if matters are not resolved by the July elections, the unsettled nature of the political process in Libya will damage the country's image as a business partner and confuse foreign banks and oil firms attempting to open new contacts with the new Libyan Government, or reactivate existing agreements. 2. According to a sensitive source, while discussing this matter with Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis Management Unit in the NTC, Prime Minister el Keib stated that the most problematic aspect of the rise of the LMB is the leadership role taken by Islamist militia leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj. In the opinion of this source, the NTC leadership sees Belhaj as one of the greatest threats to the long term success of their regime. Al Juwali also notes that Belhaj is the head of the founding committee for the LMB's Justice and Construction Party JCP. As the Federalist movement took hold in early March 2012, al Juwali, under instruction from el Keib and Jalil, met with Belhaj and other Western militia leaders to arrange for their support In the event military force is needed to hold the country together. Belhaj represented the most effective of the Western militias. 3. According to the Minister of Defense, this situation with the Federalist movement enhanced Belhaj's prestige at the time he was working to secure a leadership role in the LMB and the JCP. El Keib and Jalil are concerned that, despite the fact that the LMB has a limited base after years of suppression by the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, they will appeal to those Libyans who believe that the NTC regime is under the influence of the United States and Western Europe. The activities of Belhaj in both the LMB and the JCP reinforce this view. Jalil finds this situation frustrating, particularly in the light of his regular assurances that Libya would operate under Islamic law, and while maintaining appropriate ties to the West, will remain hostile to Israel. 4. Source Comment:In a private conversation, Jalil stated that he is working to balance the internal political realities of Libya against the concerns of the international business community. The President is concerned that the appointment of BenYezza as Oil Minister in October 2011 provided the JCP with a tangible concern to use against NTC candidates during the July elections. After his long experience as a senior official of the Multinational Italian Oil Firm ENI, Ben Yezza is viewed by Belhaj and many members of the LMB as a symbol of the issue they will pursue in the national election, the idea that NTC, like the Qaddafi, regime is corrupt and involved in allowing foreign interests to control the nation's mineral wealth. That said, Jalil continues to agree with el Keib that Ben Yezza is an excellent administrator, and in the long run will play an important role in effectively managing the nation's mineral wealth. 5. According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil and his advisors have been in contact with Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, the leader of the much larger and more powerful Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood EMB. This contact is largely based on the President's need to address reports he has received that the LMB is reaching out to Badie and his advisors for support. This effort is particularly important given the belief among NTC leaders that the EMB and its Freedom and Justice Party FJP will control the Government of Egypt as that country moves to civilian rule later in 2012. In the opinion of this source, Badie is sympathetic to Jalil's position, especially since the Libyan President and el Keib were members of the EMB during their student days in Egypt. The Supreme Guide will, according to Jalil, work to influence the LMB to establish a cooperative effort with the NTC. Badie will point out the fact that his ability to cooperate with both the Supreme Council for the Armed Force SCAF, as well as the Salafist al Nour party, helped establish the EMB as the dominant political force in Egypt, while avoiding high levels of violence. 6. Source Comment:An extremely sensitive source within the EMB agreed that Badie and Jalil have spoken in an effort to develop a plan to deal with the LMB. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739874 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045173 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739874 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. According to this source, Jalil told Badie that the LMB and the JCP are far more intolerant of foreign business and banking interests than the NTC, and a strong showing in the July elections will strengthen Belhaj and other conservative Islamists, adversely affecting the Libyan economy, which in turn will cause problems for Egypt as it recovers from its own revolution in 2011. Jalil emphasized that at this point the NTC has managed to avoid violent outbursts between competing groups, even in the face of the Federalist movement in the East, in a region that borders Egypt. He warned that an LMB JCP victory might change this and lead to increased violence between rival militias that could wash over into Egypt. 7. According to a sensitive source, the LMB has a complex history and Jalil and el Keib believe this past may hold some points which can be used against the Brotherhood and the JCP in the July elections. The TNTC leaders know that after Qaddafi came to power in 1969, the LMB was repressed and many of its leaders were executed publicly. Eventually the Brotherhood, having reestablished itself in the United States and Europe, entered into a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime 1999, and in 2005 began a series of negotiations with SW al-Islam Qaddafi, whose goal was to co-opt and neutralize opposition groups, particularly Islamist ones. 8. According to this individual, Belhaj and the other Islamist leaders mistrusted the LMB during the first months of the 2011 revolution. However, Belhaj eventually established a working relationship with Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of the Revolutionary Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and the former deputy defense minister in the NTC. Abu Kltef was a leading figure in the LMB who spent more than 18 years in prison, including the notorious facility at Abu SeIlm. Under Abu Kitef and leaders like Dr. Abdullah Shamia, who was in charge of the economic committee of the NTC, the Brotherhood established itself as a unique group within the Jai Keib regime; serving there until they began to plan for independent political activity in late 2011 and early 2012. 9. In early 2012, as the relationship between the NTC and Belhaj and the other Islamists deteriorated in the face of regional and ethnic power struggles, the LMB leadership, in coordination with Belhaj began to look at an independent political effort in the parliamentary elections. During its first public conference in Benghazi during November 2011, the LMB elected a new leader, increased its consultative council membership from 11 to 30 leaders, and decided to form a political party; the JCP. Mohammed Swan, the former head of the Libyan LMB's Consultative Council, won a tight victory over longtime LMB leader Soliman Abd al-Qadr, to become the first leader of the JCP. Bashir al-Kubty was elected General Observer of the LMB. 10. Source comment:According to an individual with excellent access, the LMB leaders are sensitive to charges that the JCP is a party with a narrow religious agenda, and they encouraged Walid al-Sakran, non-member of the LMB, to compete as a candidate for JCP leadership. That said Belhaj and other Islamist leaders believe that the LMB is set to follow the electoral path of Islamist success seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries. Belhaj now believes that the country will move forward under sharia law, administered by the Islamist bloc, including the LMB JCP UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739874 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045174
[(0.9748091910512345, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sullivan, Jacob J SullivanJJ state. gov Sent:Tuesday, April 3, 2012 7:17 PM To:Subject:RE:Latest from HRC's contact Can I call you in 30? Several items. Original Message-- From:H mailto:HDR22 clintonemall. corn Sent:Tuesday, April 03, 2012 7:11 PM To:Sullivan, Jacob Subject:Re:Latest from HRC's contact Anything to report? I can call now If you're free.---- Original Message From:Sullivan, Jacob mallto:SullIvanil state. gov Sent:Tuesday, April 03, 2012 06:48 PM To:H Subject:FW:Latest from HRC's contact FYI Original Message From:Stevens, John C Sent:Tuesday, April 03, 2012 6:33 PM To:Sullivan, Jacob J Cc:Feltman, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A Subject:RE:Latest from HRC's contact Very interesting report. By chance, I met with our insightful n Benghazi yesterday and we discussed B6 the LMB's electoral prospects. He didn't think they would have a large following bic they don't have a strong organization and because most Libyans view the LMB as a branch of the Egyptian MB, and Libyans don't want to be ruled by Egypt. He did not mention the interesting point below about the LMB as a counterbalance to the eastern-based Federalists. He did emphasize, though, that the Federalist movement has widespread support in the east and will continue to up the ante with Tripoli, including possibly making a move on the oil production in that part of the country AGOCO, a large state-owned oil company, is based in Benghazi.-- Chris SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED Original Message From:Sullivan, Jacob J Sent:Tuesday, April 03, 2012 12:44 PM To:Feltrnan, Jeffrey D; Cretz, Gene A; Stevens, John C Subject:Latest from HRC's contact Below is the latest report from HRC's contact; would be interested in your reactions. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045175 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. During the last week of March 2012, the leaders of the National Transitional Council NTC regime in Libya discussed the rising popularity and independence of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood LMB in preparation for the national parliamentary elections scheduled for July 2012. According to a source with direct access to these discussions, President Mustafa Abdel Jalil stated in very direct terms that he sees the emergence of the LMB as a major factor in the upcoming elections, which are already complicated by the Federalist movement for the semi-autonomous status of the historic Eastern Libyan region of Cyrenalca Barqa in Arabic. Minister of Defense Ousama at Juwali and Prime Minister Abdurrahim el Keib both believe that the rise of the LMB, which was a relatively minor member of the NTC until November 2011, is, in fact, related to the Federalist movement in Eastern Libya. According to al Juwali, a native of the Western Libyan region of Zintan, the LMB is drawing strength from people who fear that the Federalist movement in Barqa will result in that region dominating the country, gaining control of an inordinate share of the country's oil and mineral reserves. For his part, Jalil stated that he agrees with Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza that if matters are not resolved by the July elections, the unsettled nature of the political process in Libya will damage the country's image as a business partner and confuse foreign banks and oil firms attempting to open new contacts with the new Libyan Government, or reactivate existing agreements. 2. According to a sensitive source, while discussing this matter with Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis Management Unit in the NTC, Prime Minister el Keib stated that the most problematic aspect of the rise of the LMB is the leadership role taken by Islamist militia leader General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj. In the opinion of this source, the NTC leadership sees Belhaj as one of the greatest threats to the long term success of their regime. Al Juwali also notes that Belhaj is the head of the founding committee for the LMB's Justice and Construction Party JCP. As the Federalist movement took hold in early March 2012, al Juwali, under instruction from el Keib and Jalil, met with Belhaj and other Western militia leaders to arrange for their support in the event military force is needed to hold the country together. Belhaj represented the most effective of the Western militias. 3. According to the Minister of Defense, this situation with the Federalist movement enhanced Belhaj's prestige at the time he was working to secure a leadership role in the LMB and the JCP. El Keib and Jalil are concerned that, despite the fact that the LMB has a limited base after years of suppression by the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, they will appeal to those Libyans who believe that the NTC regime is under the influence of the United States and Western Europe. The activities of Belhaj in both the LMB and the JCP reinforce this view. Jalil finds this situation frustrating, particularly in the light of his regular assurances that Libya would operate under Islamic law, and while maintaining appropriate ties to the West, will remain hostile to Israel. 4. Source Comment:In a private conversation, Jalil stated that he is working to balance the internal political realities of Libya against the concerns of the international business community. The President is concerned that the appointment of BenYezza as Oil Minister in October 2011 provided the JCP with a tangible concern to use against NTC candidates during the July elections. After his long experience as a senior official of the Multinational Italian Oil Firm NI, Ben Yezza is viewed by Belhaj and many members of the LMB as a symbol of the issue they will pursue in the national election, the idea that NTC, like the Qaddafi, regime is corrupt and involved in allowing foreign interests to control the nation's mineral wealth. That said, Jalil continues to agree with el Keib that Ben Yezza is an excellent administrator, and in the long run will play an important role in effectively managing the nation's mineral wealth. 5. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045176 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. According to an extremely sensitive source, Jalil and his advisors have been in contact with Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, the leader of the much larger and more powerful Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood EMB. This contact is largely based on the President's need to address reports he has received that the LMB is reaching out to Badie and his advisors for support. This effort is particularly important given the belief among NTC leaders that the EMB and its Freedom and Justice Party FJP will control the Government of Egypt as that country moves to civilian rule later in 2012. In the opinion of this source, Badie is sympathetic to Jalil's position, especially since the Libyan President and el Keib were members of the EMB during their student days in Egypt. The Supreme Guide will, according to Jalil, work to influence the LMB to establish a cooperative effort with the NTC. Sadie will point out the fact that his ability to cooperate with both the Supreme Council for the Armed Force SCAF, as well as the Salafist al Nour party, helped establish the EMB as the dominant political force in Egypt, while avoiding high levels of violence. 6. Source Comment:An extremely sensitive source within the EMB agreed that Badie and Jalil have spoken in an effort to develop a plan to deal with the LMB. According to this source, Jalil told Badie that the LMB and the JCP are far more intolerant of foreign business and banking interests than the NTC, and a strong showing in the July elections will strengthen Belhaj and other conservative Islamists, adversely affecting the Libyan economy, which in turn will cause problems for Egypt as it recovers from its own revolution in 2011. Jaill emphasized that at this point the NTC has managed to avoid violent outbursts between competing groups, even in the face of the Federalist movement in the East, in a region that borders Egypt. He warned that an LMB JCP victory might change this and lead to increased violence between rival militias that could wash over into Egypt. 7. According to a sensitive source, the LMB has a complex history and Jalil and el Keib believe this past may hold some points which can be used against the Brotherhood and the JCP in the July elections. The TNTC leaders know that after Qaddafi came to power in 1969, the LMB was repressed and many of its leaders were executed publicly. Eventually the Brotherhood, having reestablished itself in the United States and Europe, entered into a dialogue with the Qaddafi regime 1999, and in 2005 began a series of negotiations with Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, whose goal was to co-opt and neutralize opposition groups, particularly Islamist ones. 8. According to this individual, Belhaj and the other Islamist leaders mistrusted the LMB during the first months of the 2011 revolution. However, Belhaj eventually established a working relationship with Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of the Revolutionary Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and the former deputy defense minister in the NTC. Abu Kitef was a leading figure in the LMB who spent more than 18 years in prison, including the notorious facility at Abu Selim. Under Abu Kitef and leaders like Dr. Abdullah Shamia, who was in charge of the economic committee of the NTC, the Brotherhood established itself as a unique group within the Jalil el Keib regime; serving there until they began to plan for independent political activity in late 2011 and early 2012. 9. In early 2012, as the relationship between the NTC and Belhaj and the other Islamists deteriorated in the face of regional and ethnic power struggles, the LMB leadership, in coordination with Belhaj began to look at an independent political effort in the parliamentary elections. During its first public conference in Benghazi during November 2011, the LMB elected a new leader, increased its consultative council membership from 11 to 30 leaders, and decided to form a political party; the JCP. Mohammed Swan, the former head of the Libyan LMB's Consultative Council, won a tight victory over longtime LMB leader Solirnan Abd al-Qadr, to become the first leader of the JCP. Bashir al-Kubty was elected General Observer of the LMB. 10. Source comment:According to an individual with excellent access, the LMB leaders are sensitive to charges that the JCP is a party with a narrow religious agenda, and they encouraged Walid al-Sakran, non-member of the LMB, to compete as a candidate for JCP leadership. That said Belhaj and other Islamist leaders believe that the LMB is set to follow the electoral path of Islamist success seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045177 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Belhaj now believes that the country will move forward under sharia law, administered by the Islamist bloc, including the LMB JCP UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739875 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-5CB0045178")]
265 [265 266]
0.975751086413
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent:To:Subject Attachments:H hrod17 clintonemaiLcom Wednesday, July 4, 2012 7:54 AM 'sullivanjj state. gov' Fw:H:Libyan elections intel. Sid hrc memo libyan elections intel 070312. docx More info. B6 From:Sent:Tuesday, July 03, 2012 07:08 PM To:1-1 Subject:H:Ubyan elections Intel. Sid CONFIDENTIAL July 3, 2012 For:Hillary From:Sid Re:Libyan election SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. Libyan National Transitional Council NTC President Mustafa Abdel Jalil expected the final days leading to the July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes violent; however, according to a knowledgeable individual, he is particularly concerned by the level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the electoral process. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General National Congress GNC to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in extreme confidence that the NTC may have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government is firmly in place. That said he still plans to have interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down after the election results have been certified. The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes shape to choose a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jalil would like to keep several ministers from the el-Keib government in the new regime, particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali. 2. According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability in an effort to reassure foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal with the regional issues that divide the country's three electoral regions:Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica Barge in the East, and Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve these differences has strengthened the federalist movement in Barge while antagonizing the tribal leaders in the South. Both groups are calling on their followers to boycott the election while the Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its forces from the area around the town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the same time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the influence of Tripoli and the Western region on the upcoming elections. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045188 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 3. Source Comment:In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the 200 seats in the GNC lies at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania, 60 for Barqa, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At present, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood LMB and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party JCP, are attempting to mount a national campaign, receiving discreet advice and technical support from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood EMB. With this assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that operates most effectively throughout the country. Jalil has established ties to the EMB, from whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamad Sowan and his associates are working with the leadership of the EMB. 4. According to his sources, Jalil believes that he can work with Sowan and the LMB JCP; however, he is concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President of Egypt, and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie are focused on developing Egyptian influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMB leaders want to establish a strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve Egypt's economic situation. Libyan officials in Cairo and Jalil's own associates are warning him that the Egyptians may see the NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB JCP, focusing his attention, and that of the el-Keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national elections. 5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the assistance of the Libyan National Party LNP, the Islamist group led by religious scholar Ali al-Salabi and former Islamist militant General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal conflicts between Sowan and Belhaj, Jalil believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the government. In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the NTC, and establish a more conservative Islamist regime. At the same time, since the LNP is a Tripoli based movement, Jalil fears that the tribal federalists in Barqa might react violently to them gaining an important role in the new government. Since the Barqa leaders are urging their followers to boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB JCB could lead to calls for Barge to secede from the Libya. Source Comment:The LNP is dominated by the former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group AI-Jamala al-Islamiyyah LIFG, who, according to sensitive sources, maintained ties to al Qa'ida during their struggle with the forces of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. 6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril is leading the National Forces Alliance NFA, an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi. While Jibril is not on the list of candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other Islamists as an effort by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that the NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new government. According to this source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni also plays an important role in the NFA. 7. At the same time, Jafil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the National Front NF, which is based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization. The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled intellectual dissident leader from a prominent Eastern Libyan family. Jalil's sources advise that the NF is also backed by the al-Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-autonomous or independent Barqa. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF leaders have ties to the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however, personal differences between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult. 8. Source Comment:In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that Jalil believes the LMB JCB will have a significant role in the new government, possibly supported by the LNP. However; he points out that since accurate polling is nonexistent it is impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jaill also noted that it is quite possible that no group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may require the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come. Accordingly, he has instructed al-Juwali to prepare to use the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units of the Army, including many of its armored forces are deployed in the Kufra region of the Southeast, in an effort to control tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist Qaddafi loyalists amongst the nomadic tribes of the region. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045189 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL July 3, 2012 For:Hillary From. Sid Re:Libyan election SOURCE. Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services 1. Libyan National Transitional Council NTC President Mustafa Abdel mil expected the final days leading to the July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes violent however, according to a knowledgeable individual, he is particularly concerned by the level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the electoral process. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General National Congress GNC to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in extreme confidence that the NTC may have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government is firmly in place. That said he still plans to have interim. Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down after the election results have been certified The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes shape to choose a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jalil would like to keep several ministers from the el-Keib government in the new regime, particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali. 2. According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability in an effort to reassure foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045190 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal with the regional issues that divide the country's three electoral regions:Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica Barqa in the East, and Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve these differences has strengthened the federalist movement in Barqa while antagonizing the tribal leaders in the South. Both groups are calling on their followers to boycott the election while the Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its forces from the area around the town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the same time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the influence of Tripoli and the Western region on the upcoming elections. 3. Source Comment:In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the 200 seats in the GNC lies at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania, 60 for Barqa, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At present, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood LMB and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party JCP, are attempting to mount a national campaign, receiving discreet advice and technical support from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood EMB. With this assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that operates most effectively throughout the country. Jalil has established ties to the EMB, from whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamad Sowan and his associates are working with the leadership of the EMB. 4. According to his sources, Jalil believes that he can work with Sowan and the LMB JCP; however, he is concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President of Egypt, and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie are focused on developing Egyptian influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMB leaders want to establish a strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve Egypt's economic situation Libyan officials in Cairo and Jalil's own associates are warning him that the Egyptians may see the NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB JCP, focusing his attention, and that of the el-Keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national elections. 5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the assistance of the Libyan National Party LNP, the Islamist group led by religious scholar All al-Salabi and former Islamist militant General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal conflicts between Sowan and Belhaj, Jalil believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the government In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the NTC, and establish a more conservative Islamist regime. At the same time, since the LNP is a Tripoli based movement, Jalil fears that the tribal federalists in Barqa might react violently to them gaining an UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045191 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. important role in the new government. Since the Barqa leaders are urging their followers to boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB JCB could lead to calls for Barqa to secede from the Libya. Source Comment:The LNP is dominated by the former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah LIFG, who, according to sensitive sources, maintained ties to al Qa'ida during their stru e with the forces of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. 6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril is leading the National Forces Alliance NFA, an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Muarnmar al Qaddafi. While Jibril is not on the list of candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other Islamists as an effort by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that the NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new government. According to this source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni also plays an important role in the NFA. 7. At the same time, Jalil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the National Front NF, which is based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization. The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled intellectual dissident leader from a prominent Eastern Libyan family. Jahr s sources advise that the NF is also backed by the al-Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-autonomous or independent Barqa. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF leaders have ties to the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however, personal differences between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult. 8. Source Comment:In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that Jalil believes the LMB JCB will have a significant role in the new government, possibly supported by the LNP. However; he points out that since accurate polling is nonexistent it is impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jalil also noted that it is quite possible that no group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may require the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come. Accordingly, he has instructed al-Juwali to prepare to use the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units of the Army, including many of its armored forces are deployed in the Kufra region of the Southeast, in an effort to control tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist Qaddafi loyalists amongst the nomadic tribes of the region. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739880 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045192
[(0.9757510864131833, "From:Sent:Tuesday, July 03, 2012 07:08 PM To:H Subject:H:Libyan elections Intel. Sid B6 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent To:Subject Attachments:H hrod17 clintonemail. com Tuesday, July 17, 2012 7:16 AM 'Russorv state. gov. Fw:H:Libyan elections intel. Sid hrc memo libyan elections intel 070312. docx Pls print. CONFIDENTIAL July 3, 2012 For Hillary From:Sid Re:Libyan election SOURCE:Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services. 1. Libyan National Transitional Council NTC President Mustafa Abdel Jalil expected the final days leading to the July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes violent; however, according to a knowledgeable individual, he is particularly concerned by the level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the electoral process. In the opinion of this individual, Jalil and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General National Congress GNC to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in extreme confidence that the NTC may have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government is firmly in place. That said he still plans to have interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down after the election results have been certified. The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes shape to choose a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jalil would like to keep several ministers from the el-Keib government in the new regime, particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwali. 2. According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability in an effort to reassure foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal with the regional issues that divide the country's three electoral regions:Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica Barqa in the East, and Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve these differences has strengthened the federalist movement in Barqa while antagonizing the tribal leaders in the South. Both groups are calling on their followers to boycott the election while the Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its forces from the area around the town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the same time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the influence of Tripoli and the Western region on the upcoming elections. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045199 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. 3. Source Comment In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the 200 seats in the GNC lies at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania, 60 for Banta, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At present, the Libyan MUSlifIl Brotherhood LMB and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party JCP, are attempting to mount a national campaign, receiving discreet advice and technic. al support from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood EMB. Withthis assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that operates most effectively throughout the country. JO has established ties to the EMB, from whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamed Sowan and his associates are working with the leadership of the EMB. 4, According to his sources, Jai believes that he can work with Sowan and the LMB JCP; however, he is concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President of Egypt and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed Bathe are focused on developing Egyptian influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMS leaders want to establish a strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve Egypt's economic situation. Libyan officials in Cairo and Jallfs own associates are warning him that the Egyptians may see the NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB JCP, focusing his attention, and that of the el-keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national elections. 5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the assistance of the Libyan National Party LNP, the Islamist group led by religious scholar All al-Salabi and former Islarnist militant General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal conflicts between Sowan and Bethel Jalii believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the government. In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the RITC, and establish a more conservative Islamist regime. At the same time since the LNP is a Tn'poli based movement, Jalil fears that the tribal federalists in Barge might react violently to them gaining an important role in the new government. Since the Barge leaders are urging their followers to boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB JCB could lead to calls for Barge to secede from the Libya. Source Comment:The LNP is dominated by the former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group AI-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah LIFG, who according to sensitive sources, maintained ties to at Oalcia during their struggle with the forces of former dictator! Muenster at Qaddafi. 6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmotel Jibril is leading the National Forces Alliance NFA, an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Nluammar at Qaddafi. VVhile Jibril is not on the list of candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other Islamists as an effort by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that the NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new government. According to this source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tanhouni also plays an important role in the NFA. 7, At the same time Jalil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the National Front NF, which is based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization. The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled intellectual dissident leader from a prominent Eastern Libyan family, Jai's sources advise that the NF is also backed by the al-Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-autonomous or independent Barga. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF leaders have ties to the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however, personal differences between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult. 8. Source Comment:In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that Jalil believes the LNIBIJCB will have a significant role in the new government possibly supported by the LNP. However; he points out that since accurate polling is nonexistent it is impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jaill also noted that it is quite possible that no group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may require the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come. Accordingly, he has instructed ahArwalii to prepare to use the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units of the Army, including many of its armored forces are deployed in the kutra region of the Southeast, in an effort to control tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist Qaddati loyalists amongst the nomadic tribes of the region. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045200 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. CONFIDENTIAL July 3, 2012 For:Hilary From. Sid Re Libyan election SOURCE:Sources. vvith direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security ser ices. 1, Libyan National Transitional Council NTC President Mustafa Abdel Jail expected the final days leading to the July 7, 2012 national elections to be complicated and sometimes violent however, according to a knowledgeable individual, he is particularly concerned by the level of control exerted by regional militia's and political groups on the electoral process. In the opinion of this individual, Jahl and his advisors believe that, given the level of suspicion and frustration felt in the various parts of the country, it will be difficult for the new 200 seat General National Congress GNC to establish its authority, draft a new constitution, and establish new national government. With this in mind, Jalil stated in extreme confidence that the NTC may have to remain in power until the situation becomes stable and a new government is firmly in place. That said he still plans to have interim Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib step down after the election results have been certified. The NTC will then work with the GNC as it takes shape to choose a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jail would like to keep several ministers from the el-Keib government in the new regime, particularly Minister of Defense Ousama al-Juwal i 2 According to this individual, Jalil wants to maintain a degree of security and stability in an effort to reassure foreign businesses and banks that Libya will not descend into civil war UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045201 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. and chaos. At the same time, the NTC must deal with the regional issues that divide the country's three electoral regions:Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica Barqa in the East, and Fezzan in the South. In the weeks leading up to the election the failure of the NTC to resolve these differences has strengthened the federalist movement in Barqa while antagonizing the tribal leaders in the South. Both groups are calling on their followers to boycott the election while the Southerners are calling for the National Army to withdraw its forces from the area around the town of Kufra, where they are deployed to stop fighting between tribal militias. At the same time, on July 1 federalist supporters attacked electoral offices in Benghazi, protesting the influence of Tripoli and the Western region on the upcoming elections. 3. Source Comment:In the opinion of a knowledgeable individual, the division of the 200 seats in the GNC lies at the heart of this matter, with 120 seats allotted for the Tripolitania, 60 for Barqa, and 18 for the Fezzan area. At present, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood LMB and its political arm, the Justice and Construction Party JCP, are attempting to mount a national campaign, receiving discreet advice and technical support from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood EMB. With this assistance, Jalil is convinced that the JCP is the party that operates most effectively throughout the country. Jalil has established ties to the EMB, from whom he has learned that JCP leader Mohamad Sowan and his associates are working with the leadership of the EMB. 4. According to his sources, Jalil believes that he can work with Sowan and the LMB JCP; however, he is concerned that Mohammed Morsi, the newly elected EMB President of Egypt, and EMB Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie are focused on developing Egyptian influence in Libya. Jalil has been informed privately that these EMB leaders want to establish a strong position in Libya, particularly in the oil services sector as part of their effort to improve Egypt's economic situation. Libyan officials in Cairo and Jalil's own associates are warning him that the Egyptians may see the NTC as a potential barrier to their effort and are advising Sowan to press for an early withdrawal of Jalil and the NTC from Libyan politics. For his part, Jalil has attempted to avoided direct conflict with the LMB JCP, focusing his attention, and that of the el-Keib interim government on trying to deal with the unrest in the period leading up to the national elections. 5. According to a particularly sensitive source, Jalil believes that Sowan will need the assistance of the Libyan National Party LNP, the Islamist group led by religious scholar Ali al-Salabi and former Islamist militant General Abdel Hakim Alamin Belhaj to gain enough seats to control the GNC. While there are significant personal conflicts between Sowan and Belhaj, Jalil believes that the two groups could work together to gain control of the government. In this case, Jalil believes the new regime would move quickly to oust the NTC, and establish a more conservative Islamist regime. At the same time, since the LNP is a Tripoli based movement, Nil fears that the tribal federalists in Barqa might react violently to them gaining an UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045202 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. important role in the new government. Since the Barqa leaders are urging their followers to boycott the election, a strong role for the LNP in coalition with the LMB JCB could lead to calls for Barqa to secede from the Libya. Source Comment:The LNP is dominated by the former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group AI-Jamala al-Islamiyyah LIFO, who, according to sensitive sources, maintained ties to al Qa'ida during their struggle with the forces of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi 6. Former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril is leading the National Forces Alliance NFA, an umbrella coalition of liberal parties that received Western support for efforts to overthrow the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi. While fibril is not on the list of candidates, his presence in the NFA leadership is seen by Belhaj and other Islamists as an effort by the United States and Western Europe to manipulate the election. Jalil does not believe that the NFA can gain control of enough seats in parliament to play a significant role in the new government. According to this source, Jalil believes that former Oil and Finance Minister Mi Tarhouni also plays an important role in the NFA. 7. At the same time, Jalil is watching the progress of a second moderate party, the National Front NF, which is based on the work of a 1980s-era anti-Qaddafi exile organization. The party is led by Mohammed al-Magariaf, an exiled intellectual dissident leader from a prominent Eastern Libyan family. Jalil 's sources advise that the NF is also backed by the al-Sennusi tribe, the former Libyan royal family, who may be looking to play a role in a semi-autonomous or independent Barqa. One particularly sensitive source noted that many of the NF leaders have ties to the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom, and at one point Jalil believed that the NF might be able to work with the NFA; however, personal differences between the leaders of the two parties made effective cooperation difficult. 8. Source Comment:In the end, a particularly sensitive source stated in confidence that Jalil believes the LMB JCB will have a significant role in the new government, possibly supported by the LNP. However; he points out that since accurate polling is nonexistent it is impossible to predict a victor with any accuracy. Jalil also noted that it is quite possible that no group will win a clear victory, which, when added to the boycotts and pre-election violence may require the NTC maintain control of the country for some time to come Accordingly, he has instructed al-Juwali to prepare to use the National Army to maintain order. For his part Al-Juwali has warned that this will be a difficult task since the best units of the Army, including many of its armored forces are deployed in the Kufra region of the Southeast, in an effort to control tribal conflicts, stem the flow of weapons into the country from South Sudan, and resist Qaddafi loyalists amongst the nomadic tribes of the region UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739885 Date:05 13 2015 STATE DEPT.-PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045203")]
271 [271 275]
0.976506315279
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From:H hrod17 clintonemail. com Sent:Monday, July 6, 2009 8:43 AM To:'millscd state. gov. Cc:'ValmoroU state. gov'; 'sullivanjj state. gov'; Huma Abedin Subject:Re:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? I'm willing to see him whenever. Original Message From:Mills, Cheryl D MillsCD state. gov To:H Sent:Mon Jul 06 04:03:02 2009 Subject:Fw:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? Fyi Original Message From:Beale, Courtney A Kramer To:Mills, Cheryl D; Abedin, Huma; Valmoro, Lona J; Sullivan, Jacob Cc:S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E Sent:Sun Jul 05 23:47:57 2009 Subject:Re:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? They are now saying that Zelaya doesn't want to travel tomorrow because wants to participate remotely in the burial ceremony on Monday for those who died in violence at the airport today. He said he will return to Washington on Tuesday in time to meet in the late afternoon. They are asking if it would be possible to have the meeting sometime on Tuesday late afternoon instead. Courtney Original Message From:Mills, Cheryl D To:Beale, Courtney A Kramer; Abedin, Huma; Valmoro, Lona J; Sullivan, Jacob Cc:S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E Sent:Sun Jul 05 23:14:40 2009 Subject:Re:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? She previously had indicated noon or later for a meeting Original Message From:Beale, Courtney A Kramer To:Abedin, Huma; Valmoro, Lona J; Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J Cc:S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E Sent:Sun Jul 05 22:54:40 2009 Subject:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? Huma and Lona, UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 Sorry for the late email, but Central America Office Director Christopher Webster just called me to inquire about a possible meeting between Zelaya and the Secretary tomorrow. He said they are trying to convince Zelaya to return from San Salvador to the U. S. and that A S Shannon indicated the Secretary had said that she would be willing to meet with him tomorrow. They were wondering if they could give Zelaya a window of time for a meeting see email below from DCM in Sal Salvador. Please advise. Thanks, Courtney Original Message From:Webster, Christopher W Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:47 PM To:Beale, Courtney A Kramer Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Original Message From:Blau, Robert I Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:36 PM To:Webster, Christopher W Subject:Re:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 The plan is for Hugo Martinez to pull Zelaya aside for me to be able to urge that he get to washdc for mtg with S tomorrow. Please tell me if there is a time window for that mtg. Tom Shannon sais earlier that it was in the afternoon. Original Message From:Webster, Christopher W To:Blau, Robert I Sent:Sun Jul 05 20:21:05 2009 Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 If you can find out whether Zelaya will be returning to Washington, that would be very helpful. Chris Original Message From:Webster, Christopher W Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:20 PM To:Blau, Robert I Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Thanks Original Message From:Blau, Robert I Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:19 PM To:Webster, Christopher W; Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Bostic, Ebony LAC CAM; Llorens, Hugo; Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez, Juan S; Armstrong, Robert A; Lee, Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon; WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; B6 Morales Jr, Hector E; Riley, Robert 1; Haldane, Robert A; Reneau, Jeffrey K USUN;; Kelly, Craig A; Shannon, Thomas A; Robinson, David M; Benning, Douglass R Wolfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabriela UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 donkachris UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; lesse. s. curtis USAID N DMD Subject:Re:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Zelaya just landed in El SAlvador. Jacobs, Janice L; Carter, Sharon B6 Original Message From:Webster, Christopher W To:Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert J Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Bostic, Ebony LAC CAM; Llorens, Hugo; Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez, Juan S; Armstrong, Robert A; Lee, Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon;; WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; Morales Jr, Hector E; Riley, Robert i; Haldane, Reneau. Jeffrey K USUN:Kelly, Craig A; Shannon, Thomas A; Robinson, David M; Benning, Douglass R; Wolfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabriela; Blau, Robert I; Laidlaw, Philip G; Llorens, Hugo; Benning, Douglass R Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; Krzywda, David A Managua; lesse. s. curtis jesse. s. curtis; 'donkachris donkachris; Jacobs, Janice L; Carter, Sharon USAID N DMD; Blau, Robert I Sent:Sun Jul 05 20:08:19 2009 Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Jesse:Did the Nicaraguans indicate where Zelaya is headed? To San Salvador or back to Washington? I have copied Embassy San Salvador's Charge Bob Blau and Political Counselor Phil Laidlaw. I have also copied Ambassador Llorens and Tegucigalpa's Acting DCM Douglass Benning Simon Henshaw is on leave. Thanks, Chris Original Message From:Curtis, Jesse S Managua Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:03 PM To:Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert J Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Webster, Christopher W; Bostic, Ebony LAC CAM; Llorens, Hugo; Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez, Juan S; Armstrong, Robert A; Lee, Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon; WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; Morales Jr, Hector E; Riley, Robert J; Haldane, Robert A; Reneau, Jeffrey K USUN; Kelly Craig A. Shannon Thomas k Robinson David M; Benning, Douglass R; Wolfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabriela UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; Morales Jr, Hector E; Riley, Robert 1; Haldane, Reneau, Jeffrey K USUN; Robert A; jesse. s. curtis donkachris donkachris UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; Krzywda, David A Managua; Idonkachris Jacobs, Janice L; Carter, Sharon B6 USAID N DMD Blau, Robert I Subject:Re:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 At 1945, local NIC media aired footage from MGA airport of Zelaya getting back on plane. It appeared that FM Rodas and Ven FM Maduro were also in departing party. NIC president Ortega put Z on plane at airport, but did not go with him. Footage was recent, if not live, perhaps no more than 20 minutes old. Jesse Original Message From:Curtis, Jesse S Managua To:Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert I Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Webster, Christopher W; Bostic, Ebony LAC CAM; Llorens, Hugo; Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez. Juan 5; Armstrong. Robert A Lee Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon; Kelly, Craig A; Shannon, Thomas A; Robinson, David M Benning, Douglass R; Wolfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabriela Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; Krzywda, David A Managua; lesse. s. curtis lesse. s. curtis B6 B6 Jacobs, Janice L; Carter, Sharon USAID N DMD:Blau, Robert I Sent:Sun Jul 05 18:37:19 2009 Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 11-- Return of Zelaya, pt 4 Looping other members of SITREP spam-- Managua understands that plane with ousted HOND President Zelaya left WDC at approx 1500 WDC time. Also understand that plane is expected in Managua at approx 1924 local. Understand that a separate plane with Argentine Pres Kirchner and Ecuadorian Pres. Correa also left WDC this afternoon en route to El Salvador. NEW INFORMATION About 45 minutes ago, Telesur had images of apparent pro-Zelaya supporters at the airport fence and trying to pull it down. Security forces inside the airport compound re-deployed to prevent a breach. It seems they did use white smoke or gas to deter protestor action. Telesur also reported that shots were fired into the assembled crowd and that one or two people were shot and killed no names or confirmation. Images of ambulances in crowd were visible. It seems now that the fence has been breached and a handful of pro-Zelaya supporters move in and out of airport area to pick up rocks and retreat there is open, clear area inside fence, possible construction. Security forces have taken up positions on tarmac, presumably to prevent further incursion. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015 With respect to Micheleti assertion that NIC troops have mobilized near the border, our NIC contacts, both in GON and private citizens indicate that there has been NO NO unusual NIC mil activity at border-- Las Manos or El Espino. However, as of 1900 Saturday, border contacts at El Espino report that HOND military reinforced its presence by about 70 personnel, who remain at El Espino. We were told this happened at Las Manos as well, but have not yet been able to confirm with our sources at that border location. Will continue to monitor and observe. Jesse Jesse Curtis Acting Counselor, Political Section U. S. Embassy Managua, Nicaragua tel:011-505-2-252-7128 7495 Cell Email:Curtis15 state. gov http:nicaragua. usembassy. gov http:www. state. govh This message is unclassified per E. O. 12958 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05758891 Date:06 30 2015
[(0.9765063152790865, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Mills, Cheryl D MillsCD state. gov Sent:Monday, July 06, 2009 4:03 AM To:Subject:Fw:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? Fyi Original Message From:Beale, Courtney A Kramer To:Mills, Cheryl D; Abedin, Huma; Valmoro, Lona J; Sullivan, Jacobi Cc:S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E Sent:Sun Jul 05 23:47:57 2009 Subject:Re:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? They are now saying that Zelaya doesn't want to travel tomorrow because wants to participate remotely in the burial ceremony on Monday for those who died in violence at the airport today. He said he will return to Washington on Tuesday in time to meet in the late afternoon. They are asking if it would be possible to have the meeting sometime on Tuesday late afternoon instead. Courtney Original Message From:Mills, Cheryl D To:Beale, Courtney A Kramer; Abedin, Huma; Valmoro, lona J; Sullivan, Jacob J Cc:S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E Sent:Sun Jul 05 23:14:40 2009 Subject:Re:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? She previously had indicated noon or later for a meeting Original Message From:Beale, Courtney A Kramer To:Abedin, Huma; Valmoro, Lona J; Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J Cc:S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E Sent:Sun Jul 05 22:54:40 2009 Subject:Time Window for S Meeting with Zelaya Tomorrow? Huma and Lona, Sorry for the late email, but Central America Office Director Christopher Webster just called me to inquire about a possible meeting between Zelaya and the Secretary tomorrow. He said they are trying to convince Zelaya to return from San Salvador to the U. S. and that A S Shannon indicated the Secretary had said that she would be willing to meet with him tomorrow. They were wondering if they could give Zelaya a window of time for a meeting see email below from DCM in Sal Salvador. Please advise. Thanks, Courtney Original Message From:Webster, Christopher W 77 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:47 PM To:Beale, Courtney A Kramer Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Original Message From:Blau, Robert I Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:36 PM To:Webster, Christopher W Subject:Re:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 The plan is for Hugo Martinez to pull Zelaya aside for me to be able to urge that he get to washdc for mtg with S tomorrow. Please tell me if there is a time window for that mtg. Tom Shannon sais earlier that it was in the afternoon. Original Message From:Webster, Christopher W To:Blau, Robert I Sent:Sun Jul 05 20:21:05 2009 Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 If you can find out whether Zelaya will be returning to Washington, that would be very helpful. Chris Original Message From:Webster, Christopher W Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:20 PM To:Blau, Robert I Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Thanks Original Message From:Blau, Robert I Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:19 PM To:Webster, Christopher W; Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert J Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Bostic, Ebony lAC CAM; Llorens, Hugo; Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez, Juan 5; Armstrong, Robert A; Lee, Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon; WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; Morales Jr, Hector E; Riley, Robert J; Haldane, Robert A; Reneau, Jeffrey K USUN; Kelly, Craig A; Shannon, Thomas A; Robinson, David M; Benning, Douglass R; Wolfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabriela Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; Krz da, David A Managua; lesse. s. curti5; 'donkachri USAID N DMD; Subject:Re:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5; Jacobs, Janice L; Carter, Sharon Zelaya just landed in El SAlvador. Original Message 7P UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 From:Webster, Christopher W To:Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert1 Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Bostic, Ebony LAC CAM; Llorens. Hugo:Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez, Juan 5; Armstrong, Robert A; Lee, Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon; WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; Morales Jr, Hector E; Iiley, Robert J; Haldane, Robert A; Reneau, Jeffrey K USUN; KPIIV Craie A. Shannon, Thomas A; Robinson, David M; Benrung, Douglass ti; Wolfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabriela; Blau, 'jesse. s. cu rtis USAID N DMD; Blau, Robert 1 Subject:Re:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Robert I; Laidlaw, Philip G; Llorens, Hugo; Benning, Douglass R Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; Krzywda, David A Managua; 'jesse. s. curtis 'donkachris Jacobs, Janice 1; Carter, Sharon USAID N DMD; Blau, Robert I Sent:Sun Jul 05 20:08:19 2009 Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 12-- Return of Zelaya, pt 5 Jesse:Did the Nicaraguans indicate where Zelaya is headed? To San Salvador or back to Washington? I have copied Embassy San Salvador's Charge Bob Blau and Political Counselor Phil Laidlaw. I have also copied Ambassador Llorens and Tegucigalpa's Acting DCM Douglass Benning Simon Henshaw is on leave. Thanks, Chris Original Message From:Curtis, Jesse S Managua Sent:Sunday, July 05, 2009 10:03 PM To:Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert J Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Webster, Christopher W; Bostic, Ebony LAC CAM; Llorens, Hugo; Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez, Juan 5; Armstrong, Robert A; Lee, Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon; WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; Morales Jr, Hector E; Riley, Robert J; Haldane, Robert A; Reneau, Jeffrey K USUN; elly, Craig A; Shannon, Thomas A; Robinson, David M; Benning, Douglass R; Volfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabnela Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; Krzywda, David A Managua; Idonkachris; Jacobs, Janice L; Carter, Sharon At 1945, local NIC media aired footage from MGA airport of Zelaya getting back on plane. It appeared that FM Rodas and Ven FM Maduro were also in departing party. 79 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 NIC president Ortega put Z on plane at airport, but did not go with him. Footage was recent, if not live, perhaps no more than 20 minutes old. Jesse Original Message From:Curtis, Jesse S Managua To:Curtis, Jesse S Managua; Callahan, Robert J Managua; Sanders, Richard M Managua; Webster, Christopher W; Bostic, Ebony LAC CAM; Llorens, Hugo; Ben-Yehuda, Jenna H; Gonzalez, Juan S; Armstrong, Robert A; Lee, Michelle A; Henshaw, Simon;; WHA-OAS-POL; Amselem, W Lewis; Morales Jr, Hector E; Riley, Robert 1; Haldane, Robert A; Reneau, Jeffrey K USUN; Kelly, Craig A; Shannon, Thomas A; Robinson, David M; Benning, Douglass R;; Wolfe, David C; Zambrano, Maria Gabriela Cc:Managua POL; SES-0; East, Kyle D Managua; Managua, RSO-Officers; Boyle, Kathleen L Managua; Los Banos-Jardina, Michelle G Managua; Pierre, Martial Managua; Martz, Sara E Managua; Harris, Lara K Managua; Krzywda, David A Managua; lesse. s. curtis 'donkachris; Jacobs, Janice L; Carter, Sharon USAID N DMD;; Blau, Robert I Sent:Sun Jul 05 18:37:19 2009 Subject:RE:Honduran Coup-- Managua SITREP 11-- Return of Zelaya, pt 4 Looping other members of SITREP spam-- Managua understands that plane with ousted HOND President Zelaya left WDC at approx 1500 WDC time. Also understand that plane is expected in Managua at approx 1924 local. Understand that a separate plane with Argentine Pres Kirchner and Ecuadorian Pres. Correa also left WDC this afternoon en route to El Salvador. NEW INFORMATION About 45 minutes ago, Telesur had images of apparent pro-Zelaya supporters at the airport fence and trying to pull it down. Security forces inside the airport compound re-deployed to prevent a breach. It seems they did use white smoke or gas to deter protestor action. Telesur also reported that shots were fired into the assembled crowd and that one or two people were shot and killed no names or confirmation. Images of ambulances in crowd were visible. It seems now that the fence has been breached and a handful of pro-Zelaya supporters move in and out of airport area to pick up rocks and retreat there is open, clear area inside fence, possible construction. Security forces have taken up positions on tarmac, presumably to prevent further incursion. With respect to Micheleti assertion that NIC troops have mobilized near the border, our NIC contacts, both in GON and private citizens indicate that there has been NO NO unusual NIC mil activity at border-- Las Manos or El Espino. However, as of 1900 Saturday, border contacts at El Espino report that HOND military reinforced its presence by about 70 personnel, who remain at El Espino. We were told this happened at Las Manos as well, but have not yet been able to confirm with our sources at that border location. Will continue to monitor and observe. 80 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015 Jesse Jesse Curtis Acting Counselor, Political Section U. S. Embassy Managua, Nicaragua tel:011-505-2-252-7128 7495 Cell C Email:CurtisJS state. gov http:nicaragua. usembassy. gov http:www. state. gov This message is unclassified per E. O. 12958 81 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05762640 Date:06 30 2015")]
550 [ 550 2016]
0.978827519989
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05760303 Date:06 30 2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent:To:Subject:H hrod17 clintonemail. com Thursday, November 12, 2009 9:42 AM 'sbwhoeop Re:FYI:Murdoch makes his move to Cameron. Attack on BBC to follow. Sid That's quite the match-- Murdochs v Mandelson. Original Message From:sbwhoeop To:H Sent:Thu Nov 12 08:51:40 2009 Subject:FYI:Murdoch makes his move to Cameron. Attack on BBC to follow. Sid The Independent November 12, 2009 Has Cameron done a deal with Murdoch? By Andy McSmith Lord Mandelson's attack shines spotlight on Tory leader's links with media mogul David Cameron has been accused of making a contract with Britain's biggest media company to trade political support before an election for government favours afterwards if the Tories win. The accusation was levelled yesterday by the Business Secretary Peter Mande! son, who is increasingly the public face of Gordon Brown's government. Ministers are angry at the campaign that The Sun has run against the Prime Minister all this week over the spelling mistakes in a letter Mr Brown sent to the mother of a young soldier killed in Afghanistan. They suspect that the Conservative Party has been tailoring its policies on media regulation and the BBC to suit the commercial interests of News International, which owns The Sun, and that the paper's aggressive support for the Tories is a pay-off that could spread to other parts of the mass media. Examples of the apparent tie-in between what News International's boss, James Murdoch, wants, and what David Cameron is ready to promise include the recent decision by the Conservatives to abandon the idea of top slicing the BBC licence fee. It had been proposed that part of the money paid to the BBC would be siphoned off to help regional television companies meet the threat from the Internet. But this would also have helped them compete more effectively against Sky News, which is part of the Murdoch media empire. When the policy was abandoned in September, Jeremy Hunt, the shadow Culture Secretary, said that it was because enacting it might make the commercial television companies focus not on attracting viewers but on attracting subsidies. There was no gain for the BBC in the climbdown, because David Cameron had already said that the Tories will freeze the licence fee. What it will mean is that the BBC's income will be capped, without the regional television companies seeing any government help, which will strengthen the market position of Britain's only satellite television company, Sky. This was done for News International, a Tory insider said yesterday. Murdoch wants Sky to go head to head with the BBC. He doesn't want the independent companies strengthened. In April 2008, James Murdoch complained bitterly about the media regulator Ofcom in his first major speech after taking over as chief executive of News Corporation in Europe and Asia. The following year, David Cameron announced that a Conservative government would cut Ofcom down to size. Last summer James Murdoch attacked the abysmal record of the BBC Trust-the body created by Labour to over see the BBC-in a lecture he gave at the Edinburgh Festival, singling out its total failure to stop the BBC buying the Lonely UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05760303 Date:06 30 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05760303 Date:06 30 2015 Planet travel guides, a takeover that Murdoch denounced as an egregious invasion of private enterprise by the state. Less than two months later, Jeremy Hunt promised that the Tories would abolish the Trust. In the same lecture, Murdoch complained that BBC performers like Jonathan Ross are being paid salaries that no commercial competitor can afford. He had barely uttered the words before Ed Vaizey, a shadow media minister, promised that a Tory government would compel the BBC to publish the salaries of its top performers. Lord Mandelson alleged yesterday that the Conservatives and News International had effectively formed a contract, over the head, incidentally, of the newspaper's editor and their readers, in which they are sort of bound to one another. Speaking to the BBC's Today programme, he added:What The Sun can do for the Conservatives during the election is one part of the contract and, presumably, what the Conservatives can do for News International if they are elected is the other side of the bargain. But there is a wider question. When The Sun creates the news in this way, this is then followed up by Sky News, which then puts pressure on the BBC to follow suit. This was absolutely, categorically denied yesterday by The Sun's political editor, Tom Newton Dunn, who accused Lord Mandelson of talking preposterous nonsense. The Sun, which supported Labour through three general elections under Tony Blair's leadership, announced that it was jumping ship on the day that Gordon Brown delivered his annual speech. to the Labour Party conference in September. Its onslaught on Gordon Brown for the mistakes made in a handwritten letter to Jacqui Janes is the most aggressive attack that the newspaper has directed at any Labour Party leader since Neil Kinnock stood down after losing the 1992 general election, a defeat for which The Sun claimed victory with the slogan It was The Sun wot won it. But there were signs yesterday that the attack may have rebounded on The Sun. Mr Brown, who is blind in one eye, has admitted that his handwriting is bad and has apologised to Mrs Janes, whose 20-year-old son, Jamie, was killed by a makeshift bomb in Afghanistan last month. A poll yesterday for the website PoliticsHome, whose main shareholder is the Conservative Party deputy chairman Lord Ashcroft, found that 65 per cent of those polled thought that The Sun's attack was inappropriate compared with 23 per cent who thought it was legitimate. The closeness of the new Tory-Sun axis is shown up by the revelation, from an inside source, that David Cameron personally consulted the editor of The Sun, Dominic Mohan, in three separate conversations before he abandoned his cast-iron promise to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, now that all 27 members states of the EU have ratified it. Mr Cameron was understandably wary of how The Sun might react to the abandonment of that promise. The paper has campaigned for years against what it sees as the growth of an EU superstate. It was in an open letter to readers of The Sun that Cameron first made his guarantee, two years ago. His announcement that a referendum is off the agenda was subjected to a scathing attack in the Daily Mail, but in The Sun it was given kid-glove treatment under the headline Cameron's crusade for UK rights. The person behind this aggressively pro-Tory policy is James Murdoch, not his father, Rupert, who created The Sun virtually from scratch in the 1970s. Rupert Murdoch claimed in an interview with Sky News Australia that he regretted his son's decision to turn against Gordon Brown, who is a friend of mine, but defended it on the grounds that Brown has been a disappointment. Yesterday, The Times, another Murdoch newspaper, announced that its veteran political editor, Phil Webster, is leaving the Commons, where he h8 been based for decades. Mr Webster is very well thought of by New Labour. His replacement, Roland Watson, was a friend of David Cameron's at Eton but has no political ties with the Tories. Tom Newton Dunn, newly appointed as The Sun's political editor, is another Old Etonian. His father, Bill, used to be a Tory MEP, but defected to the Liberal Democrats in 2000. Independent News and Media Limited http:license. icopyright. net user external. act? publisher_id 1204 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05760303 Date:06 30 2015
[(0.9788275199889315, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05765712 Date:07 31 2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From:Sent:To:Subject:The Independent November 12, 2009 sbwhoeop Thursday, November 12, 2009 8:52 AM H FYI:Murdoch makes his move to Cameron. Attack on BBC to follow. Sid Has Cameron done a deal with Murdoch? By Andy McSmith Lord Mandelson's attack shines spotlight on Tory leader's links with media mogul David Cameron has been accused of making a contract with Britain's biggest media company to trade political support before an election for government favours afterwards if the Tories win. The accusation was levelled yesterday by the Business Secretary Peter Mandelson, who is increasingly the public face of Gordon Brown's government. Ministers are angry at the campaign that The Sun has run against the Prime Minister all this week over the spelling mistakes in a letter Mr Brown sent to the mother of a young soldier killed in Afghanistan. They suspect that the Conservative Party has been tailoring its policies on media regulation and the BBC to suit the commercial interests of News International, which owns The Sun, and that the paper's aggressive support for the Tories is a pay-off that could spread to other parts of the mass media. Examples of the apparent tie-in between what News International's boss, James Murdoch, wants, and what David Cameron is ready to promise include the recent decision by the Conservatives to abandon the idea of top slicing the BBC licence fee. It had been proposed that part of the money paid to the BBC would be siphoned off to help regional television companies meet the threat from the internet. But this would also have helped them compete more effectively against Sky News, which is part of the Murdoch media empire. When the policy was abandoned in September, Jeremy Hunt, the shadow Culture Secretary, said that it was because enacting it might make the commercial television companies focus not on attracting viewers but on attracting subsidies. There was no gain for the BBC in the climbdown, because David Cameron had already said that the Tories will freeze the licence fee. What it will mean is that the BBC's income will be capped, without the regional television companies seeing any government help, which will strengthen the market position of Britain's only satellite television company, Sky. This was done for News International, a Tory insider said yesterday. Murdoch wants Sky to go head to head with the BBC. He doesn't want the independent companies strengthened. In April 2008, James Murdoch complained bitterly about the media regulator Ofcom in his first major speech after taking over as chief executive of News Corporation in Europe and Asia. The following year, David Cameron announced that a Conservative government would cut Ofcom down to size. Last summer James Murdoch attacked the abysmal record of the BBC Trust-the body created by Labour to over see the BBC-in a lecture he gave at the Edinburgh Festival, singling out its total failure to stop the BBC buying the Lonely Planet travel guides, a takeover that Murdoch denounced as an egregious invasion of private enterprise by the state. Less than two months later, Jeremy Hunt promised that the Tories would abolish the Trust. In the same lecture, Murdoch complained that BBC performers like Jonathan Ross are being paid salaries that no commercial competitor can afford. He had barely uttered the words before Ed Vaizey, a shadow media minister, promised that a Tory government would compel the BBC to publish the salaries of its top performers. Lord Mandelson alleged yesterday that the Conservatives and News International had effectively formed a contract, over the head, incidentally, of the newspaper's editor and their readers, in which they are sort of bound to one another. Speaking to the BBC's Today programme, he added:What The Sun can do for the Conservatives during the election is one part of the contract and, presumably, what the Conservatives can do for News International if they are elected is the other side of the bargain. But there is a wider question. When The Sun creates the news in this way, this is then followed up by Sky News, which then puts pressure on the BBC to follow suit. This was absolutely, categorically denied yesterday by The Sun's political editor, Tom Newton Dunn, who accused Lord Mandelson of talking preposterous nonsense. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05765712 Date:07 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05765712 Date:07 31 2015 The Sun, which supported Labour through three general elections under Tony Blair's leadership, announced that it was jumping ship on the day that Gordon Brown delivered his annual speech to the Labour Party conference in September. Its onslaught on Gordon Brown for the mistakes made in a handwritten letter to Jacqui Janes is the most aggressive attack that the newspaper has directed at any Labour Party leader since Neil Kinnock stood down after losing the 1992 general election, a defeat for which The Sun claimed victory with the slogan It was The Sun wot won it. But there were signs yesterday that the attack may have rebounded on The Sun. Mr Brown, who is blind in one eye, has admitted that his handwriting is bad and has apologised to Mrs Janes, whose 20-year-old son, Jamie, was killed by a makeshift bomb in Afghanistan last month. A poll yesterday for the website PoliticsHome, whose main shareholder is the Conservative Party deputy chairman Lord Ashcroft, found that 65 per cent of those polled thought that The Sun's attack was inappropriate compared with 23 per cent who thought it was legitimate. The closeness of the new Tory-Sun axis is shown up by the revelation, from an inside source, that David Cameron personally consulted the editor of The Sun, Dominic Mohan, in three separate conversations before he abandoned his cast-iron promise to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, now that all 27 members states of the EU have ratified it. Mr Cameron was understandably wary of how The Sun might react to the abandonment of that promise. The paper has campaigned for years against what it sees as the growth of an EU superstate. It was in an open letter to readers of The Sun that Cameron first made his guarantee, two years ago. His announcement that a referendum is off the agenda was subjected to a scathing attack in'the Daily Mail, but in The Sun it was given kid-glove treatment under the headline Cameron's crusade for UK rights. The person behind this aggressively pro-Tory policy is James Murdoch, not his father, Rupert, who created The Sun virtually from scratch in the 1970s. Rupert Murdoch claimed in an interview with Sky News Australia that he regretted his son's decision to turn against Gordon Brown, who is a friend of mine, but defended it on the grounds that Brown has been a disappointment. Yesterday, The Times, another Murdoch newspaper, announced that its veteran political editor, Phil Webster, is leaving the Commons, where he has been based for decades. Mr Webster is very well thought of by New Labour. His replacement, Roland Watson, was a friend of David Cameron's at Eton but has no political ties with the Tories. Tom Newton Dunn, newly appointed as The Sun's political editor, is another Old Etonian. His father, Bill, used to be a Tory MEP, but defected to the Liberal Democrats in 2000. Independent News and Media Limited UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05765712 Date:07 31 2015")]
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UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767099 Date:08 31 2015 FRENCH-JOINT COMMUNIQUE RELEASE IN FULL COMMUNIQU COMMUN DES GOUVERNEMENTS D'HAITI ET DES ETATS-UNIS DIAMERIQUE DIFFUSE A PORT-AU-PRINCE LE 17 JANVIER 2010 Le President de la Republique d'HaIti, M. Rene Preval, et la Secretaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, Mme Hillary Rodham Clinton, se sont entretenus a Port-au-Prince, a la suite du seisme catastrophique du 12 janvier 2010 et de ses consequences tragiques, et ont rendu public le communiqu commun suivant:Reconnaissant:- la longue histoire d'amitie qui lie le peuple d'HaIti et le peuple des Etats-Unis et le respect mutuel qu'ils professent pour leur souverainete respective;-les graves souffrances du peuple d'HaIti, notamment la perte immense de vies, la quantite massive de blesses et les dommages etendus causes a 'infrastructure publique et a la propriete privee;-la necessite urgente d'une reponse immediate aux demandes du Gouvernement d'HaIti et 'importance primordiale de 'execution sure, rapide et efficace des operations de sauvetage, de secours, de retablissement et de reconstruction;-les defis actuels sans precedent auxquels doit faire face le Gouvernement; et-I'entretien du 15 janvier entre Ie President Obama et le President Preval soulignant l'urgence des besoins de l'Etat et du peuple haitiens, 'engagement du President Obama relatif au soutien total du peuple des Etats-Unis en faveur du Gouvernement et du peuple d'Haiti en ce qui concerne aussi bien 'effort immediat de retablissement que 'effort a long terme de reconstruction, et 'engagement des deux Presidents a coordonner l'aide entre les diverses parties, notamment Ie Gouvernement d'HaIti, les Nations Unies, les Etats-Unis et les nombreux partenaires et organisations internationaux sur le terrain; Le President Preval, au nom du Gouvernement et du peuple d'HaIti, salue comme essentiels les efforts que deploient en Haiti le Gouvernement et le peuple des Etats-Unis en faveur du retablissement immediat et de la reconstruction a long terme d'HaIti, et prie les Etats-Unis d'apporter leur assistance en tant que de besoin en vue d'accroitre la securite, a l'appui du Gouvernement et du peuple d'Haiti ainsi que des Nations unies et des partenaires et des organisations internationaux sur Ie terrain; UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767099 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767099 Date:08 31 2015 La Secretaire d'Etat Clinton, au nom du Gouvernement et du peuple des Etats-Unis, reaffirme 'intention des Etats-Unis, par leur assistance, de se tenir aux cotes du peuple haitien en ce moment de grande tragedie; et Le President Preval et la Secretaire d'Etat Clinton reaffirment ensemble que les Gouvernements d'Haiti et des Etats-Unis continueront de cooperer en vertu du present accord commun afin d'assurer les operations les plus seires et efficaces possibles de sauvetage, de secours, de retablissement et de reconstruction. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767099 Date:08 31 2015
[(0.9834065809964202, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767103 Date:08 31 2015 FRENCH-JOINT COMMUNIQUE RELEASE IN FULL COMMUNIQUE COMMUN DES GOUVERNEMENTS D'HAITI ET DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE DIFFUSE A PORT-AU-PRINCE LE 17 JANVIER 2010 Le President de la Republique d'Haiti, M. Rene Preval, et Ia Secretaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, Mme Hillary Rodham Clinton, se sont entretenus a Port-au-Prince, a la suite du seisme catastrophique du 12 janvier 2010 et de ses consequences tragiques, et ont rendu public le communiqu commun suivant:Reconnaissant:- la longue histoire d'amitie qui lie le peuple d'Haiti et le peuple des Etats-Unis et le respect mutuel qu'ils professent pour leur souverainete respective;-les graves souffrances du peuple notamment la perte immense de vies, Ia quantite massive de blesses et les dommages etendus causes a 'infrastructure publique et a la propriete privee;-Ia necessite urgente d'une reponse immediate aux demandes du Gouvernement d'Haiti et 'importance primordiale de 'execution sore, rapide et efficace des operations de sauvetage, de secours, de retablissement et de reconstruction;-les defis actuels sans precedent auxquels doit faire face le Gouvernement d'HaIti; et-l'entretien du 15 janvier entre le President Obama et le President Preval soulignant l'urgence des besoins de l'Etat et du peuple haitiens, 'engagement du President Obama relatif au soutien total du peuple des Etats-Unis en faveur du Gouvernement et du peuple d'Haiti en ce qui concerne aussi bien l'effort immediat de retablissement que l'effort a long terme de reconstruction, et 'engagement des deux Presidents a coordonner 'aide entre les diverses parties, notamment le Gouvernement d'Haiti, les Nations Unies, les Etats-Unis et les nombreux partenaires et organisations internationaux sur le terrain; Le President Preval, au nom du Gouvernement et du peuple d'Hafti, salue comme essentiels les efforts que deploient en Haiti le Gouvernement et le peuple des Etats-Unis en faveur du retablissement immediat et de la reconstruction a long terme d'HaIti, et prie les Etats-Unis d'apporter leur assistance en tant que de besoin en vue d'accroitre la securite, a l'appui du Gouvernement et du peuple d'Haiti ainsi que des Nations unies et des partenaires et des organisations internationaux sur le terrain; UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767103 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767103 Date:08 31 2015 La Secretaire d'Etat Clinton, au nom du Gouvernement et du peuple des Etats-Unis, reaffirme 'intention des Etats-Unis, par leur assistance, de se tenir aux cotes du peuple haitien en ce moment de grande tragedie; et Le President Preval et la Secretaire d'Etat Clinton reaffirment ensemble que les Gouvernements d'Haiti et des Etats-Unis continueront de cooperer en vertu du present accord commun afin d'assurer les operations les plus sores et efficaces possibles de sauvetage, de secours, de retablissement et de reconstruction. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767103 Date:08 31 2015")]
3934 [3934 3935]
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UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770127 Date:08 31 2015 RELEASE IN PART B5 From:Sent To:Cc:Subject Slaughter, Anne-Marie SlaughterA state. gov Thursday, May 6, 2010 7:18 PM Sullivan, JacobJ The political ramifications of the Greek European debt crisis As you know, the EU-IMF-USG consensus hope motivating the Greek bailout is that it will buy time for Spain, Portugal, etc. From widening credit spreads to falling stock prices, most relevant market indicators are responding with doubt. Former IMF Chief Economist and NYT Columnist and influential blogger for bond traders Simon Johnson has an important rejoinder to this consensus hope in today's NYT, full text pasted below. As the EU has no playbook for most of the pressing questions it faces, my staff is working to brainstorm as to the least bad of what are only sobering options. This is long but worth it. May 6, 2010, 6:11 amIt's Not About Greece AnymoreBy PETER BOONE AND SIMON JOHNSONLouisa Gouliamaki Agence France-Presse Getty Images Protesters waved flags from the Acropolis archaeological site behind banners in English and Greek hung in front of the Parthenon temple in Athens. Peter Boone is chairman of the charity Effective Intervention and a research associate at the Center for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics. He is also a principal in Salute Capital Management Ltd. Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of 13 Bankers. The Greek rescue package announced last weekend is dramatic, unprecedented and far from enough to stabilize the euro zone. The Greek government and the European Union leadership, prodded by the International Monetary Fund, are finally becoming realistic about the dire economic situation in Greece. They have abandoned previous rounds of optimistic forecasts and have now admitted to a profoundly worse situation. This new program calls for fiscal adjustments cuts to the fiscal deficit, mostly through spending cuts totaling 11 percent of gross domestic product in 2010, 4. 3 percent in 2011, and 2 percent in 2012 and 2013. The total debt-to-G. D. P. ratio peaks at 149 percent in 2012-13 before starting a gentle glide path back down to sanity. This new program is honest enough to show why it is unlikely to succeed. Daniel Gros, an eminent economist on euro zone issues based in Brussels, has argued that for each 1 percent of G. D. P. decline in Greek government spending, total demand in the country falls by 2. 5 percent of G. D. P. If the government reduces spending by 15 percent of G. D. P. the initial shock to demand could be well over 30 percent of G. D. P. Obviously this simple rule does not work with such large numbers, but it illustrates that Greece is likely to experience a very sharp recession and there is substantial uncertainty around how bad the economy will get. The program announced last weekend assumes Greek G. D. P. falls by 4 percent this year, then by another 2. 6 percent in 2011, before recovering to positive growth in 2012 and beyond. Such figures seem extremely optimistic, particularly in the face of the civil unrest now sweeping Greece and the deep hostility expressed toward Greece in some northern European policy circles. The pattern of growth is critical because, under this program, Greece needs to grow out of its debt problem soon. Greece's debt-to-G. D. P. ratio will be a debilitating 145 percent at the end of 2011. Now consider putting more realistic growth figures into the I. M. F. forecast for Greece's economy e. g., with G. D. P. declining 12 percent in 2011, then the debt-to-G. D. P. ratio may reach 155 percent. At these levels, with a 5 percent real interest rate and no growth, the country needs a primary surplus at 8 percent of G. D. P. to keep the debt-to-G. D. P. ratio stable. It will be nowhere near that level. The I. M. F. program has Greece running a primary budget deficit of around 1 percent of G. D. P. in that year, and that assumes a path for Greek growth that can be regarded only as an upside scenario. The politics of these implied budget surpluses remains brutal. Since most Greek debt is held abroad, roughly 80 percent of the budget savings the Greek government makes go straight to Germans, French and other foreign UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770127 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770127 Date:08 31 2015 debt holders mostly banks. If growth turns out poorly, will the Greeks be prepared for ever-tougher austerity to pay the Germans? Even if everything goes well, Greek citizens seem unlikely to welcome this version of their new normal. Last week the European leadership panicked very late in the day when it realized that the euro zone itself was at risk of a meltdown. If the euro zone proves unwilling to protect a member like Greece from default, then bond investors will run from Portugal and Spain also if you doubt this, study carefully the interlocking debt picture published recently in The New York Times. Higher yields on government debt would have caused concerns about potential bank runs in these nations, and then spread to more nations in Europe. When there is such a run, it is not clear where it stops. In the hazy distance, Belgium, France, Austria and many others were potentially at risk. Even the Germans cannot afford to bail out those nations. Slapped in the face by this ugly scenario, the Europeans decided to throw everything they and the I. M. F. had at bailing out Greece. The program as announced has only a small chance of preventing eventual Greek bankruptcy, but it may still slow or avert a dangerous spiral downward and enormous collateral damage in the rest of Europe. The I. M. F. floated in some fashion an alternative scenario with a debt restructuring, but this was rejected by both the European Union and the Greek authorities. This is not a surprise; leading European policy makers are completely unprepared for broader problems that would follow a Greek restructuring, because markets would immediately mark down the debt i. e., increase the yields for Portugal, Spain, Ireland and even Italy. The fear and panic in the face of this would be unparalleled in modern times:When the Greeks pay only 50 percent on the face value of their debt, what should investors expect from the Portuguese and Spanish? It all becomes arbitrary, including which countries are dragged down. Someone has to decide who should be defended and at what cost, and the European structures are completely unsuited to this kind of tough decision-making under pressurein the extreme downside scenario, Germany is the only obvious safe haven within the euro zone, so its government bond yields would collapse while other governments face sharply rising yields. The euro zone would likely not hold together. There is still a narrow escape path, without immediate debt default and the chaos that that would produce:- Talk down the euro moving toward parity with the American dollar would help lift growth across the euroz one.-As the euro falls, bond yields will rise on the euro zone periphery. This will create episodes of panic. Enough short-term financing must be in place to support the rollover of government debt.. Once the euro has fallen a great deal, announce the European Central Bank will support the euro at those levels i. e., prevent appreciation, with G-20 tacit agreement, and also support the peripheral euro zone nations viewed as solvent by buying their bonds whenever markets are chaotic. At that stage, but not before, the euro zone leadership needs to push weaker governments to restructure. That will include Greece and perhaps also Portugal. Hopefully, in this scenario Spain can muddle through. European banks should be recapitalized as necessary and have most of their management replaced. This is a massive failure of euro groupthink including most notably at the political level but there is no question that bank executives have not behaved responsibly in a long while and should be replaced en masse. To the extent possible, some of the ensuing losses should be shared with bank creditors. But be careful what you wish for. The bankers are powerful for a reason; they have built vital yet fragile structures at the heart of our economies. Dismantle with care. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770127 Date:08 31 2015
[(0.9840490792857178, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05774734 Date:08 31 2015 RELEASE IN PART B5 From:Sent:To:Subject:H hrod17 clintonemail. com Saturday, May 8, 2010 6:57 AM 'slaughtera state. gov' Re:The political ramifications of the Greek European debt crisis Pls share w me whatever S P prepares. Thx. Original Message From:Slaughter, Anne-Marie SlaughterA state. gov To:H Cc:Sullivan, Jacob J SullivanJJ state. gov Sent:Thu May 06 19:18:12 2010 Subject:The political ramifications of the Greek European debt crisis As you know, the EU-IMF-USG consensus hope motivating the Greek bailout is that it will buy time for Spain, Portugal, etc. From widening credit spreads to falling stock prices, most relevant market indicators are responding with doubt. Former IMF Chief Economist and NYT Columnist and influential blogger for bond traders Simon Johnson has an important rejoinder to this consensus hope in today's NYT, full text pasted below. As the EU has no playbook for most of the pressing questions it faces, my staff is working to brainstorm as to the least bad of what are only sobering options. This is long but worth it. May 6, 2010, 6:11 amlt's Not About Greece AnymoreBy PETER BOONE AND SIMON JOHNSONLouisa Gouliamaki Agence France-Presse Getty Images Protesters waved flags from the Acropolis archaeological site behind banners in English and Greek hung in front of the Parthenon temple in Athens. Peter Boone is chairman of the charity Effective Intervention and a research associate at the Center for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics. He is also a principal in Salute Capital Management Ltd. Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of 13 Bankers. The Greek rescue package announced last weekend is dramatic, unprecedented and far from enough to stabilize the euro zone. The Greek government and the European Union leadership, prodded by the International Monetary Fund, are 'finally becoming realistic about the dire economic situation in Greece. They have abandoned previous rounds of optimistic forecasts and have now admitted to a profoundly worse situation. This new program calls for fiscal adjustments cuts to the fiscal deficit, mostly through spending cuts totaling 11 percent of gross domestic product in 2010, 4. 3 percent in 2011, and 2 percent in 2012 and 2013. The total debt-to-G. D. P. ratio peaks at 149 percent in 2012-13 before starting a gentle glide path back down to sanity. This new program is honest enough to show why it is unlikely to succeed. Daniel Gros, an eminent economist on euro zone issues based in Brussels, has argued that for each 1 percent of G. D. P. decline in Greek government spending, total demand in the country falls by 2. 5 percent of G. D. P. If the government reduces spending by 15 percent of G. D. P. the initial shock to demand could be well over 30 percent of G. D. P. Obviously this simple rule does not work with such large numbers, but it illustrates that Greece is likely to experience a very sharp recession and there is substantial uncertainty around how bad the economy will get. The program announced last weekend assumes Greek G. D. P. falls by 4 percent this year, then by another 2. 6 percent in 2011, before recovering to positive growth in 2012 and beyond. Such figures seem extremely optimistic, particularly in the face of the civil unrest now sweeping Greece and the deep hostility expressed toward UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05774734 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05774734 Date:08 31 2015 Greece in some northern European policy circles. The pattern of growth is critical because, under this program, Greece needs to grow out of its debt problem soon. Greece's debt-to-G. D. P. ratio will be a debilitating 145 percent at the end of 2011. Now consider putting more realistic growth figures into the I. M. F. forecast for Greece's economy e. g., with G. D. P. declining 12 percent in 2011, then the debt-to-G. D. P. ratio may reach 155 percent. At these levels, with a 5 percent real interest rate and no growth, the country needs a primary surplus at 8 percent of G. D. P. to keep the debt-to-G. D. P. ratio stable. It will be nowhere near that level. The I. M. F. program has Greece running a primary budget deficit of around 1 percent of G. D. P. in that year, and that assumes a path for Greek growth that can be regarded only as an upside scenario. The politics of these implied budget surpluses remains brutal. Since most Greek debt is held abroad, roughly 80 percent of the budget savings the Greek government makes go straight to Germans, French and other foreign debt holders mostly banks. If growth turns out poorly, will the Greeks be prepared for ever-tougher austerity to pay the Germans? Even if everything goes well, Greek citizens seem unlikely to welcome this version of their new normal. Last week the European leadership panicked very late in the day when it realized that the euro zone itself was at risk of a meltdown. If the euro zone proves unwilling to protect a member like Greece from default, then bond investors will run from Portugal and Spain also if you doubt this, study carefully the interlocking debt picture published recently in The New York Times. Higher yields on government debt would have caused concerns about potential bank runs in these nations, and then spread to more nations in Europe. When there is such a run, it is not clear where it stops. In the hazy distance, Belgium, France, Austria and many others were potentially at risk. Even the Germans cannot afford to bail out those nations. Slapped in the face by this ugly scenario, the Europeans decided to throw everything they and the I. M. F. had at bailing out Greece. The program as announced has only a small chance of preventing eventual Greek bankruptcy, but it may still slow or avert a dangerous spiral downward and enormous collateral damage in the rest of Europe. The I. M. F. floated in some fashion an alternative scenario with a debt restructuring, but this was rejected by both the European Union and the Greek authorities. This is not a surprise; leading European policy makers are completely unprepared for broader problems that would follow a Greek restructuring, because markets would immediately mark down the debt i. e., increase the yields for Portugal, Spain, Ireland and even Italy. The fear and panic in the face of this would be unparalleled in modern times:When the Greeks pay only 50 percent on the face value of their debt, what should investors expect from the Portuguese and Spanish? It all becomes arbitrary, including which countries are dragged down. Someone has to decide who should be defended and at what cost, and the European structures are completely unsuited to this kind of tough decision-making under pressurein the extreme downside scenario, Germany is the only obvious safe haven within the euro zone, so its government bond yields would collapse while other governments face sharply rising yields. The euro zone would likely not hold together. There is still a narrow escape path, without immediate debt default and the chaos that that would produce:Talk down the euro moving toward parity with the American dollar would help lift growth across the euroz one. As the euro falls, bond yields will rise on the euro zone periphery. This will create episodes of panic. Enough short-term financing must be in place to support the rollover of government debt. Once the euro has fallen a great deal, announce the European Central Bank will support the euro at those levels i. e., prevent appreciation, with G-20 tacit agreement, and also support the peripheral euro zone nations viewed as solvent by buying their bonds whenever markets are chaotic. At that stage, but not before, the euro zone leadership needs to push weaker governments to restructure. That will include Greece and perhaps also Portugal. Hopefully, in this scenario Spain can muddle through. European banks should be recapitalized as necessary and have most of their management replaced. This is a massive failure of euro groupthink including most notably at the political level but there is no question that bank executives have not behaved responsibly in a long while and should be replaced en masse. To the extent possible, some of the ensuing losses should be shared with bank creditors. But be careful what you wish for. The bankers are powerful for a reason; they have built vital yet fragile structures at the heart of our economies. Dismantle with care. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05774734 Date:08 31 2015")]
5382 [5382 7302]
0.984606824473
UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From:sbwhoeop Sent:Sunday, May 16, 2010 11:59 PM To:Subject:H:Must read when you can. Sid H:I'm sure you are preoccupied with the adventures of Lula, et al. Nonetheless, the article below, just posted by the NY Review, soon to be published, is a breakthrough piece that will have a large impact. It's worth reading, not least for Frank Luntz's poll numbers. The hysterical tone of much of the Israeli leadership and US Jewish community is partly rooted in this long-term and profound development. Sid http:www. nybooks. com articles archives 2010 jun 10 failure-american-jewish-establishment The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment June 10, 2010 by Peter Beinart E-mail Single Page Share More by Peter Beinart anjamin Netanyahu; drawing by John Springs In 2003, several prominent Jewish philanthropists hired Republican pollster Frank Luntz to explain why American Jewish college students were not more vigorously rebutting campus criticism of Israel. In response, he unwittingly produced the most damning indictment of the organized American Jewish community that I have ever seen. The philanthropists wanted to know what Jewish students thought about Israel. Luntz found that they mostly didn't. Six times we have brought Jewish youth together as a group to talk about their Jewishness and connection to Israel, he reported. Six times the topic of Israel did not come up until it was prompted. Six times these Jewish youth used the word 'they' rather than'us to describe the situation. That Luntz encountered indifference was not surprising. In recent years, several studies have revealed, in the words of Steven Cohen of Hebrew Union College and An Kelman of the University of California at Davis, that non-Orthodox younger Jews, on the whole, feel much less attached to Israel than their elders, with many professing a near-total absence of positive feelings. In 2008, the student senate at Brandeis, the only nonsectarian Jewish-sponsored university in America, rejected a resolution commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Jewish state. Luntz's task was to figure out what had gone wrong. When he probed the students' views of Israel, he hit up against some firm beliefs. First, they reserve the right to question the Israeli position. These young Jews, Luntz explained, resist anything they see as 'group think. They want an open and frank discussion of Israel and its flaws. Second, young Jews desperately want peace. When Luntz showed them a series of ads, one of the most popular was entitled Proof that Israel Wants Peace, and listed offers by various Israeli governments to withdraw from conquered land. Third, some empathize with the plight of the Palestinians. When Luntz displayed ads depicting Palestinians as violent and hateful, several focus group participants criticized them as stereotypical and unfair, citing their own Muslim friends. Most of the students, in other words, were liberals, broadly defined. They had imbibed some of the defining values of American Jewish political culture:a belief in open debate, a skepticism about military force, a commitment to human rights. And in their innocence, they did not realize that they were supposed to shed those values when it came to Israel. The only kind of Zionism they found attractive was a Zionism that recognized Palestinians as deserving of dignity and capable of peace, and they were quite willing to condemn an Israeli government that did not share those beliefs. Luntz did not grasp the irony. The only kind of Zionism they found attractive was the kind that the American Jewish establishment has been working against for most of their lives. Among American Jews today, there are a great many Zionists, especially in the Orthodox world, people deeply devoted to the State of Israel. And there are a great many liberals, especially in the secular Jewish world, people deeply devoted to human rights for all people, Palestinians included. But the two groups are increasingly distinct. Particularly in the younger generations, fewer and fewer American Jewish liberals are Zionists; fewer and fewer American Jewish Zionists are liberal. One reason is that the leading institutions of American Jewry have refused to foster indeed, have actively opposed a Zionism that challenges Israel's behavior in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and toward its own Arab citizens. For several UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 decades, the Jewish establishment has asked American Jews to check their liberalism at Zionism's door, and now, to their horror, they are finding that many young Jews have checked their Zionism instead. Morally, American Zionism is in a downward spiral. If the leaders of groups like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations do not change course, they will wake up one day to find a younger, Orthodox-dominated, Zionist leadership whose naked hostility to Arabs and Palestinians scares even them, and a mass of secular American Jews who range from apathetic to appalled. Saving liberal Zionism in the United States so that American Jews can help save liberal Zionism in Israel is the great American Jewish challenge of our age. And it starts where Luntz's students wanted it to start:by talking frankly about Israel's current government, by no longer averting our eyes. Since the 1990s, journalists and scholars have been describing a bifurcation in Israeli society. In the words of Hebrew University political scientist Yaron Ezrahi, After decades of what came to be called a national consensus, the Zionist narrative of liberation has dissolved into openly contesting versions. One version, founded on a long memory of persecution, genocide, and a bitter struggle for survival, is pessimistic, distrustful of non-Jews, and believing only in Jewish power and solidarity. Another, nourished by secularized Versions of messianism as well as the Enlightenment idea of progress, articulates a deep sense of the limits of military force, and a commitment to liberal-democratic values. Every country manifests some kind of ideological divide. But in contemporary Israel, the gulf is among the widest on earth. As Ezrahi and others have noted, this latter, liberal-democratic Zionism has grown alongside a new individualism, particularly among secular Israelis, a greater demand for free expression, and a greater skepticism of coercive authority. You can see this spirit in new historians like Tom Segev who have fearlessly excavated the darker corners of the Zionist past and in jurists like former Supreme Court President Aharon Barak who have overturned Knesset laws that violate the human rights guarantees in Israel's Basic Laws. You can also see it in former Prime Minister Ehud Barak's apparent willingness to relinquish much of the West Bank in 2000 and early 2001. But in Israel today, this humane, universalistic Zionism does not wield power. To the contrary, it is gasping for air. To understand how deeply antithetical its values are to those of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, it's worth considering the case of Effi Eitam. Eitam, a charismatic ex cabinet minister and war hero, has proposed ethnically cleansing Palestinians from the West Bank. We'll have to expel the overwhelming majority of West Bank Arabs from here and remove Israeli Arabs from the political system, he declared in 2006. In 2008, Eitam merged his small Ahi Party into Netanyahu's Likud. And for the 2009-2010 academic year, he is Netanyahu's special emissary for overseas campus engagement. In that capacity, he visited a dozen American high schools and colleges last fall on the Israeli government's behalf. The group that organized his tour was called Caravan for Democracy. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman once shared Eitam's views. In his youth, he briefly joined Meir Kahane's now banned Kach Party, which also advocated the expulsion of Arabs from Israeli soil. Now Lieberman's position might be called pre-expulsion. He wants to revoke the citizenship of Israeli Arabs who won't swear a loyalty oath to the Jewish state. He tried to prevent two Arab parties that opposed Israel's 2008-2009 Gaza war from running candidates for the Knesset. He said Arab Knesset members who met with representatives of Hamas should be executed. He wants to jail Arabs who publicly mourn on Israeli Independence Day, and he hopes to permanently deny citizenship to Arabs from other countries who marry Arab citizens of Israel. You don't have to be paranoid to see the connection between Lieberman's current views and his former ones. The more you strip Israeli Arabs of legal protection, and the more you accuse them of treason, the more thinkable a policy of expulsion becomes. Lieberman's American defenders often note that in theory he supports a Palestinian state. What they usually fail to mention is that for him, a two-state solution means redrawing Israel's border so that a large chunk of Israeli Arabs find themselves exiled to another country, without their consent. Lieberman served as chief of staff during Netanyahu's first term as prime minister. And when it comes to the West Bank, Netanyahu's own record is in its way even more extreme than his prot g 's. In his 1993 book, A Place among the Nations, Netanyahu not only rejects the idea of a Palestinian state, he denies that there is such a thing as a Palestinian. In fact, he repeatedly equates the Palestinian bid for statehood with Nazism. An Israel that withdraws from the West Bank, he has declared, would be a ghetto-state with Auschwitz borders. And the effort to gouge Judea and Samaria the West Bank out of Israel resembles Hitler's bid to wrench the German-speaking Sudeten district from Czechoslovakia in 1938. It is unfair, Netanyahu insists, to ask Israel to concede more territory since it has already made vast, gut-wrenching concessions. What kind of concessions? It has abandoned its claim to Jordan, which by rights should be part of the Jewish state. On the left of Netanyahu's coalition sits Ehud Barak's emasculated Labor Party, but whatever moderating potential it may have is counterbalanced by what is, in some ways, the most illiberal coalition partner of all, Shas, the ultra-Orthodox party representing Jews of North African and Middle Eastern descent. At one point, Shas like some of its Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox counterparts was open to dismantling settlements. In recent years, however, ultra-Orthodox Israelis, anxious to find housing for their large families, have increasingly moved to the West Bank, where thanks to government subsidies it is far cheaper to live. Not coincidentally, their political parties have swung hard against territorial compromise. And they have done so with a virulence that reflects ultra-Orthodox Judaism's profound hostility to liberal values. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Shas's immensely powerful spiritual leader, has called Arabs vipers, snakes, and ants. In 2005, after Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proposed dismantling settlements in the Gaza Strip, Yosef urged that God strike him down. The official Shas newspaper recently called President Obama an Islamic extremist. Hebrew University Professor Ze'ev Sternhell is an expert on fascism and a winner of the prestigious Israel Prize. Commenting on Lieberman and the leaders of Shas in a recent Op-Ed in Haaretz, he wrote, The last time politicians UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 holding views similar to theirs were in power in post World War II Western Europe was in Franco's Spain. With their blessing, a crude and multifaceted campaign is being waged against the foundations of the democratic and liberal order. Sternhell should know. In September 2008, he was injured when a settler set off a pipe bomb at his house. Israeli governments come and go, but the Netanyahu coalition is the product of frightening, long-term trends in Israeli society:an ultra-Orthodox population that is increasing dramatically, a settler movement that is growing more radical and more entrenched in the Israeli bureaucracy and army, and a Russian immigrant community that is particularly prone to anti-Arab racism. In 2009, a poll by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 53 percent of Jewish Israelis and 77 percent of recent immigrants from the former USSR support encouraging Arabs to leave the country. Attitudes are worst among Israel's young. When Israeli high schools held mock elections last year, Lieberman won. This March, a poll found that 56 percent of Jewish Israeli high school students and more than 80 percent of religious Jewish high school students would deny Israeli Arabs the right to be elected to the Knesset. An education ministry official called the survey a huge warning signal in light of the strengthening trends of extremist views among the youth. You might think that such trends, and the sympathy for them expressed by some in Israel's government, would occasion substantial public concern even outrage among the leaders of organized American Jewry. You would be wrong. In Israel itself, voices from the left, and even center, warn in increasingly urgent tones about threats to Israeli democracy. Former Prime Ministers Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak have both said that Israel risks becoming an apartheid state if it continues to hold the West Bank. This April, when settlers forced a large Israeli bookstore to stop selling a book critical of the occupation, Shulamit Aloni, former head of the dovish Meretz Party, declared that Israel has not been democratic for some time now. But in the United States, groups like AIPAC and the Presidents' Conference patrol public discourse, scolding people who contradict their vision of Israel as a state in which all leaders cherish democracy and yearn for peace. The result is a terrible irony. In theory, mainstream American Jewish organizations still hew to a liberal vision of Zionism. On its website, AIPAC celebrates Israel's commitment to free speech and minority rights. The Conference of Presidents declares that Israel and the United States share political, moral and intellectual values including democracy, freedom, security and peace. These groups would never say, as do some in Netanyahu's coalition, that Israeli Arabs don't deserve full citizenship and West Bank Palestinians don't deserve human rights. But in practice, by defending virtually anything any Israeli government does, they make themselves intellectual bodyguards for Israeli leaders who threaten the very liberal values they profess to admire. After Israel's elections last February, for instance, Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice-chairman of the Presidents' Conference, explained that Avigdor Lieberman's agenda was far more moderate than the media has presented it. Insisting that Lieberman bears no general animus toward Israeli Arabs, Abraham Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that He's not saying expel them. He's not saying punish them. Permanently denying citizenship to their Arab spouses or jailing them if they publicly mourn on Israeli Independence Day evidently does not qualify as punishment. The ADL has criticized anti-Arab bigotry in the past, and the American Jewish Committee, to its credit, warned that Lieberman's proposed loyalty oath would chill Israel's democratic political debate. But the Forward summed up the overall response of America's communal Jewish leadership in its headline Jewish Leaders Largely Silent on Lieberman's Role in Government. Not only does the organized American Jewish community mostly avoid public criticism of the Israeli government, it tries to prevent others from leveling such criticism as well. In recent years, American Jewish organizations have waged a campaign to discredit the world's most respected international human rights groups. In 2006, Foxman called an Amnesty International report on Israeli killing of Lebanese civilians bigoted, biased, and borderline anti-Semitic. The Conference of Presidents has announced that biased NGOs include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Christian Aid, and Save the Children. Last summer, an AIPAC spokesman declared that Human Rights Watch has repeatedly demonstrated its anti-Israel bias. When the Obama administration awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Mary Robinson, former UN high commissioner for human rights, the ADL and AIPAC both protested, citing the fact that she had presided over the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa. Early drafts of the conference report implicitly accused Israel of racism. Robinson helped expunge that defamatory charge, angering Syria and Iran. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are not infallible. But when groups like AIPAC and the Presidents' Conference avoid virtually all public criticism of Israeli actions directing their outrage solely at Israel's neighbors they leave themselves in a poor position to charge bias. Moreover, while American Jewish groups claim that they are simply defending Israel from its foes, they are actually taking sides in a struggle within Israel between radically different Zionist visions. At the very moment the Anti-Defamation League claimed that Robinson harbored an animus toward Israel, an alliance of seven Israeli human rights groups publicly congratulated her on her award. Many of those groups, like B'Tselem, which monitors Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, and the Israeli branch of Physicians for Human Rights, have been at least as critical of Israel's actions in Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank as have Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. All of which raises an uncomfortable question. If American Jewish groups claim that Israel's overseas human rights critics are motivated by anti-Israeli, if not anti-Semitic, bias, what does that say about Israel's domestic human rights critics? The implication is clear:they must be guilty of self-hatred, if not treason. American Jewish leaders don't generally say that, of course, but their allies in the Netanyahu government do. Last summer, Israel's vice prime minister, Moshe Ya'alon, called the anti-occupation group Peace Now a virus. This January, a right-wing group called Im Tirtzu accused Israeli human rights organizations of having fed information to the Goldstone Commission that investigated Israel's Gaza war. A UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 Knesset member from Netanyahu's Likud promptly charged Naomi Chazan, head of the New Israel Fund, which supports some of those human rights groups, with treason, and a member of Lieberman's party launched an investigation aimed at curbing foreign funding of Israeli NG0s. To their credit, Foxman and other American Jewish leaders opposed the move, which might have impaired their own work. But they are reaping what they sowed. If you suggest that mainstream human rights criticism of Israel's government is motivated by animus toward the state, or toward Jews in general, you give aid and comfort to those in Israel who make the same charges against the human rights critics in their midst. In the American Jewish establishment today, the language of liberal Zionism with its idioms of human rights, equal citizenship, and territorial compromise has been drained of meaning. It remains the lingua franca in part for generational reasons, because many older American Zionists still see themselves as liberals of a sort. They vote Democratic; they are unmoved by biblical claims to the West Bank; they see average Palestinians as decent people betrayed by bad leaders; and they are secular. They don't want Jewish organizations to criticize Israel from the left, but neither do they want them to be agents of the Israeli right. These American Zionists are largely the product of a particular era. Many were shaped by the terrifying days leading up to the Six-Day War, when it appeared that Israel might be overrun, and by the bitter aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, when much of the world seemed to turn against the Jewish state. In that crucible, Israel became their Jewish identity, often in conjunction with the Holocaust, which the 1967 and 1973 wars helped make central to American Jewish life. These Jews embraced Zionism before the settler movement became a major force in Israeli politics, before the 1982 Lebanon war, before the first intifada. They fell in love with an Israel that was more secular, less divided, and less shaped by the culture, politics, and theology of occupation. And by downplaying the significance of Avigdor Lieberman, the settlers, and Shas, American Jewish groups allow these older Zionists to continue to identify with that more internally cohesive, more innocent Israel of their youth, an Israel that now only exists in their memories. But these secular Zionists aren't reproducing themselves. Their children have no memory of Arab armies massed on Israel's border and of Israel surviving in part thanks to urgent military assistance from the United States. Instead, they have grown up viewing Israel as a regional hegemon and an occupying power. As a result, they are more conscious than their parents of the degree to which Israeli behavior violates liberal ideals, and less willing to grant Israel an exemption because its survival seems in peril. Because they have inherited their parents' liberalism, they cannot embrace their uncritical Zionism. Because their liberalism is real, they can see that the liberalism of the American Jewish establishment is fake. To sustain their uncritical brand of Zionism, therefore, America's Jewish organizations will need to look elsewhere to replenish their ranks. They will need to find young American. Jews who have come of age during the West Bank occupation but are not troubled by it. And those young American Jews will come disproportionately from the Orthodox world. Because they marry earlier, intermarry less, and have more children, Orthodox Jews are growing rapidly as a share of the American Jewish population. According to a 2006 American Jewish Committee AJC survey, while Orthodox Jews make up only 12 percent of American Jewry over the age of sixty, they constitute 34 percent between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. For America's Zionist organizations, these Orthodox youngsters are a potential bonanza. In their yeshivas they learn devotion to Israel from an early age; they generally spend a year of religious study there after high school, and often know friends or relatives who have immigrated to Israel. The same AJC study found that while only 16 percent of non-Orthodox adult Jews under the age of forty feel very close to Israel, among the Orthodox the figure is 79 percent. As secular Jews drift away from America's Zionist institutions, their Orthodox counterparts will likely step into the breach. The Orthodox are still interested in parochial Jewish concerns, explains Samuel Heilman, a sociologist at the City University of New York. They are among the last ones who stayed in the Jewish house, so they now control the lights. But it is this very parochialism a deep commitment to Jewish concerns, which often outweighs more universal ones that gives Orthodox Jewish Zionism a distinctly illiberal cast. The 2006 AJC poll found that while 60 percent of non-Orthodox American Jews under the age of forty support a Palestinian state, that figure drops to 25 percent among the Orthodox. In 2009, when Brandeis University's Theodore Sasson asked American Jewish focus groups about Israel, he found Orthodox participants much less supportive of dismantling settlements as part of a peace deal. Even more tellingly, Reform, Conservative, and unaffiliated Jews tended to believe that average Palestinians wanted peace, but had been ill-served by their leaders. Orthodox Jews, by contrast, were more likely to see the Palestinian people as the enemy, and to deny that ordinary Palestinians shared any common interests or values with ordinary Israelis or Jews. Orthodox Judaism has great virtues, including a communal warmth and a commitment to Jewish learning unmatched in the American Jewish world. I'm biased, since my family attends an Orthodox synagogue. But if current trends continue, the growing influence of Orthodox Jews in America's Jewish communal institutions will erode even the liberal-democratic veneer that today covers American Zionism. In 2002, America's major Jewish organizations sponsored a large Israel solidarity rally on the Washington Mall. Up and down the east coast, yeshivas shut down for the day, swelling the estimated Orthodox share of the crowd to close to 70 percent. When the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told the rally that innocent Palestinians are suffering and dying as well, he was booed. America's Jewish leaders should think hard about that rally. Unless they change course, it portends the future:an American Zionist movement that does not even feign concern for Palestinian dignity and a broader American Jewish population that does not even feign concern for Israel. My own children, given their upbringing, could as easily end up among the booers as among Luntz's focus group. Either prospect fills me with dread. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015 In 2004, in an effort to prevent weapons smuggling from Egypt, Israeli tanks and bulldozers demolished hundreds of houses in the Rafah refugee camp in the southern Gaza Strip. Watching television, a veteran Israeli commentator and politician named Tommy Lapid saw an elderly Palestinian woman crouched on all fours looking for her medicines amid the ruins of her home. He said she reminded him of his grandmother. In that moment, Lapid captured the spirit that is suffocating within organized American Jewish life. To begin with, he watched. In my experience, there is an epidemic of not watching among American Zionists today. A Red Cross study on malnutrition in the Gaza Strip, a bill in the Knesset to allow Jewish neighborhoods to bar entry to Israeli Arabs, an Israeli human rights report on settlers burning Palestinian olive groves, three more Palestinian teenagers shot it's unpleasant. Rationalizing and minimizing Palestinian suffering has become a kind of game. In a more recent report on how to foster Zionism among America's young, Luntz urges American Jewish groups to use the word Arabs, not Palestinians, since the term Palestinians' evokes images of refugee camps, victims and oppression, while Arab' says wealth, oil and Islam. Of course, Israel like the United States must sometimes take morally difficult actions in its own defense. But they are morally difficult only if you allow yourself some human connection to the other side. Otherwise, security justifies everything. The heads of AIPAC and the Presidents' Conference should ask themselves what Israel's leaders would have to do or say to make them scream no. After all, Lieberman is foreign minister; Effi Eitam is touring American universities; settlements are growing at triple the rate of the Israeli population; half of Israeli Jewish high school students want Arabs barred from the Knesset. If the line has not yet been crossed, where is the line? What infuriated critics about Lapid's comment was that his grandmother died at Auschwitz. How dare he defile the memory of the Holocaust? Of course, the Holocaust is immeasurably worse than anything Israel has done or ever will do. But at least Lapid used Jewish suffering to connect to the suffering of others. In the world of AIPAC, the Holocaust analogies never stop, and their message is always the same:Jews are licensed by their victimhood to worry only about themselves. Many of Israel's founders believed that with statehood, Jews would rightly be judged on the way they treated the non-Jews living under their dominion. For the first time we shall be the majority living with a minority, Knesset member Pinchas Lavon declared in 1948, and we shall be called upon to provide an example and prove how Jews live with a minority. But the message of the American Jewish establishment and its allies in the Netanyahu government is exactly the opposite:since Jews are history's permanent victims, always on the knife-edge of extinction, moral responsibility is a luxury Israel does not have. Its only responsibility is to survive. As former Knesset speaker Avraham Burg writes in his remarkable 2008 book, The Holocaust Is Over; We Must Rise From Its Ashes, Victimhood sets you free. This obsession with victimhood lies at the heart of why Zionism is dying among America's secular Jewish young. It simply bears no relationship to their lived experience, or what they have seen of Israel's. Yes, Israel faces threats from Hezbollah and Hamas. Yes, Israelis understandably worry about a nuclear Iran. But the dilemmas you face when you possess dozens or hundreds of nuclear weapons, and your adversary, however despicable, may acquire one, are not the dilemmas of the Warsaw Ghetto. The year 2010 is not, as Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed, 1938. The drama of Jewish victimhood a drama that feels natural to many Jews who lived through 1938, 1948, or even 1967 strikes most of today's young American Jews as farce. But there is a different Zionist calling, which has never been more desperately relevant. It has its roots in Israel's Independence Proclamation, which promised that the Jewish state will be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew prophets, and in the December 1948 letter from Albert Einstein, Hannah Arendt, and others to The New York Times, protesting right-wing Zionist leader Menachem Begin's visit to the United States after his party's militias massacred Arab civilians in the village of Deir Yassin. It is a call to recognize that in a world in which Jewish fortunes have radically changed, the best way to memorialize the history of Jewish suffering is through the ethical use of Jewish power. For several months now, a group of Israeli students has been traveling every Friday to the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah, where a Palestinian family named the Ghawis lives on the street outside their home of fifty-three years, from which they were evicted to make room for Jewish settlers. Although repeatedly arrested for protesting without a permit, and called traitors and self-haters by the Israeli right, the students keep coming, their numbers now swelling into the thousands. What if American Jewish organizations brought these young people to speak at Hillel? What if this was the face of Zionism shown to America's Jewish young? What if the students in Luntz's focus group had been told that their generation faces a challenge as momentous as any in Jewish history:to save liberal democracy in the only Jewish state on earth? Too many years I lived in the warm embrace of institutionalized elusiveness and was a part of it, writes Avraham Burg. I was very comfortable there. I know; I was comfortable there too. But comfortable Zionism has become a moral abdication. Let's hope that Luntz's students, in solidarity with their counterparts at Sheikh Jarrah, can foster an uncomfortable Zionism, a Zionism angry at what Israel risks becoming, and in love with what it still could be. Let's hope they care enough to try. May 12, 2010. Peter Beinart is Associate Professor of Journalism and Political Science at the City University of New York, a Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, and Senior Political Writer for The Daily Beast. His new book, The Icarus Syndrome:A History of American Hubris, will be published in June. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770567 Date:08 31 2015
[(0.9846068244726981, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From:H hrod17 clintonemail. com Sent:Monday, May 17, 2010 5:52 AM To:'JilotyLC state. gov' Subject:Fw:H:Must read when you can. Sid Pls print 3 copies. Original Message From:sbwhoeop To:H Sent:Sun May 16 23:58:51 2010 Subject:H:Must read when you can. Sid H:I'm sure you are preoccupied with the adventures of Lula, et al. Nonetheless, the article below, just posted by the NY Review, soon to be published, is a breakthrough piece that will have a large impact. It's worth reading, not least for Frank Luntz's poll numbers. The hysterical tone of much of the Israeli leadership and US Jewish community is partly rooted in this long-term and profound development. Sid http:www. nybooks. com articles archives 2010 jun 10 failure-american-jewish-establishment The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment June 10, 2010 http:www. nybooks. com issues 2010 jun 10 by Peter Beinart http:www. nybooks. com contributors peter-beinart E-mail http:www. nybooks. com mail_friend 5 23934 Single Page http:www. nybooks. com articles archives 2010 jun 10 failure-american-jewish-establishment? Pagination false Share http:www. addthis. com bookmark. php More by Peter Beinart http:www. nybooks. com contributors peter-beinart http:www. nybooks. com galleries john-springs-illustrator 2009 jun 11 benjamin-netanyahu Benjamin Netanyahu; drawing by John Springs In 2003, several prominent Jewish philanthropists hired Republican pollster Frank Luntz to explain why American Jewish college students were not more vigorously rebutting campus criticism of Israel. In response, he unwittingly produced the most damning indictment of the organized American Jewish community that I have ever seen. The philanthropists wanted to know what Jewish students thought about Israel. Luntz found that they mostly didn't. Six times we have brought Jewish youth together as a group to talk about their Jewishness and connection to Israel, he reported. Six times the topic of Israel did not come up until it was prompted. Six times these Jewish youth used the word 'they' rather than us' to describe the situation. That Luntz encountered indifference was not surprising. In recent years, several studies have revealed, in the words of Steven Cohen of Hebrew Union College and Ari Kelman of the University of California at bavis, that non-Orthodox younger Jews, on the whole, feel much less attached to Israel than their elders, with many professing a near-total absence of positive feelings. In 2008, the student senate at Brandeis, the only nonsectarian Jewish-sponsored university in America, rejected a resolution commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Jewish state. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 Luntz's task was to figure out what had gone wrong. When he probed the students' views of Israel, he hit up against some firm beliefs. First, they reserve the right to question the Israeli position. These young Jews, Luntz explained, resist anything they see as 'group think. They want an open and frank discussion of Israel and its flaws. Second, young Jews desperately want peace. When Luntz showed them a series of ads, one of the most popular was entitled Proof that Israel Wants Peace, and listed offers by various Israeli governments to withdraw from conquered land. Third, some empathize with the plight of the Palestinians. When Luntz displayed ads depicting Palestinians as violent and hateful, several focus group participants criticized them as stereotypical and unfair, citing their own Muslim friends. Most of the students, in other words, were liberals, broadly defined. They had imbibed some of the defining values of American Jewish political culture:a belief in open debate, a skepticism about military force, a commitment to human rights. And in their innocence, they did not realize that they were supposed to shed those values when it came to Israel. The only kind of Zionism they found attractive was a Zionism that recognized Palestinians as deserving of dignity and capable of peace, and they were quite willing to condemn an Israeli government that did not share those beliefs. Luntz did not grasp the irony. The only kind of Zionism they found attractive was the kind that the American Jewish establishment has been working against for most of their lives. Among American Jews today, there are a great many Zionists, especially in the Orthodox world, people deeply devoted to the State of Israel. And there are a great many liberals, especially in the secular Jewish world, people deeply devoted to human rights for all people, Palestinians included. But the two groups are increasingly distinct. Particularly in the younger generations, fewer and fewer American Jewish liberals are Zionists; fewer and fewer American Jewish Zionists are liberal. One reason is that the leading institutions of American Jewry have refused to foster indeed, have actively opposed a Zionism that challenges Israel's behavior in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and toward its own Arab citizens. For several decades, the Jewish establishment has asked American Jews to check their liberalism at Zionism's door, and now, to their horror, they are finding that many young Jews have checked their Zionism instead. Morally, American Zionism is in a downward spiral. If the leaders of groups like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations do not change course, they will wake up one day to find a younger, Orthodox-dominated, Zionist leadership whose naked hostility to Arabs and Palestinians scares even them, and a mass of secular American Jews who range from apathetic to appalled. Saving liberal Zionism in the United States so that American Jews can help save liberal Zionism in Israel is the great American Jewish challenge of our age. And it starts where Luntz's students wanted it to start:by talking frankly about Israel's current government, by no longer averting our eyes. Since the 1990s, journalists and scholars have been describing a bifurcation in Israeli society. In the words of Hebrew University political scientist Yaron Ezrahi, After decades of what came to be called a national consensus, the Zionist narrative of liberation has dissolved into openly contesting versions. One version, founded on a long memory of persecution, genocide, and a bitter struggle for survival, is pessimistic, distrustful of non-Jews, and believing only in Jewish power and solidarity. Another, nourished by secularized versions of messianism as well as the Enlightenment idea of progress, articulates a deep sense of the limits of military force, and a commitment to liberal-democratic values. Every country manifests some kind of ideological divide. But in contemporary Israel, the gulf is among the widest on earth. As Ezrahi and others have noted, this latter, liberal-democratic Zionism has grown alongside a new individualism, particularly among secular Israelis, a greater demand for free expression, and a greater skepticism of coercive authority. You can see this spirit in new historians like Tom Segev who have fearlessly excavated the darker corners of the Zionist past and in jurists like former Supreme Court President Aharon Barak who have overturned Knesset laws that violate the human rights guarantees in Israel's Basic Laws. You can also see it in former Prime Minister Ehud Barak's apparent willingness to relinquish much of the West Bank in 2000 and early 2001. But in Israel today, this humane, universalistic Zionism does not wield power. To the contrary, it is gasping for air. To understand how deeply antithetical its values are to those of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, it's worth considering the case of Effi Eitam. Eitam, a charismatic ex cabinet minister and war hero, has proposed ethnically cleansing Palestinians from the West Bank. We'll have to expel the overwhelming majority of West Bank Arabs from here and remove Israeli Arabs from the political system, he declared in 2006. In 2008, Eitam merged his small Ahi Party into Netanyahu's Likud. And for the 2009-2010 academic year, he is Netanyahu's special emissary for overseas campus engagement. In that capacity, he visited a dozen American high schools and colleges last fall on the Israeli government's behalf. The group that organized his tour was called Caravan for Democracy. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman once shared Eitam's views. In his youth, he briefly joined Meir Kahane's now banned Kach Party, which also advocated the expulsion of Arabs from Israeli soil. Now Lieberman's position might be called pre-expulsion. He wants to revoke the citizenship of Israeli Arabs who won't swear a loyalty oath to the Jewish UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 state. He tried to prevent two Arab parties that opposed Israel's 2008-2009 Gaza war from running candidates for the Knesset. He said Arab Knesset members who met with representatives of Hamas should be executed. He wants to jail Arabs who publicly mourn on Israeli Independence Day, and he hopes to permanently deny citizenship to Arabs from other countries who marry Arab citizens of Israel. You don't have to be paranoid to see the connection between Lieberman's current views and his former ones. The more you strip Israeli Arabs of legal protection, and the more you accuse them of treason, the more thinkable a policy of expulsion becomes. Lieberman's American defenders often note that in theory he supports a Palestinian state. What they usually fail to mention is that for him, a two-state solution means redrawing Israel's border so that a large chunk of Israeli Arabs find themselves exiled to another country, without their consent. Lieberman served as chief of staff during Netanyahu's first term as prime minister. And when it comes to the West Bank, Netanyahu's own record is in its way even more extreme than his prot g 's. In his 1993 book, A Place among the Nations, Netanyahu not only rejects the idea of a Palestinian state, he denies that there is such a thing as a Palestinian. In fact, he repeatedly equates the Palestinian bid for statehood with Nazism. An Israel that withdraws from the West Bank, he has declared, would be a ghetto-state with Auschwitz borders. And the effort to gouge Judea and Samaria the West Bank out of Israel resembles Hitler's bid to wrench the German-speaking Sudeten district from Czechoslovakia in 1938. It is unfair, Netanyahu insists, to ask Israel to concede more territory since it has already made vast, gut-wrenching concessions. What kind of concessions? It has abandoned its claim to Jordan, which by rights should be part of the Jewish state. On the left of Netanyahu's coalition sits Ehud Barak's emasculated Labor Party, but whatever moderating potential it may have is counterbalanced by what is, in some ways, the most illiberal coalition partner of all, Shas, the ultra-Orthodox party representing Jews of North African and Middle Eastern descent. At one point, Shas like some of its Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox counterparts was open to dismantling settlements. In recent years, however, ultra-Orthodox. Israelis, anxious to find housing for their large families, have increasingly moved to the West Bank, where thanks to government subsidies it is far cheaper to live. Not coincidentally, their political parties have swung hard against territorial compromise. And they have done so with a virulence that reflects ultra-Orthodox Judaism's profound hostility to liberal values. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Shas's immensely powerful spiritual leader, has called Arabs vipers, snakes, and ants. In 2005, after Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proposed dismantling settlements in the Gaza Strip, Yosef urged that God strike him down. The official Shas newspaper recently called President Obama an Islamic extremist. Hebrew University Professor Ze'ev Sternhell is an expert on fascism and a winner of the prestigious Israel Prize. Commenting on Lieberman and the leaders of Shas in a recent Op-Ed in Haaretz, he wrote, The last time politicians holding views similar to theirs were in power in post World War II Western Europe was in Franco's Spain. With their blessing, a crude and multifaceted campaign is being waged against the foundations of the democratic and liberal order. Sternhell should know. In September 2008, he was injured when a settler set off a pipe bomb at his house. Israeli governments come and go, but the Netanyahu coalition is the product of frightening, long-term trends in Israeli society:an ultra-Orthodox population that is increasing dramatically, a settler movement that is growing more radical and more entrenched in the Israeli bureaucracy and army, and a Russian immigrant community that is particularly prone to anti-Arab racism. In 2009, a poll by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 53 percent of Jewish Israelis and 77 percent of recent immigrants from the former USSR support encouraging Arabs to leave the country. Attitudes are worst among Israel's young. When Israeli high schools held mock elections last year, Lieberman won. This March, a poll found that 56 percent of Jewish Israeli high school students and more than 80 percent of religious Jewish high school students would deny Israeli Arabs the right to be elected to the Knesset. An education ministry official called the survey a huge warning signal in light of the strengthening trends of extremist views among the youth. You might think that such trends, and the sympathy for them expressed by some in Israel's government, would occasion substantial public concern even outrage among the leaders of organized American Jewry. You would be wrong. In Israel itself, voices from the left, and even center, warn in increasingly urgent tones about threats to Israeli democracy. Former Prime Ministers Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak have both said that Israel risks becoming an apartheid state if it continues to hold the West Bank. This April, when settlers forced a large Israeli bookstore to stop selling a book critical of the occupation, Shulamit Aloni, former head of the dovish Meretz Party, declared that Israel has not been democratic for some time now. But in the United States, groups like AIPAC and the Presidents' Conference patrol public discourse, scolding people who contradict their vision of Israel as a state in which all leaders cherish democracy and yearn for peace. The result is a terrible irony. In theory, mainstream American Jewish organizations still hew to a liberal vision of Zionism. On its website, AIPAC celebrates Israel's commitment to free speech and minority rights. The Conference of Presidents UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 declares that Israel and the United States share political, moral and intellectual values including democracy, freedom, security and peace. These groups would never say, as do some in Netanyahu's coalition, that Israeli Arabs don't deserve full citizenship and West Bank Palestinians don't deserve human rights. But in practice, by defending virtually anything any Israeli government does, they make themselves intellectual bodyguards for Israeli leaders who threaten the very liberal values they profess to admire. After Israel's elections last February, for instance, Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice-chairman of the Presidents' Conference, explained that Avigdor Lieberman's agenda was far more moderate than the media has presented it. Insisting that Lieberman bears no general animus toward Israeli Arabs, Abraham Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that He's not saying expel them. He's not saying punish them. Permanently denying citizenship to their Arab spouses or jailing them if they publicly mourn on Israeli Independence Day evidently does not qualify as punishment. The ADL has criticized anti-Arab bigotry in the past, and the American Jewish Committee, to its credit, warned that Lieberman's proposed loyalty oath would chill Israel's democratic political debate. But the Forward summed up the overall response of America's communal Jewish leadership in its headline Jewish Leaders Largely Silent on Lieberman's Role in Government. Not only does the organized American Jewish community mostly avoid public criticism of the Israeli government, it tries to prevent others from leveling such criticism as well. In recent years, American Jewish organizations have waged a campaign to discredit the world's most respected international human rights groups. In 2006, Foxman called an Amnesty International report on Israeli killing of Lebanese civilians bigoted, biased, and borderline anti-Semitic. The Conference of Presidents has announced that biased NGOs include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Christian Aid, and Save the Children. Last summer, an AIPAC spokesman declared that Human Rights Watch has repeatedly demonstrated its anti-Israel bias. When the Obama administration awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Mary Robinson, former UN high commissioner for human rights, the ADL and AIPAC both protested, citing the fact that she had presided over the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa. Early drafts of the conference report implicitly accused Israel of racism. Robinson helped expunge that defamatory charge, angering Syria and Iran. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are not infallible. But when groups like AIPAC and the Presidents' Conference avoid virtually all public criticism of Israeli actions directing their outrage solely at Israel's neighbors they leave themselves in a poor position to charge bias. Moreover, while American Jewish groups claim that they are simply defending Israel from its foes, they are actually taking sides in a struggle within Israel between radically different Zionist visions. At the very moment the Anti-Defamation League claimed that Robinson harbored an animus toward Israel, an alliance of seven Israeli human rights groups publicly congratulated her on her award. Many of those groups, like B'Tselem, which monitors Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories, and the Israeli branch of Physicians for Human Rights, have been at least as critical of Israel's actions in Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank as have Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. All of which raises an uncomfortable question. If American Jewish groups claim that Israel's overseas human rights critics are motivated by anti-Israeli, if not anti-Semitic, bias, what does that say about Israel's domestic human rights critics? The implication is clear:they must be guilty of self-hatred, if not treason. American Jewish leaders don't generally say that, of course, but their allies in the Netanyahu government do. Last summer, Israel's vice prime minister, Moshe Ya'alon, called the anti-occupation group Peace Now a virus. This January, a right-wing group called Im Tirtzu accused Israeli human rights organizations of having fed information to the Goldstone Commission that investigated Israel's Gaza war. A Knesset member from Netanyahu's Likud promptly charged Naomi Chazan, head of the New Israel Fund, which supports some of those human rights groups, with treason, and a member of Lieberman's party launched an investigation aimed at curbing foreign funding of Israeli NGOs. To their credit, Foxman and other American Jewish leaders opposed the move, which might have impaired their own work. But they are reaping what they sowed. If you suggest that mainstream human rights criticism of Israel's government is motivated by animus toward the state, or toward Jews in general, you give aid and comfort to those in Israel who make the same charges against the human rights critics in their midst. In the American Jewish establishment today, the language of liberal Zionism with its idioms of human rights, equal citizenship, and territorial compromise has been drained of meaning. It remains the lingua franca in part for generational reasons, because many older American Zionists still see themselves as liberals of a sort. They vote Democratic; they are unmoved by biblical claims to the West Bank; they see average Palestinians as decent people betrayed by bad leaders; and they are secular. They don't want Jewish organizations to criticize Israel from the left, but neither do they want them to be agents of the Israeli right. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 These American Zionists are largely the product of a particular era. Many were shaped by the terrifying days leading up to the Six-Day War, when it appeared that Israel might be overrun, and by the bitter aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, when much of the world seemed to turn against the Jewish state. In that crucible, Israel became their Jewish identity, often in conjunction with the Holocaust, which the 1967 and 1973 wars helped make central to American Jewish life. These Jews embraced Zionism before the settler movement became a major force in Israeli politics, before the 1982 Lebanon war, before the first intifada. They fell in love with an Israel that was more secular, less divided, and less shaped by the culture, politics, and theology of occupation. And by downplaying the significance of Avigdor Lieberman, the settlers, and Shas, American Jewish groups allow these older Zionists to continue to identify with that more internally cohesive, more innocent Israel of their youth, an Israel that now only exists in their memories. But these secular Zionists aren't reproducing themselves. Their children have no memory of Arab armies massed on Israel's border and of Israel surviving in part thanks to urgent military assistance from the United States. Instead, they have grown up viewing Israel as a regional hegemon and an occupying power. As a result, they are more conscious than their parents of the degree to which Israeli behavior violates liberal ideals, and less willing to grant Israel an exemption because its survival seems in peril. Because they have inherited their parents' liberalism, they cannot embrace their uncritical Zionism. Because their liberalism is real, they can see that the liberalism of the American Jewish establishment is fake. To sustain their uncritical brand of Zionism, therefore, America's Jewish organizations will need to look elsewhere to replenish their ranks. They will need to find young American Jews who have come of age during the West Bank occupation but are not troubled by it. And those young American Jews will come disproportionately from the Orthodox world. Because they marry earlier, intermarry less, and have more children, Orthodox Jews are growing rapidly as a share of the American Jewish population. According to a 2006 American Jewish Committee AJC survey, while Orthodox Jews make up only 12 percent of American Jewry over the age of sixty, they constitute 34 percent between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. For America's Zionist organizations, these Orthodox youngsters are a potential bonanza. In their yeshivas they learn devotion to Israel from an early age; they generally spend a year of religious study there after high school, and often know friends or relatives who have immigrated to Israel. The same AJC study found that while only 16 percent of non-Orthodox adult Jews under the age of forty feel very close to Israel, among the Orthodox the figure is 79 percent. As secular Jews drift away from America's Zionist institutions, their Orthodox counterparts will likely step into the breach. The Orthodox are still interested in parochial Jewish concerns, explains Samuel Heilman, a sociologist at the City University of New York. They are among the last ones who stayed in the Jewish house, so they now control the lights. But it is this very parochialism a deep commitment to Jewish concerns, which often outweighs more universal ones that gives Orthodox Jewish Zionism a distinctly illiberal cast. The 2006 AJC poll found that while 60 percent of non-Orthodox American Jews under the age of forty support a Palestinian state, that figure drops to 25 percent among the Orthodox. In 2009, when Brandeis University's Theodore Sasson asked American Jewish focus groups about Israel, he found Orthodox participants much less supportive of dismantling settlements as part of a peace deal. Even more tellingly, Reform, Conservative, and unaffiliated Jews tended to believe that average Palestinians wanted peace, but had been ill-served by their leaders. Orthodox Jews, by contrast, were more likely to see the Palestinian people as the enemy, and to deny that ordinary Palestinians shared any common interests or values with ordinary Israelis or Jews. Orthodox Judaism has great virtues, including a communal warmth and a commitment to Jewish learning unmatched in the American Jewish world. I'm biased, since my family attends an Orthodox synagogue. But if current trends continue, the growing influence of Orthodox Jews in America's Jewish communal institutions will erode even the liberal-democratic veneer that today covers American Zionism. In 2002, America's major Jewish organizations sponsored a large Israel solidarity rally on the Washington Mall. Up and down the east coast, yeshivas shut down for the day, swelling the estimated Orthodox share of the crowd to close to 70 percent. When the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told the rally that innocent Palestinians are suffering and dying as well, he was booed. America's Jewish leaders should think hard about that rally. Unless they change course, it portends the future:an American Zionist movement that does not even feign concern for Palestinian dignity and a broader American Jewish population that does not even feign concern for Israel. My own children, given their upbringing, could as easily end up among the booers as among Luntz's focus group. Either prospect fills me with dread. In 2004, in an effort to prevent weapons smuggling from Egypt, Israeli tanks and bulldozers demolished hundreds of houses in the Rafah refugee camp in the southern Gaza Strip. Watching television, a veteran Israeli commentator and UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 'politician named Tommy Lapid saw an elderly Palestinian woman crouched on all fours looking for her medicines amid the ruins of her home. He said she reminded him of his grandmother. In that moment, Lapid captured the spirit that is suffocating within organized American Jewish life. To begin with, he watched. In my experience, there is an epidemic of not watching among American Zionists today. A Red Cross study on malnutrition in the Gaza Strip, a bill in the Knesset to allow Jewish neighborhoods to bar entry to Israeli Arabs, an Israeli human rights report on settlers burning Palestinian olive groves, three more Palestinian teenagers shot it's unpleasant. Rationalizing and minimizing Palestinian suffering has become a kind of game. In a more recent report on how to foster Zionism among America's young, Luntz urges American Jewish groups to use the word Arabs, not Palestinians, since the term 'Palestinians' evokes images of refugee camps, victims and oppression, while Arab' says wealth, oil and Islam. 7 Of course, Israel like the United States must sometimes take morally difficult actions in its own defense. But they are morally difficult only if you allow yourself some human connection to the other side. Otherwise, security justifies everything. The heads of AIPAC and the Presidents' Conference should ask themselves what Israel's leaders would have to do or say to make them scream no. After all, Lieberman is foreign minister; Effi Eitam is touring American universities; settlements are growing at triple the rate of the Israeli population; half of Israeli Jewish high school students want Arabs barred from the Knesset. If the line has not yet been crossed, where is the line? What infuriated critics about Lapid's comment was that his grandmother died at Auschwitz. How dare he defile the memory of the Holocaust? Of course, the Holocaust is immeasurably worse than anything Israel has done or ever will do. But at least Lapid used Jewish suffering to connect to the suffering of others. In the world of AIPAC, the Holocaust analogies never stop, and their message is always the same:Jews are licensed by their victimhood to worry only about themselves. Many of Israel's founders believed that with statehood, Jews would rightly be judged on the way they treated the non-Jews living under their dominion. For the first time we shall be the majority living with a minority, Knesset member Pinchas Lavon declared in 1948, and we shall be called upon to provide an example and prove how Jews live with a minority. But the message of the American Jewish establishment and its allies in the Netanyahu government is exactly the opposite:since Jews are history's permanent victims, always on the knife-edge of extinction, moral responsibility is a luxury Israel does not have. Its only responsibility is to survive. As former Knesset speaker Avraham Burg writes in his remarkable 2008 book, The Holocaust Is Over; We Must Rise From Its Ashes, Victimhood sets you free. This obsession with victimhood lies at the heart of why Zionism is dying among America's secular Jewish young. It simply bears no relationship to their lived experience, or what they have seen of Israel's. Yes, Israel faces threats from Hezbollah and Hamas. Yes, Israelis understandably worry about a nuclear Iran. But the dilemmas you face when you possess dozens or hundreds of nuclear weapons, and your adversary, however despicable, may acquire one, are not the dilemmas of the Warsaw Ghetto. The year 2010 is not, as Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed, 1938. The drama of Jewish victimhood a drama that feels natural to many Jews who lived through 1938, 1948, or even 1967 strikes most of today's young American Jews as farce. But there is a different Zionist calling, which has never been more desperately relevant. It has its roots in Israel's Independence Proclamation, which promised that the Jewish state will be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew prophets, and in the December 1948 letter from Albert Einstein, Hannah Arendt, and others to The New York Times, protesting right-wing Zionist leader Menachem Begin's visit to the United States after his party's militias massacred Arab civilians in the village of Deir Yassin. It is a call to recognize that in a world in which Jewish fortunes have radically changed, the best way to memorialize the history of Jewish suffering is through the ethical use of Jewish power. For several months now, a group of Israeli students has been traveling every Friday to the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah, where a Palestinian family named the Ghawis lives on the street outside their home of fifty-three years, from which they were evicted to make room for Jewish settlers. Although repeatedly arrested for protesting without a permit, and called traitors and self-haters by the Israeli right, the students keep coming, their numbers now swelling into the thousands. What if American Jewish organizations brought these young people to speak at Hillel? What if this was the face of Zionism shown to America's Jewish young? What if the students in Luntz's focus group had been told that their generation faces a challenge as momentous as any in Jewish history:to save liberal democracy in the only Jewish state on earth? Too many years I lived in the warm embrace of institutionalized elusiveness and was a part of it, writes Avraham Burg. I was very comfortable there. I know; I was comfortable there too. But comfortable Zionism has become a moral abdication. Let's hope that Luntz's students, in solidarity with their counterparts at Sheikh Jarrah, can foster an UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015 uncomfortable Zionism, a Zionism angry at what Israel risks becoming, and in love with what it still could be. Let's hope they care enough to try. May 12, 2010 Peter Beinart is Associate Professor of Journalism and Political Science at the City University of New York, a Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, and Senior Political Writer for The Daily Beast. His new book, The Icarus Syndrome:A History of American Hubris, will be published in June. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05775710 Date:08 31 2015")]
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UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05771965 Date:08 31 2015 RELEASE IN FULL Project Proposal USG Agency Roles in Off-Shore On-Shore Balancing This project will prepare by December 31, 2010, a proposal defining in practical terms the contributions of U. S. Government agencies to a security strategy of off-shore military and on-shore political-economic balancing. An Alternative Security Strategy. Off-shore on-shore balancing seeks to achieve America's core national security objectives through a combination of over-the-horizon off-shore military power and in-region on-shore economic and political power. Off-shore on-shore balancing is an alternative to advancing U. S. security goals through the deployment of large ground forces overseas, already problematic and likely to become even more so as economic challenges continue and chronic resentment deepens. Off-shore on-shore balancing relies on naval, air, and rapidly deployable ground forces in combination with on-site economic and political support for local partners to secure America's interests in combating terrorism and achieving other key national security goals, particularly in the Middle East and Asia. Afghanistan Case Study. To explore the strategy in practice, the project will consider a three-year transition to off-shore on-shore balancing in Afghanistan. In the first, USG agencies would empower Pashtun groups through political and economic programs to achieve greater autonomy and create local opposition to the Taliban. U. S. and NATO troops on the ground would provide security. In the second year, U. S. and NATO troops would continue to provide security for political and economic programs and deliver lethal effects against terrorist groups, but they would operate with from a shrinking footprint as they redeployed to less sensitive parts of the country. In the third year, U. S. and NATO would remove troops and rely on air, naval, and rapidly deployable ground forces to deliver over-the-horizon effects. Talking to the Practitioners. The project aims to define the contributions from key agencies, starting with the State Department and then moving on to the intelligence community and the military services. The project will solicit agencies' views on how current and future programs might contribute to the strategy, identify inter-agency processes that might facilitate the coordination of the strategy, and anticipate issues that would arise in a transition to the strategy. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05771965 Date:08 31 2015
[(0.9852856425379476, "UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05771993 Date:08 31 2015 RELEASE IN FULL Project Proposal USG Agency Roles in Off-Shore On-Shore Balancing This project will prepare by December 31, 2010, a proposal defining in practical terms the contributions of U. S. Government agencies to a security strategy of off-shore military and on-shore political-economic balancing. An Alternative Security Strategy. Off-shore on-shore balancing seeks to achieve America's core national security objectives through a combination of over-the-horizon off-shore military power and in-region on-shore economic and political power. Off-shore on-shore balancing is an alternative to advancing U. S. security goals through the deployment of large ground forces overseas, already problematic and likely to become even more so as economic challenges continue and chronic resentment deepens. Off-shore on-shore balancing relies on naval, air, and rapidly deployable ground forces in combination with on-site economic and political support for local partners to secure America's interests in combating terrorism and achieving other key national security goals, particularly in the Middle East and Asia. Afghanistan Case Study. To explore the strategy in practice, the project will consider a three-year transition to off-shore on-shore balancing in Afghanistan. In the first, USG agencies would empower Pashtun groups through political and economic programs to achieve greater autonomy and create local opposition to the Taliban. U. S. and NATO troops on the ground would provide security. In the second year, U. S. and NATO troops would continue to provide security for political and economic programs and deliver lethal effects against terrorist groups, but they would operate with from a shrinking footprint as they redeployed to less sensitive parts of the country. In the third year, U. S. and NATO would remove troops and rely on air, naval, and rapidly deployable ground forces to deliver over-the-horizon effects. Talking to the Practitioners. The project aims to define the contributions from key agencies, starting with the State Department and then moving on to the intelligence community and the military services. The project will solicit agencies' views on how current and future programs might contribute to the strategy, identify inter-agency processes that might facilitate the coordination of the strategy, and anticipate issues that would arise in a transition to the strategy. UNCLASSIFIED U. S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05771993 Date:08 31 2015")]
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